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WAYS TO ENSURE THE UNITARY CHARACTER IN THE EXTERNAL 
TRADE RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON ISSUES OF 
MIXED COMPETENCE BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND
ITS MEMBER STATES
ABSTRACT
Both the European Community (EC) and its Member States agree that it is in then- 
best interest to coordinate their action vis-a-vis the rest of the world in international 
agreements. This dissertation examines the law and practice of the EC external trade 
relations. The major point of analysis is to find ways to ensure the unitary character 
of the EC external trade relations in areas of mixed competence between EC 
Member States and EC Institutions as well as understand the management of the EC 
external trade relations. It begins with an analysis of the evolution of the EC 
common commercial policy, through which the author examines the checks and 
balances at the micro, meso and macro levels. The major EC Institutions are 
examined: the Commission as the negotiator of international agreements, the EU 
Council as the consultator and concluder of agreements, the European Parliament in 
its role of consultator and the role of the European Court of Justice in relation to 
shared competence between the EC and its Member States in the framework of 
international trade. The decision making process of the EU and its relation with 
national institutions are analyzed as an important part of this dissertation. The legal 
complexity of mixity is then analyzed. This unique legal phenomenon (mixed 
agreements) is tackled from an intra-EC perspective as well as from its external 
dimension, where its various implications for third parties are taken into account. 
This dissertation concludes that although the European Union is composed of 15 
sovereign Member States with unique needs and circumstances, in most cases it is in 
their national interest to give up their national sovereignty to the European level to 
have a stronger negotiating position in international negotiations. This would only be 
legally possible by amending the Treaties.
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II. Objectives and Central Argument
III. An Overview of the Thesis
IV. Methodology and Sources
V. Approach
I. Introduction
The intention of this dissertation is to study how the External Trade Relations of the 
European Community (EC) are managed. In the framework of the European Union, 
there is Community competence, national competence and mixed competence. Through
Article 133 of the EC Treaty, the European Community has been given exclusive
competence1 to create common commercial policy in the field of the external trade 
relations.2 However, this competence is not exclusive to the EC in such areas as services, 
investment and intellectual property rights, where Member States share competence with 
the EC. These cases involve so-called “mixed competence”, where competence is shared 
between the European Community and its Member States. That said, the scope of this 
dissertation is to focus on specific aspects of EC’s external trade policy, i.e., services, 
intellectual property rights and investment.
Competencies are joint because Member States prefer not to allow Community
1 For a definition of the locution “exclusive EC competence,” see infra chapter 3.
2 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), (1992) 1 
CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, February 7,1992, 
OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
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competence and, instead, preserve their national competence.3 This approach, which 
became apparent in the Court’s Opinion 2/91 on the ILO, weakens the constitutional 
position of the Community in the field of external relations.4 As long as the external 
competence has not become exclusively EC competence, Member States, even acting 
collectively, remain free to enter into multilateral treaty relations. The tensions created 
by the mixture of competencies between the EC and its Member States are seen as an 
obstacle to the achievement of Community interests as a whole, and are a problem for 
Europe’s trade partners.
Shared competence5 between the EC and its Member States implies the 
fragmentation of unity in the international representation of the Community and 
translates into less power for the EC in the international arena. On the other hand, EC 
exclusive competence facilitates international negotiations, since the Commission is the 
only competent actor in a given matter. In light of this discussion, Allan Rosas argues 
that only when the fifteen Member States “speak with one voice” can they aspire to be 
a powerful voice, and thus collaborate with the United States on equal terms.6
3 See Editorial Comments, “The Aftermath of Opinion 1/94 or how to ensure unity of representation for joint 
competencies”, (1995) 32 CMLRev, p. 386.
4 Opinion 2/91, [1993] ECR 1-1061.
5 For a definition of the locution “shared competence,” see infra chapter 3.
6 Rosas, A. “The External Relations of the European Union: Problems and Challenges” in The Forum for  
US-EU Legal-Economic Affairs, The Mentor Group, 1998, pp.59-71, at p. 59.
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II. Objectives and Central Argument
A.- Objectives
The objectives of this dissertation are to examine the circumstances under which Member 
States, regarding the negotiation of international agreements, confer the exercise of their 
national competencies on the European Commission in order to allow the EC to act with 
a single voice in its external trade relations in those areas where, according to the 
Treaties of the European Communities, there is shared competence between the Member 
States and the EC. This means, in technical terms, the fields of services, intellectual 
property rights and investment. We will analyze situations where the aim is to ensure 
single representation of the EC and its Member States in international trade negotiations 
in which their scope touches EC competence and Member States’ competence (shared 
competence). The necessary circumstance is an agreement which is a Community and a 
national agreement at the same time.7 This, inevitably, provokes a de facto confusing 
situation which I shall try to clarify throughout this dissertation.
Having said that, I would like to emphasize that the decision of Member States 
to allow the Commission to negotiate on their behalf does not imply any legal transfer 
of competencies from Member States to the Commission. It is done for mere practical 
purposes to obtain greater bargaining power in international trade negotiations. In other
7 Information gathered from an interview on February 1999 with Ramon Torrent, Professor of Political 
Economy at the University of Barcelona and Former Director responsible for the External Economic 




words, the only transfer from Member States to the Commission is the right to negotiate 
mixed agreements.8 In fact, the locution “shared competence” is perfectly compatible 
with that of “speaking with one voice.” The relation between the two is that precisely 
because of the existence of shared competence -which is a legal fact in EC law-, there 
is a procedural tendency in international trade negotiations toward speaking with one 
voice in order to obtain a stronger position.
Weiler commented in 1992 that “the EC may not speak with one voice but 
increasingly speaks like a choir.”9 As there is no article in the Treaties of the European 
Community that provides a straightforward answer to this question, there is a significant 
legal vacuum on issues of mixed competencies in the European Union (EU).10 Member 
States cede their negotiating role to the European Community negotiator, and in 
practice, it is the European Commission who negotiates. The Commission, therefore, 
attends negotiations on behalf of the EC and its Member States vis-a-vis a third party11 
without prejudice to legal competence.
B.- Argument
The hypothesis, therefore, is that Member States confer specific negotiating powers on
g
For a thorough definition of mixed agreements, see infra the chapter on The European Community and 
Mixed Agreements.
9 Weiler, J. H. H., “The Evolution of Mechanisms and Institutions for a European Foreign Policy. Reflections 
on the Interaction of Law and Politics”, European University Institute Research Paper No. 85/202, 1992.
10 For further reading on this matter, see Heliskoski, J. “Should there be a New Article on External Relations? 
Opinion 1/94, Duty of Co-operation in the Light of the Constitutive Treaties” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) 
International Law Aspects o f the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 273-87.
11 This third party has to be a non-Member State of the EU.
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the EC when it is in their own national interest to have a common European position in 
international trade negotiations. By "EC level"12 or common European position we mean 
"supranational level", and the EC is a supranational organization, or one to which the 
Member States have transferred specific legislative and executive powers and whose 
decisions are binding on them and their citizens. Member States may confer negotiating 
powers on the European Commission in international agreements where there is shared 
competence, but co-ordination is requested of Member States during all negotiations.
The national interest of Member States is, in a strict sense, the will of the national 
governments. However, in a larger sense, it is the position adopted by the civil society. For 
example, a Greek citizen may not agree with the idea of a free airspace in Europe because he 
thinks that this might endanger his country’s security vis-a-vis one of its neighbors, i.e. 
Turkey. In a broader sense, national interest implies a fight for the long-term well-being of a 
community within a society, or a fight for the maintenance and improvement of the wealth 
of that community. In the case of mixed agreements, national interest and EC interest 
coincide, so the EC and its Member States both sign the agreements in question.
For the EU, national interests vary very much depending on the historical situation 
of the country in question. The Schengen Agreement was only partially accepted by the 
United Kingdom (UK) in May 2000 for geographic and historical reasons. The UK’s 
reluctance to accept the Euro is another example of a conflict between national interests and 
European interests. The notion of national interest can also depend on governing political 
party. A right-wing British Government, for example, might be less amenable to Social Rights
12 For further details, see Drost, H. What’s w hat and Who’s who in Europe, Cassell, 1995, p. 207.
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and Benefits in the EU than a left-wing political party.
Regarding a common European interest and position, Sophie Meunier 
demonstrates13 how to KarlDeutsch and his "communitarian" followers, successive stages 
of integration could be expected to gradually build a sense of community in the region, at the 
expense of outsiders.14 By becoming socialized as "Europeans", EC policy-makers, 
negotiators and technical experts would develop ways of working that would increasingly 
isolate those who do not belong to the network. Therefore, the stronger the sense of 
European solidarity, the harder the EC would defend its position externally. Giving the EC 
and its Member States a single voice in international trade negotiations would, therefore, 
contribute to strengthening its bargaining position.15
Institutional steps have been taken recently towards greater coherence and common 
action. For example, the fact that the EC can conclude legally binding agreements with third 
parties, whether it be a State or an international organization, in its own name, including trade 
agreements, is an achievement of the 1950s that has become particularly significant in the last 
two decades.16 Many of these agreements have been concluded on legal grounds of a 
common commercial policy, Article 133 EC.17 International Agreements today may also 
involve a number of other legal bases, for example, the procedures for conclusion of
13 See Meunier, S. "Talking with a Single Voice: European Integration and EC-US Trade Negotiations", p. 
3; paper prepared for delivery at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
The Sheraton Washington Hotel, August, 28-31,1997.
14 Deutsch, K. et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton University Press, 1957.
15 See Meunier, S. "Talking with a Single Voice: European Integration and EC-US Trade Negotiations", p. 
3; paper prepared for delivery at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
The Sheraton Washington Hotel, August, 28-31,1997.
16 Wellenstein, E. ‘Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations”, Common Market Law 
Review 16,1979, pp. 407-423.
17 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7,1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), (1992) 1 
CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992,
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agreements and the role of the Commission, Council and Parliament that appear in 
Article 300 EC.18
An important example of the EC’s potential as an international actor was the 
Uruguay Round. The EC’s credibility as a meaningful player in the post-Uruguay Round 
system will depend on its ability to overcome the threat of fragmentation.19 The EC 
gained strength during the GATT talks because it was obliged to speak with one voice. 
If Member States present themselves in a non-unified way within a multilateral 
framework, their influence on world trade politics is likely to decrease. This is a concern 
as some of the international agreements concluded by the EC are also concluded by the 
Member States (the so-called “mixed agreements”), which complicates both their 
conclusion and administration.
III. An Overview of the Thesis
This dissertation is divided into two main parts, being the first one the EC External Trade 
Relations in its context. The aim of the first part is to show the legal problems raised by 
issues of shared competence and mixity throughout the history of the EC external trade 
relations. It also intends to show what implications the so-called legal phenomenon of 
“mixed agreements” has for third parties. The second part deals with the EC institutions 
with regard to EC External Trade Relations. It intends to analyze the role that the major
OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMUfcev, p. 719.
18 Ibid.
19 See Meunier, S. "Talking with a Single Voice: European Integration and EC-US Trade Negotiations", 
Abstract; paper prepared for delivery at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
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EC institutions play in the proposed field of study. Of particular interest is the role of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in relation to EC exclusive and shared competence. 
Issues such as the EC in the World Trade Organization (WTO), the jurisdiction of the 
ECJ in international trade and how international agreements in general, and the WTO 
Agreement in particular, affect EC law will be analyzed in Part II of this dissertation. In 
the last section of Part II, there is an analysis of the famous Hermes International case, 
which intends to explain the interpretation by the ECJ of a particular mixed agreement.
In the field of External Trade Relations of the European Community there are 
many examples where the Community’s and the Member States’ competence is shared, 
for example, the Food and Agriculture Organization, where Case 25/94,20 Commission 
v Council, can be used as evidence. Our interest is to analyze the ways and means that 
would ensure the unitary character of the international representation of the EC in 
situations where the competence is shared, namely in its external trade relations.
The problem arises because we are dealing with situations where the European 
Community and its Member States have international legal personality to sign 
international treaties. The question is to see when Member States of the European Union 
authorize the European Commission, the executive power of the European Union, to act 
on behalf of Member States and the Community in bilateral/multilateral mixed 
agreements. The Commission’s powers are to negotiate agreements, even if these are not 
exclusively communautaire. These agreements are eventually concluded by the EU 
Council.
Association, The Sheraton Washington Hotel, August, 28-31,1997.
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The duty of co-operation suggested by the European Court of Justice seems to 
be a rather broad formula for the achievement of a unitary character for the EC, for 
example, the Community’s post-Opinion 1/94 external relations regime. Opinion 1/94 
does not give any guidelines as to the more specific implementation of the “duty of 
cooperation”.21 Co-operation has taken place until now either ad hoc or under an 
informal “code of conduct” agreed in May 1994 between the Council, the Commission 
and the Member States at the “post-Uruguay Round” negotiations on services.22 
However, the Member States, the Council and the Commission have been unable to 
reach an agreement -in spite of numerous attempts- upon a permanent and more 
comprehensive code that would cover the Community and Member States’ participation 
in the WTO as a whole.
Nor does Opinion 1/94 indicate any provisions of either the EC Treaty or the 
Treaty on European Union in which the duty of co-operation can be found.23 To justify 
its position, the Court simply referred to its previous case-law (Ruling 1/78 on the Draft 
Convention of the International Atomic Energy Agency on Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transport, paras. 34-36 24 and Opinion 2/91 on ILO 
Convention 170 on Chemicals at Work, para. 3625).26
20 [1996] ECR 1-1469, para. 48.
21 [1994] ECR 1-5267.
22 See European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Union 1994, pt. 990. The 
code has never been officially published but the text is cited in Part XVII of the “Description of the Request” 
(“Questions put by the Court to the Commission, the Council and the Member States and the answers given 
to those questions”), Opinion 1/94, at pp. 5365-5366.
23 [1994] ECR 1-5267.
24 Ruling 1/78 of 14 November 1978, [1978] ECR 2151.
25 Opinion 2/91 of 19 March 1993, (1993) CMLRev 800.
26 Professor Jacques HJ. Bourgeois has been very critical in this respect: see Bourgeois, J. H. J. “The EC 
in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: an Echtemach Procession”, (1995) 32 CMLRev, 763 at p. 785;
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Where competence is shared between the EC and its Member States, both 
Member States and the EC are obliged to seek a common position. Coordination of their 
positions is indispensable to prevent inconsistencies or even mutual blockage within the 
framework of an international organization.27 According to the ECJ, this requirement of 
unity in the international representation of the three Communities shows the importance 
of co-operation or close association between the Member States and the EC institutions 
in the negotiation or conclusion of agreements and in the fulfillment of commitments at 
the international level.28 Community and Member States, since they have an obligation 
to co-operate, must attempt to organize harmoniously their coexistence in international 
organizations in which they share membership and competence, such as the WTO,29 as 
stated in Opinion 2/91.30
As for the fulfillment of commitments at the international level, Opinion 1/94 (Re 
WTO Agreement)31 describes how Community and Member States are each other’s 
prisoners. The one cannot act without the other. Achieving a common position of 
Member States is a sine qua non for Community action.
Bourgeois, J. H. J. ‘The Uruguay Round Results from a European Lawyers’ Perspective: an Introduction” 
in Bourgeois, J. H. J. et a l (eds.) The Uruguay Round Results. A European Lawyers ’ Perspective, European 
University Press, 1995, p. 19. See also Kuijper, P. J. “The Conclusion and Implementation of the Uruguay 
Round Results by the European Community” (1995) 6 EJIL 222 at pp. 242-243; Hilf, M. “The ECJ’s 
Opinion on the WTO -N o Surprise, but Wise?”, (1995) 6 EJIL 245 at p. 258; Dutheil de la Rochere, J. 
“L’ere des competences partagees. A propos de l’etendue des competences exterieures de la Communaute 
europeenne”, (1995) 390 RMUE 461 at p. 470; Maunu, A. “The Implied External Competence of the 
European Community After the ECJ Opinion 1/94 -Towards Coherence or Diversity?” (1995) 2 LIEI115 
at p. 126; Macleod, I., HendryJ. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p. 145.
27 See Editorial Comments, “The Aftermath of Opinion 1/94 or how to ensure unity of representation for joint 
competencies”, (1995) 32 CMLRev, p. 386.
28 [1994] ECR 1-5267.
29 See Editorial Comments, “The Aftermath of Opinion 1/94 or how to ensure unity of representation for joint 
competencies”, (1995) 32 CMLRev, p. 385.
30 [1993] ECR 1-1061, at para. 36.
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This “duty to co-operate” is an obligation imposed on Member States and 
Community institutions under Community Law. Formerly, the repealed Article 116 
EEC32 was available for that purpose.33 It obliged Member States to proceed within the 
framework of international organizations of an economic character on matters of 
particular interest to the common market only by common action. However, Article 116 
EEC Treaty has been regrettably deleted at Maastricht. It had proven to be a useful legal 
basis for coordination of actions of Member States and the Community in the no-man’s- 
land of dubious demarcation between Community and national competencies, or where 
the exercise of these competencies was inextricably linked (for instance, the international 
commodities agreements in application of the so-called Proba 20).34
However, Article 116 EEC Treaty was not one of the most transparent 
provisions of the Treaty. Where the Community was not able to act because it was not 
a member of the relevant organization, Member States would have to act on its behalf, 
and the necessary Community action was decided on the basis of Article 133 TEC, not 
Article 116 EEC Treaty. There is a similar issue in Article 12 TEU in relation to matters 
falling within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Article 33 TEU 
in relation to common positions in international organizations and at international 
conferences in various fields covered by Title VI of the TEU.35
With regard to Part II of this dissertation, an important issue to mention, in order
31 [1995] 1 CMLR 205 at para. 108.
32 Hereinafter the repealed Article 116 EEC will be addressed as “Article 116 EEC.”
33 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7,1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), (1992) 1 
CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, 




to better understand the complexity of European integration, is the veto power assigned 
to EC Member States. It is worth mentioning the French policy of chaise vide, which 
was eventually reflected institutionally in the Compromis de Luxembourg. France, by 
refusing to participate in the EC decision-making process, effectively blocked a series of 
decisions.36 The Single European Act of 1987, the Council practice of 1985 and 
Maastricht represent a reduction of Member State participation, by moving from 
unanimity to a qualified majority requirement. Weiler points out in his book The 
Constitution of Europe that EC Member States are less willing today to accept ERTA- 
type decisions by the ECJ.37 In theses decisions, EC Member States, by transferring 
sovereignty over a given issue to the EC, implicitly acknowledged that the EC can 
exercise sovereignty over the issue at an international level.38
Authors such as Weiler argue against the popular belief that the 1970s were 
nothing much to the history of European integration and everything started after Casis 
de Dijon?9 During that time, the ECJ was the most influential international/supranational 
court, the Commission was assuming its role of the engine of the integration process and 
the European Parliament was requesting more institutional powers. The Council found 
itself more and more restrained in the Community game, probably against the original 
design of some Member States who regarded the EU Council as an ultima ratio, a refuge
35 Treaty on European Union, February 7,1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
36 Mavroidis, P. “Lexcalibur: The House that Joe Built”, Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law, Vol. 38, 
2000, Number 3, pp. 670-671.
37 Weiler, J. H. H  The Constitution o f Europe. "Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?" and Other Essays
on European Integration, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
38 Mavroidis, P. “Lexcalibur: The House that Joe Built”, Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law, Vol. 38, 
2000, Number 3, p. 671.
39 Case 120/78 REWE Central v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649.
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of nationalism. However, the EC was established originally on an unquestionable transfer 
of sovereignty from Member States to the EC,40 with only the doctrine of implied powers 
as a caveat. Provisions that do not specify exactly what has been transferred to the EC, 
such as Article 308 EC, nevertheless constitute an explicit limitation of national 
sovereignty.41
According to Weiler, Member States are not prepared to live in a world in which 
the Community assumes that it is competent. Proof competence is necessary from now 
on. Opinion 1/94 is a good example 42 The EU Council challenged the Commission and 
requested that the Court establish a clear dividing line between the Community’s and the 
Member States’ competence with respect to trade liberalization for purposes of 
ratification and future negotiations. The outcome was a shock to many: the 
Commission’s powers in the field of services and intellectual property rights were 
severely curtailed. Had the ECJ’s interpretation of the ERTA doctrine been more 
expansive, it would have supported a more pro-Community view. In the post-Opinion 
1/94 period, Member States have worked more closely together in international trade 
issues. There are signs that the Commission is more cautious now. A new code of 
conduct has evolved in this field, regulating the interaction between the Commission and 
EC Member States.43
The Community as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts. According to
40 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 is a clear example of transfer of sovereignty to the EC, although
limited.
41 Mavroidis, P. “Lexcalibur: The House that Joe Built”, Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law, Vol. 38, 
2000, Number 3, p. 673.
42 [1994] ECR 1-5267.
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Mavroidis, even Germany has much more weight as the EC’s leading economy than it 
would by itself in international economic relations.44 Even when EC Member States are 
loyal to the European integration process, they will continue to call into question the 
precise limits of Community competence in a world of qualified majorities. In this sense, 
the ECJ has an important role to play.45
IV. Methodology and Sources
For the conduction of this research, I shall make an analysis of the Treaties of the European 
Communities and the case-law of the European Court of Justice (mainly the analysis of 
Opinion 1/94 and Case C-53/96 Hermes International v FHTMarketing). Later on the 
dissertation we shall see how much power was given by the ECJ to the Member States 
in mixed agreements. We shall see how this was a surprise mainly to national 
Administrations, who were not aware of the degree of their competencies on these 
issues. The main articles, in the case of the Treaty of Rome, dealing with the External 
Relations of the Union are Article 111 (repealed), Article 133, Article 300 and Article 
310. As for the legal personality of the EU, we shall examine Article 24 TEU. In any 
case, political aspects (which will also be taken into consideration) have a vital importance
43 Mavroidis, P. “Lexcalibur: The House that Joe Built”, Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law, Vol. 38, 
2000, Number 3, pp. 673-74.
44 Ibid. at p. 674.
45 A good example is the experience in banning cigarette advertising. See Weiler, J. H. H. The Constitution 
o f  Europe. "Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?" and Other Essays on European Integration, 




Primary sources such as The Annotated Summary of Agreements linking the 
Communities with Non-Member countries, together with The Participation of the 
European Communities in Multilateral Agreements, published by the European 
Commission, Directorate General for External Relations, DG 1 A, Brussels, in June 1997, 
will enable me to have a compendium of the bilateral and multilateral mixed agreements 
signed within the framework of the European Union. Case-law of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), privileged material of legal analysis, was at first unusual and, now that it exists, 
it has become controversial. Opinions from the European Court of Justice will be of great 
value for the interpretation of the Treaties. Interviews with desk officials (negotiators) from 
national delegations (COREPER and working groups) and from the European Commission 
(Directorate General for External Relations) as well as from the Council will also be part of 
primary sources.
The consultation of official and working documents from EU national parliaments and 
EC institutions, such as the Council’s General Secretariat, together with conclusions of the 
European Council, speeches and statements fromEU commissioners and national politicians 
will also be taken into consideration. As for other sources, secondary source literature 
specialised in the External Relations of the Union as well as articles from newspapers such 
as Financial Times, The Times and International Herald Tribune will also be a support 
for this dissertation.




There are various ways of looking at the issue of mixed agreements.47 There is the 
perspective of third countries. Here, analyses such as the fact that third countries have 
entered into an increasing number of agreements with the European Community without 
the participation of its Member States will be a centre of attraction. According to Article 
300 (2) EC, European Community agreements with third countries are binding on the 
European Community institutions as well as on Member States. As for implementation, 
measures are to be adopted either by the European Community institutions or by 
Member States. I shall see to what extent third countries are less likely to insist on mixed 
agreements when they see that the European Community has the means to ensure 
compliance with European Community commitments in issues that are to be taken by the 
Member States.
A second perspective is the political science one. This would be the approach of 
a federal system, proposed by Joseph Weiler.48
The third perspective is a politico-institutional one. The mixed agreements 
preserve the power and legal capacity of the Member States in order to protect their own
Typologie, Editions de 1’Universite de Bruxelles, 1980, p. 11.
47See Bourgeois, J.HJ. “Mixed Agreements: A New Approach?’ in Bourgeois, J.H.J., Dewost, J. & Gaiffe, 
M. La Communaute europeenne et les accords mixtes, Quelles perspectives?, Presses Interuniversitaires 
Europeennes, 1997, pp. 83-91.
48 See Weiler, J. H. H. “The External Legal Relations of Non-unitary Actors: Mixity and the Federal 
Principle”, in O'Keeffe, D & Schermers, M., Mixed Agreements, Deventer, Leiden, 1983, p. 35-83 at 80.
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interests against qualified majority decisions by the Council of Ministers. Mixed 
agreements also allow Member States to better control the Commission in its negotiating 
role.
A fourth perspective is based on positive law. Therefore, it allows a discussion 
from a common basis about the law as it stands. Florence Zampini gives a clear analysis 
of it.
The fifth perspective is the efficiency perspective, which advocates extending the 
concept to other external policy areas and leaving on one side the mixed agreements 
formula.
It should also be useful to see every single approach and study their strengths and 
weaknesses. Main actors such as interest groups and their influence on the European 
Community international relations will be an important part of this research. To study the 
European Union actors’ interests at 3 levels (international, Community and national 
level), the national bureaucratic interest in Article 133 Committee, Comitology, how 
control can be exercised, theories on supranationalism, issues of competence, i.e. who 
sits on the negotiations are things at which I will be looking. As for Comitology, it is a 
method of implementing legislation in the European Union. It describes the practice of 
delegating the implementation of decisions reached by the European Commission to 
committees composed of officials from the Member States. The Commission is 
responsible for carrying out decisions adopted by the Council of Ministers, the European 
Union's main legislative body, and has some legislative powers of its own.49
49 Drost, H. What's what and who's who in Europe, Cassell, 1995.
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CHAPTER I: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADING SYSTEM
I. Introduction
II. The European Community in the World Trade Organization
HI. The Problem of the EC in its External Trade Relations
A.- The “Duty of close Co-operation” in the External Relations of the 
Communities
A.I.- Community Co-ordination 
A.2.- Close Co-operation and Unity
B.- Doctrine of the French Conseil Constitutionnel
IV. Allocation of Competencies between the EC and its Member States in EC 
Trade Policy
I. Introduction
This chapter aims at giving an insight to the EC’s position within GATT and the WTO 
generally. In section II, we will see the general view that the EC’s specific problems and 
challenges for the ECJ are related on the one hand to the EC’s position in the WTO. In 
this sense, the opinion of Advocate General Tesauro with regard to Case Hermes 
International v FHT Marketing Choice is helpful for understanding the unitary character 
of the EC external trade relations: “The Community legal system is characterized by the 
simultaneous application of provisions of various origins, international, Community and
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national; but it nevertheless seeks to function and to represent itself to the outside world 
as a unified system.” 1
Section III shows more specifically the problem that the EC faces in its external 
trade relations. The so-called “duty of close cooperation” and unity in the Communities’ 
external relations will be analyzed.
II. The European Community in the World Trade Organization
When looking at the history of the EC External Trade relations, one sees that the EC 
was not a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 
(GATT). However, the EC Member States were full members of such institution. Over 
the years, the EC has become full member and a contracting party to the GATT/WTO. 
Accession protocols and trade agreements negotiated in the GATT framework provided 
in their final provisions that the agreements were open for acceptance by contracting 
parties to the GATT and by the EC. In addition, the substantive and procedural 
provisions of these Agreements treat the EC like a GATT contracting party.”2
Furthermore, since 1970, most agreements negotiated in the framework of 
GATT were accepted by the EC alone, without acceptance by EC Member States. The 
only exception is two agreements at the end of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade
1 Tesauro AG in Case C-53/96 Hermes International v FHT Marketing Choice BV, [1998] ECR 1-3603, 
]3ara. 21.
See Bourgeois, J.HJ. “The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challenges” in 
Weiler, J.H.H. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law of International Trade?, 
Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 72.
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negotiations and the part of the Tariff Protocol relating to ECSC products.3 The EC 
exercised all rights and fulfilled almost all obligations under GATT law in its own name 
like a GATT contracting party.4 Since the 1960s all GATT contracting parties had 
accepted such exercise of rights and fulfillment of obligations by the EC and had 
asserted their own GATT rights, even in dispute settlement proceedings relating to 
measures of individual EC Member States, almost always against the EC.5 The EC has 
replaced, with the consent of other GATT contracting parties, its Member States as 
bearers of rights and obligations under the GATT.
During the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade negotiations, the EC was faced 
with the issue of the scope of its authority under the EC Treaty in the field of 
international economic relations, particularly with respect to trade in services and 
intellectual property rights. Negotiations were conducted according to the normal 
procedures for GATT negotiations, albeit that the European Commission negotiated on 
behalf of both the EC and its Member States.6 By creating the WTO as an international 
organization, formal international consequences emerged in several respects: first of all, 
the fact that the EC would become a member of the WTO; second of all, the EC would 
replace the EC Member States.
3
See Bourgeois, J.HJ. “The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriers and on Government 
Procurement”, 19 CML Rev.(1982) 5 at 22.
4
See Bourgeois, J.HJ. “The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challenges” in 
Weiler, J.H.H. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law o f  International Trade?, 
Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 72.
5 See Petersmann, E.U. “The EEC as a GATT Member -Legal Conflicts between GATT law and 
European Community Law” in Hilf, M., Jacobs, F.G. & Petersmann, E.U. The European Community and 
GATT, (Kluwer, Deventer, 1986), 23 at 37-8.
6 See van den Bossche, P. “The European Community and the Uruguay Round Agreements” in Jackson, 
J.H. & Sykes, A. (eds.) Implementing the Uruguay Round, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, 23 at 56-7.
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With regard to the latter point, two constraints of political nature led the 
European Commission not to stand up. The first constraint was the fact that the matter 
was discussed in a meeting of the EU Council in November 1993, “after the Maastricht 
Treaty had entered into effect with some difficulty and it was thought wise not to push 
this issue at that stage.”7 The second political constraint was that around this time, the 
Council had not yet approved the Uruguay Round and Sir Leon Brittan thought it was 
preferable not to put on the table another contentious issue. As a result was the creation 
of Article XI of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, which states that the 
contracting parties to GATT 1947 and the European Communities shall become original 
Members of the WTO.8
This dual membership by the EC and its Member States of the WTO may be an 
open door for abuse by other WTO members and a handicap for both the EC and its 
Member States. The fact that the EC Member States are WTO Members together with 
the EC poses questions in relation to the position of the ECJ to the WTO law. As far as 
GATT 1947 was concerned, and as a result of the substitution of the EC for the Member 
States in relation to commitments under GATT, the ECJ would have the final word on 
the interpretation of the GATT provisions, even in relation to the compatibility of 
Member States legislation with GATT.9 However, this argument is no longer possible. 
In accordance with Article XI of the Agreement establishing the WTO, both the EC and 
its Member States signed the Final Act.
7
See Bourgeois, J.HJ. “The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challenges” in 
Weiler, J.H.H. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law o f International Trade?, 
Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 72.
8 WTO, The Uruguay Round Results. The Legal Texts. (Geneva, 1995), 6.
9
See Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Societa Petrolifera Italiana (SPI) and SpA Michelin
34
The EC in the International Trading System Rafael Leal-Areas
Chapter 1
The ECJ has stated that the division of powers between the EC and its Member 
States is a domestic question in which third parties have no need to intervene.10 In the 
minutes of the Council meeting 7/8 March 1994, the Commission relied on this 
argument by saying that:
The Final Act...and the Agreements thereto fall exclusively  within 
the com petence o f  the European Community.”11
This argument does not allow the a sensu contrario inference that because the 
Member States and the EC are formally WTO Members, it is irrelevant for the division 
of powers within the EC legal system. On the contrary, the Agreement establishing the 
WTO and the agreements that form part of it were approved by the Council on behalf of 
the EC expressly “as regards matters within its competence.”12 Therefore, the need to 
have a useful raison d ’etre to the joint WTO membership of the EC and the Member 
States is inevitable. It must have something to do with the division of powers within the 
EC.
III. The Problem of the EC in its External Trade Relations
In this subtitle we shall see the view of the European Court of Justice with regard to 
agreements where some of their provisions are EC competence, while others remain as 
competence of the Member States. Unfortunately, although the Court deals with the
Italiana SAMI) [1983] ECR 801, paras 15 and 17.
10 Ruling 1/78 [1978] ECR 2151, para. 35.
11 Cited in the ECJ Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR 1-5267, para. 5.
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issue throughout its case law, it does not say how to solve the problem. The view of a 
national Court (the French Conseil Constitutionnel) on this matter shall be analyzed and 
will help us understand the practice of this issue.
A.- The “Duty of close Co-operation” in the External Relations of the Communities
As mentioned earlier, the notion of European identity has not yet coalesced to the point 
that it is possible to speak of a common good for the entire EU. For this reason, the 
European Court of Justice, in its Opinion 1/94 upon the WTO,13 emphasizes the duty of 
co-operation between the Member States and the Community institutions. The European 
Court of Justice stated that:
“...it is essential to  ensure close co-operation between the M ember States 
and the Community institutions, both in the process o f  negotiation and 
conclusion and in the fulfillm ent o f the commitments entered into. That 
obligation to co-operate flow s from requirement o f  unity in the 
international representation o f  the Com m unity...”14
Since the essence of mixed agreements15 is that some of their provisions fall 
within the competence of the Community, while others fall within the competence of the 
Member States, it is hard to precisely divide powers between the Member States and the 
Communities within an agreement. The European Court of Justice has discouraged
* Council Decision of 22 December 1998 (OJ 1994 L 336/1).
13 Opinion 1/94, competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services 
and intellectual property (15 November 1994), [1994] ECR 1-5267.
14 Opinion 1/94, para. 108.
15 Let us remember that a mixed agreement is an agreement signed by one, more than one or all the 15 
Member States of the EU and the European Community, on the European side, with a third party. For a 
more detailed definition, see infra chapter 3.
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attempts to allocate competence between the Member States and the Community, Ruling 
1/78.16 Instead, when considering issues dealing with mixed agreements, the Court has 
emphasized the need for common action, or close co-operation, between the Community 
and its Member States “in close association” with each other in the negotiation and 
implementation of mixed agreements.17 The duty of co-operation, which follows from 
what the Court calls the “requirement of unity in the international representation of the 
Community,”18 is one of the fundamental principles of the external relations of the 
Communities.
As for the origins of the duty of close co-operation, they may be tracked back to 
the Treaties themselves, particularly to the duty of loyal co-operation derived by the 
Court from Articles 86 ECSC, 192 Euratom and 10 EC.19 A similar duty is contained in 
Article 3 TEU, where the Council and the Commission are responsible for ensuring the 
consistency of the external activities of the Union as a whole in the context of its 
external relations, security, economic and development policies. This duty applies as 
much to mixed agreements as to any other area of the Union’s activity.
With regard to mixed agreements, the duty of close co-operation first emerged 
in Ruling 1/78. The Court had to adjudicate on the division of powers between Euratom 
and the Member States with regard to a draft Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Materials.20 The Court said that “the draft convention...can be implemented as 
regards the Community only by means of a close association between the institutions of
16 Re Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials) at paragraph 35 (in relation to 
third parties, [1978] ECR 2151.
17 O'Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983.
18 Ruling 1/78, paragraphs 34-36 as well as Opinion 2/91, [1993] ECR 1-1061, at para. 5.
19 For fiirther discussion on the duty of loyal co-operation, see Kapteyn, P. J. G. & VerLoren van 
Themaat, P. Introduction to the Law o f the European Communities, Kluwer, 1982, chapter ID, 5.2.
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the Community and the Member States both in the process of negotiation and 
conclusion and in the fulfillment of the obligations entered into”.21 Regarding the 
implementation of the convention, the Court said that the Community would implement 
measures falling within its competence, the Member States would implement measures 
falling within their competence, and the Council would arrange for coordination of the 
actions of each.22
The Court had to face an agreement which covered matters falling within the 
exclusive competence of the Community, matters where both the Community and its 
Member States shared competence, and matters within the competence of the Member 
States in Opinion 2/91 (Re ILO Convention 170).23 The Court said as follows:
At paragraphs 34 to 36 in Ruling 1/78, the Court pointed out that when it 
appears that the subject matter of an agreement falls in part within the 
competence of the Community and in part within the competence of the 
Member States, it is important to ensure that there is a close association 
between the institutions of the Community and the Member States both in 
the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfillment of the 
obligations entered into. This duty of co-operation, to which attention was 
drawn in the context of the EAEC Treaty, must also apply in the context 
of the EEC Treaty since it results from the requirement of unity in the 
international representation of the Community.
(37) In this case, cooperation between the Community and the 
Member States is all the more necessary in view of the fact that the former 
cannot, as international law stands at present, itself conclude an ILO 
Convention and must do so through the medium of the Member States.
(38) It is therefore for the Community institutions and the Member 
States to take all the measures necessary so as best to ensure such co­
operation both in the procedure of submission to the competent authority24 
and ratification of Convention 170 and in the implementation of
25commitments resulting from that Convention.
20 Ruling 1/78, [1978] ECR 2151.
21 Ibid., at para. 34.
22 Ibid., at para. 36.
23 [1993] ECR 1-1061.
24 i.e. in the ILO.
25 Opinion 2/91, paragraphs 36 ff, [1993] ECR 1-1061.
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The agreement under consideration in Opinion 2/91 was not a mixed agreement 
stricto sensu. The Community could not formally become a party to it. This limitation 
may stem from ILO provisions restricting membership and participation only to States. 
However, the agreement did involve matters within the competence of the Community 
and of the Member States.
The issue of co-operation between the Member States and the Community 
institutions was raised even more acutely in Opinion 1/94. The Commission raised the 
issue of potential problems regarding the administration of the various agreements that 
were part of the WTO package, if the Community and the Member States were to share 
competence to participate in the conclusion of the GATS and TRIPS agreements. 
According to the Commission, the Community’s unity of action vis-a-vis the rest of the 
world would be undermined and its negotiating power greatly weakened if the Member 
States were allowed to express their own views in the WTO, or if the Community 
position had to always be adopted by consensus.27 According to the Commission, the 
Community should have sole responsibility for conclusion of the agreement.
The Court responded to the Commission’s concern by saying:
first, that any problems which may arise in implementation of the WTO 
Agreement and its annexes as regards the co-ordination necessary to 
ensure unity of action where the Community and the Member States 
participate jointly cannot modify the answer to the question of 
competence, that being a prior issue...
(108) Next, where it is apparent that the subject matter of an 
agreement or convention falls in part within the competence of the 
Community and in part within that of the Member States, it is essential to
26 Opinion 2/91, paragraph 1, [1993] ECR 1-1061.
27 Bourgeois, J. H. J. “The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: an Echtemach Procession”, 
Common Market Law Review 32, 1995, pp. 763-787.
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ensure close co-operation between the Member States and the Community 
institutions, both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the 
fulfillment of the commitments entered into. That obligation flows from 
the requirement of unity in the international representation of the 
Community...
(109) The duty to co-operate is all the more imperative in the case of 
agreements such as those annexed to the WTO Agreement, which are
inextricably interlinked, and in view of the cross retaliation measures
28established by the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
Therefore, the basic principle is that in all aspects of the negotiation, conclusion 
and implementation of a mixed agreement, the Member States and the Community are 
required to co-operate closely and act in close association. This duty of co-operation 
applies to agreements involving any of the Communities, and is binding on the 
institutions of the Community as well as the Member States.
A.L- Community Co-ordination
Both Member States and the EC institutions are obliged to inform each other of their 
positions, to seek to reach a common view on matters that fall within the scope of a 
mixed agreement, and to proceed by common action within the framework of 
international bodies. This involves meetings between the representatives of the 
Member States and the institutions (usually the Commission) to seek a common 
position. These meetings are called Community co-ordination and take place within the 
framework of the Council* either in Brussels or an international forum in which the 
Community and the Member States are participants. The latter is known as sur place
28 One of the Agreements that make up the WTO package.
29 O'Keeffe, D. “Community and Member State Competence in External Relations Agreements of the 
EU”, European Foreign Affairs Review 4, 1999, pp. 7-36.
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coordination. Community co-ordination in the negotiation of international agreements is 
well established in practice. There are informal understandings between the Commission 
and the Council. For example, there are co-ordination arrangements in international 
commodity agreements and in international organizations, particularly in the FAO and 
the UN.
A.2.- Close Co-operation and Unity
Trying to reach an agreement on a common position will inevitably lead to difficulties 
and disagreements. For example, a Member State may wish to take a position different 
from that of the Community and its partners during the negotiation of an agreement. An 
agreement also may not be of equal relevance among all the Member States. Therefore, 
the question arises whether the duty of cooperation requires all the Member States to 
reach a common position or just to use their best effort to reach such a position. In the 
end, each Member State will have to defend its own interests. It is important to 
distinguish between failure to agree on a position on matters falling within the exclusive 
competence of the EC, and failure to agree on a common position on matters where the 
Community and Member States share competencies. With regard to matters exclusively 
within the Member State competence, the EC Treaties have in principle nothing to say 
(although the provisions of Titles V and VITEU may be relevant).30
In those cases where a common position between the Community and the 
Member States is not possible, Member States will be able to express their own national
30 Pescatore, P. “Opinion 1/94 on “Conclusion” of the WTO Agreement: is there an Escape from a
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views on matters within national competence and exercise their national powers. 
Support for this proposition may be derived from the practice of the EU Council. In any 
case, there is always a duty to search for a common position. However, if a common 
position cannot be reached, Member States have the residual right to express national 
positions, as can be seen from the informal co-ordination arrangements agreed on for
4
Community and Member State participation in organizations such as the FAO. In 
addition, there could be cases in which a Member State might claim that its participation 
in an agreement was contrary to its national interests or for some other reason 
undesirable or even impossible.
B.- Doctrine of the French Conseil Constitutionnel
Ruling Number 37-394 DC, of December 31, 1997, of the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel, on the required Constitutional revisions for ratification of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam,31 illustrates some of the problems mentioned above. On one hand, the 
ruling corrects Article 88-1 of the French Constitution from the constitutional Act of 
June 25, 1992, on the division of competencies between the Community and the 
Member States. By that provision, the Community will only be a simple mechanism to 
“exercise in common” certain Member States’ competencies, and the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel refers consistently to the “transfer of competencies” from the French 
State to the Community.32 On the other hand, the Conseil Constitutionnel continues to
programmed Disaster?”, Common Market Law Review  36, 1999, pp. 387-405.
Official Journal of the French Republic of 3 January 1998, p. 165.
32 See “Appendice HI: Deux Commentaires a la Doctrine du Conseil Constitutionnel Francais” in Torrent,
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develop the thesis by which “the necessary conditions to exercise national sovereignty” 
are not affected by the transfer of competencies itself but by the types of exercise of 
these competencies. This would be affected if the Council adopted decisions by 
qualified majority but not if unanimity was used. This thesis had already been 
introduced by the Conseil Constitutionnel in its previous Ruling on the Treaty of 
Maastricht.
There are three problems with this thesis. First of all, Ruling Number 37-394 DC 
of December 31, 1997 of the French Conseil Constitutionnel is relevant to the external 
economic relations of the EC because it tries to show that the Community will be a 
mechanism used to obtain a common position between the EC and its Member States in 
certain domains. The ruling states that there will be a transfer of competencies from the 
national to the Community level. Secondly, had the European Court of Justice, in its 
Opinion 1/94 on the division of competencies between the Community and the Member 
States regarding the agreements from the negotiations in the Uruguay Round, taken a 
position stating that the exclusive EC competence covered the integrity of the 
agreements, the consequence for the French State would have been that it would not 
have had competencies. Therefore, it would not have been able to become a member of 
the World Trade Organization.
Finally, the “constitutional” problem is that of the existence, the nature (whether 
exclusive or non-exclusive) and the limits of EC competencies and not of the exercise of 
EC competencies. The exercise of EC competencies is primarily a political problem, in 
which the juridical-constitutional apriorisms are often bad advisors. As Professor
R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans I'Union Europeenne,
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Torrent points out, the requirement of unanimity in the Council is seen by some as a 
guarantee of the ability to block the action of a majority that is against the interest of the 
French Government. However, the example could be reversed: unanimity allows the 
representative of a Government of any other Member State to block the action of a 
majority where the French Government participates.
In the case of EC exclusive competencies, blocking Community action cannot be 
compensated for by an action at the national level. In such a case, preference for 
unanimity or qualified majority depends on seeing if in the near future it will be more 
beneficial to “block others” (by choosing inaction) or to run the risk of “being blocked 
by others” (and being condemned to inaction).34 This is a question of a political nature 
and not a juridical-constitutional question.
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IV. 1967-1977: The Period of the “Merger”, the End of the Transitional
Period of the EEC and the Transitional Period after the First
Enlargement
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I. Introduction
In this chapter, the evolution of the external trade relations of the EC shall be 
analyzed from its starting days. The EC has become an important actor on the 
international scene, and since the 1970s, its external relations have been growing 
both in number of agreements signed and domains of participation. The European 
Communities have participated in an important number of multilateral conventions 
within the framework of the international or regional organizations, and are 
increasingly present in world affairs. In the context of multilateral relations, they 
have a growing role.1
1 European Commission, Participation des Communautes Europeennes aux Accords Multilareaux, 
Direction General I A, 1997, Introduction.
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An important part of this chapter is devoted to a historic analysis of Article 
133 EC. We will divide this chapter into different periods of the history of the 
European Community. We begin with the period when the new entities called the 
European Community started to find their way in the complex world of international 
relations, with a starting date of 1952 (section II). The next period (1958-1967) is the 
time in which the three Communities worked in parallel (section III) and the EEC 
was seen as a major negotiating power in world affairs. 1967-1977 is the period of 
the merger of the Communities (section IV). Next, there is a quick overview of the 
evolution of the external relations, and finally, we will analyze the most recent 
developments of the EU in the international scenario (section V).
II. 1952-1958: The ECSC as a Pioneer
The powers attributed to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
specifically to its High Authority in the field of the external relations, were limited to 
the economic sectors covered by the Treaty of Paris. These powers were also limited 
in nature. Articles 71-75 ECSC3 merely grant the institutions to have recourse to 
specific interventions to avoid undesirable situations. The founders of the ECSC paid 
attention to its relations with the rest of the world, the Western world in particular. 
Jean Monnet, the first president of the ECSC High Authority, never considered the 
refusal of the UK to join the ECSC as a final “no” to the concept of European 
integration. On the contrary, he set out to establish a close working relationship with
2 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), (1992)
1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, February 7,
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the UK Government and rejected any kind of distinction between members and non­
members, who were called “third countries.”4
During this period, there were questions as to the right of the High Authority 
to receive foreign envoys.5 Days after the High Authority started its work, UK and 
US diplomatic missions were accredited to the ECSC, and these were later followed 
by others, including Austrian, Swiss, Swedish, and Danish missions. However, by 
the autumn of 1952, a problem confronted the ECSC, the UK Government was 
tabling the so-called “Edenplan”, by which the Council of Ministers and the 
Common Asssembly of the ECSC would function as a kind of inner circle of the 
Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. It 
had to be decided which institution would be entitled to deal with the UK 
Government and with the Council of Europe on these issues.6 Since the Treaty did 
not deal with this problem, it was necessary to obtain advice from three prominent 
international lawyers, Maitre Reuter, Professor Ophuls and Professor Rossi. They 
concluded that the High Authority would conduct the negotiations on these matters 
when referring to the institutional organization of the ECSC.
The US Government’s invitation to the High Authority to visit Washington in 
the summer of 1953 was another event that contributed to the establishment of the 
ECSC’s international position. The then-President of the High Authority and two of 
his advisers met with President Eisenhower and members of his cabinet, as well as
1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
3 The ECSC was created by the Treaty of Paris, 1952.
4 Wellenstein, E. ‘Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations,” CMLRev 16 
(1979), p. 408.
5 Castanos de Medicis, S. Principes et Problemes de Relations Internationales Europeermes, Editions 
A. Pedone, 1965.
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with influential members of Congress. The US administration was already 
supporting European efforts towards integrated policies, of which the ECSC was the 
first example.7 During this period, the High Authority also negotiated the 
Association Agreement of 1954 with the UK, and other important arrangements with
Q
Austria, Switzerland and Sweden on various issues relating to coal and steel 
markets.
From there, the EC continued to increase its political efforts. With regard to 
external representation, the High Authority opened a delegation at the ambassadorial 
level in London, when the “Association Agreement” was concluded with the UK, set 
up an Information Office in Washington, and established a liaison office for Latin 
America in Santiago, Chile.
HI. 1958-1967: The Three Communities Working in Parallel
A.- Euratom in the External Policies of the Communities
The second of the Treaties of Rome of 1957, which established the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom), played a vital role in the development of the 
Communities’ external relations. The Euratom Treaty contains the most 
comprehensive provisions for foreign relations of the three treaties setting up the
6 Feld, W. The European Community in World Affairs. Economic Power and Political Influence, 
Alfred Publishing Co., Inc., 1976.
7 Weidenfeld, W. America and Europe: Is the Break Inevitable? Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 
1996.
8 Agreement on the introduction of international railway tariffs for the carriage of coal through Swiss 
territory, OJ ESCS 17/57, p. 223.
48
History and Evolution of the EC External Trade Relations Rafael Leal-Areas 
Chapter 2
European Communities, including the EEC Treaty.9 The Euratom Treaty reads as 
follows:
The Community may, within the limits of its powers and jurisdiction, 
enter into obligations by concluding agreements or contracts with a 
third State, an international organisation or a national of a third State.10
Following the Directives given by the Council, it is the Commission which 
negotiates and concludes such agreements today, except those which can be 
implemented without the Council in the framework of the existing budget. However, 
under the EEC Treaty, it is the Council that concludes such agreements. Additional 
provisions address mixed agreements and limitations on the treaty-making power of 
the Member States.
In the early years of Euratom, a number of important agreements were signed 
concerning the supply of enriched uranium, with the U.S. in 1959 and with Canada.11 
For example, the Agreement between Canada and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EAEC) was signed for co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy.12 In the implementation of these agreements, security plays an important 
role. It was the preservation of the control system at the Community level that 
necessitated successful negotiations during the late 1960s and early 1970s with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna and Brussels.
An example is the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
9 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), (1992) 
1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, February 7, 
1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
10 See Chapter X on External Relations, Article 101, para. 1 of the Euratom Treaty.
11 Henig, S. External Relations o f the European Community. Associations and Trade Agreements, 
Chatham House: PEP, 1971.
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the European Community for Atomic Energy and the IAEA in application of 
paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article III of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons.13 The implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons required control arrangements which came into existence in the so-called 
“Verification Agreement” between Euratom, some of its Member States and the 
IAEA. It was a mixed agreement based on Art. 102 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community.14 The provisions of the Euratom Treaty as 
well as the main agreements concluded in the late 1950s on that basis still had 
importance in the late 1970s for the external policy of the Community.15
B.- The Emergence of the EEC as a Major Negotiating Partner in World Affairs16
In the ECSC Treaty, the idea of a common market is based on “harmonized” tariffs, 
where the tariffs of Member States may not differ more than the cost of transport 
between their territories.17 However, the EEC, as a customs union, has a full-fledged 
common tariff18 and a common commercial policy}9 as well as provisions concerning 
negotiations of the common tariff and common commercial policy with third 
countries. After the transitional period, decisions on these matters are taken by the
12 OJL 60/59, p. 1165.
13 OJ L 51 of 22/2/78, p. 1, (78/164/EURATOM).
14 Smith, M. & Woolcock, S. The United States and the European Community in a Transformed 
World, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993.
15 Ibid.
16 Piening, C. Global Europe. The European Union in World Affairs, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997.
17 Volker, E. L. M. Barriers to External and Internal Community Trade, Kluwer, 1993.
18 Article 131, ex 19 & 111 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ 
C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty 
on European Union, February 7,1992, OJC 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
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Council and proposed by the Commission by qualified majority, though in the 
beginning they had to be unanimous. Another important provision of the EEC Treaty 
is ex-Article 116, which reads as follows:
From the end of the transitional period onwards, Member States shall, 
in respect of all matters of particular interest to the common market, 
proceed within the framework of international organisations of an 
economic character only by common action. To this end, the 
Commission shall submit to the Council, which shall act by a qualified 
majority, proposals concerning the scope and implementation of such 
common action.
During the transitional period, Member States shall consult each 
other for the purpose of concerting the action they take and adopting 
as far as possible a uniform attitude.20
Ex-Article 11621 obliges Member States to act in concert when matters of 
particular interest to the common market (after the transitional period) arise in 
international economic organizations. Article 300 EC is a general provision 
concerning the procedures for negotiation and conclusion of agreements with third- 
countries or with international organizations, where the Commission acts as the 
negotiator and the Council as the “concluder”.23 It opens up the possibility of asking 
for a preliminary opinion from the ECJ. Ex-article 237 EC24 concerning enlargement
19 Articles 131 & 133 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 
224/1, at p. 44 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on 
European Union, February 7,1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
20 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), 
(1992) 1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, 
February 7,1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
21 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), 
(1992) 1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, 
February 7,1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
22 Cerexhe, E. he Droit Euopeen: Les Objectifs et les Institutions, Nauwelaerts, 1989.
23 Craig, P. & Harlow, C. (eds.) Lawmaking in the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998.
24 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), 
(1992) 1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, 
February 7,1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
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of the Community, and Article 310 EC,25 concerning “associations”, are both 
characterized by mutual rights and duties, common actions and special procedures.
What characterizes the EEC Treaty is its wide coverage of both the range of 
products and various policies. Under the EEC Treaty, the institutions can create new 
policies. Even before the merger of the Councils and Commissions of the three 
Communities in 1967, the world viewed the EEC as a general integrative 
undertaking, able to use political weight to solve problems.27 Euratom alone would 
not have had the strength to convey the same political message. However, the EEC, 
with Euratom as a component, had a considerable impact on world affairs.28 During 
this period, third countries gained interest in joining the EEC. Greece was the first to 
ask for an association agreement, with an intention of membership. Then came 
Turkey,29 and Israel also applied.
There were also those who tried to neutralize what they saw as the potential 
negative effects of these new Communities on their own position. The UK and other 
European States worked together for the creation of a free trade area within the 
framework of OEEC. This failed, and so the creation of a smaller free trade area 
(European Free Trade Association [EFTA]) came into existence. There were also 
those countries that supported the process of Community construction from 
without.30 In this respect, the United States considered the process a major
25 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), 
(1992) 1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, 
February 7 ,1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
26 Craig, P. & de Burca, G. (eds.) The Evolution ofE U  Law, Oxford University Press, 1999.
27 Hilf, M., Jacobs, F. G. & Petersmann, E. (eds.) The European Community and GATT Kluwer Law 
and Taxation Publishers, 1986.
28 Piening, C. Global Europe. The European Union in World Affairs, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997.
29 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, 
OJ No 217 of 29 December 1964, pp. 3685 and 3705.
30 Stingelin, P. The European Community and the Outsiders, Longman Canada Limited, 1973.
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contribution to the stability and prosperity of the world. Finally, there were those like 
the former USSR who condemned this revival of European dynamism as detrimental 
to the peaceful coexistence of sovereign nations.31
Before the Treaties of Rome were ratified, the then six Member States had to 
prepare for negotiations within the GATT framework.32 The EEC was quickly 
engaged in various negotiations, and the implementation of the transitional 
provisions of the Treaty required enormous efforts from the Institutions, which also 
had to deal with proposals from outside the EEC. A few years later, among these 
proposals were four applications for membership, three from the group that had 
previously formed the European Free Trade Association, and Ireland. This intense 
international activity during the first years of the EEC was focused on the common 
external tariff, which became gradually applicable over the twelve years of the 
transitional period. Ex-Article 111 of the Treaty33 gave the Community the express 
task of negotiating this common tariff. Concessions on future common customs 
duties of the single market also provoked important offers from the US.34 The 
replacement of the Member States by the European Economic Community facilitated 
reductions of trade barriers.
From the perspective of international economic relations, perhaps the most 
interesting arrangements made by the High Authority during its period of 
independent activity were the successful consultations with Japan about the situation
31 Ibid.
32 61 Stat. A3, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 187.
33 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), 
(1992) 1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, 
February 7,1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
34 Wellenstein, E. ‘Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations,” CMLRev 16 
(1979), p. 413.
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in the world steel market in the early 1960s. This was before the merger of the EEC 
and Euratom Commissions in 1967. Around 1964, the steel market was already 
going through a difficult period, with risks of dangerous protectionist reactions 
coming from the US. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the specific powers of 
the High Authority in the field of commercial policy were first used in practice.
IV. 1967-1977: The Period of the “Merger”, the End of the Transitional 
Period of the EEC and the Transitional Period After the First Enlargement
The successful participation of the EEC in the greatest multilateral trade negotiations 
of the time, the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations from 1963-1967, gave the EEC 
a very strong position in the international fora. The EC was the first major trading 
entity in the Western world to implement the proposals for the introduction of 
generalized preferences adopted in 1968 at UNCTAD II37 in New Delhi. This was 
also the period in which the executive institutions of the three Communities were 
merged into a single Commission and a single Council (1967). With the end of the 
transitional period in 1970, these merged institutions would become responsible for 
the common commercial policy.
Before the merger of the executives mentioned above, the EC was involved 
in a series of individual and collective negotiations.38 For example, the Association
35 Woolcock, S. Market Access Issues in EC-US Relations. Trading Partners or Trading Blows?, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991.
36 Feld, W. The European Common Market and the World, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967.
37 UNCTAD stands for United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
38 Allen, J. J., The European Common Market and the GATT, The University Press of Washington, D. 
C., 1960.
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Agreements with Greece for future membership were concluded in 1961 and with 
Turkey in 1963.40 Negotiations with the UK and other Western European countries 
during the 1960s for membership and special relations with the EC did not end in 
agreements.
Negotiations with Austria continued during this period and talks with Israel41 
and Spain were taken up, leading the latter county to agreements before the end of 
the 1960s. When the UK, Ireland and Denmark joined the EC in 1973, the enlarged 
Community entered into free trade agreements with the remaining members of 
EFTA, i.e. Austria, Switzerland,42 Sweden, Iceland43 and Portugal. Finland and 
Norway44 followed sometime later.
Another reason for international negotiations was the historical link between 
the different Member States of the EC and overseas territories or dependencies. 
Shortly after the establishment of the EEC, there was an important transformation in 
the links between these countries and the Common Market, which, according to Part 
IV of the EEC Treaty, consisted of a two-way free access for each other's products 
and a special Community aid program.
As a consequence, the conclusion of the Yaounde Convention took place 
with eighteen African States and Madagascar. An Agreement between the European
39 Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Greece, 
OJ 26, of 18 December 1963, p. 294.
40 Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, 
OJ No 217 of 29 December 1964, pp. 3685 and 3705.
41 An early Agreement with Israel was signed on May 11, 1975. It was a free trade and co-operation 
agreement, OJ L 136/75, p .l.
42 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation on the 
application of the rules of Community transit OJ L 294/72, p. 1.
4 Agreement establishing a free trade area between the European Economic Community and the 
Republic of Iceland, OJL 301/72, p. 1.
44 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway and 
provisions for its implementation, OJ L 171/73, p. 2.
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Economic Community and the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Madagascar regarding fishing off the coast of Madagascar was signed some years 
later.45 After the first enlargement of the Community, the whole system was 
renegotiated (1973/1974) with nearly 50 countries (all the former dependencies of 
the UK in Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean). In 1975 the Lome Convention, 
between the Community and this group of countries, introduced new ideas such as 
the organisation of commercial and industrial co-operation and the stabilization of 
export earnings.
The Yaounde Conventions linked the European Community to African 
States, providing, inter alia, financial and technical assistance for economic 
development. An example is the Convention of Association between the European 
Economic Community and Associated African States, of July 20, 196346 as well as 
the Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and 
Associated African States, of July 29, 1969.47 In reference to the Lome Conventions, 
there have been four additional agreements, the European Economic Community- 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries Convention (ACP-EEC Convention), of 
February 28, 1975,48 the second ACP-EEC Convention, of October 31, 1979,49 the 
third ACP-EEC Convention, of December 8, 1984,50 and the fourth ACP-EEC 
Convention, of December 1, 1989.51 Thanks to these Conventions, over 99% of their 
imports enjoy free access to the EU.
45 OJL 73/86, p. 25.
46 2 ILM, 971 (1970).
47 9 ILM, 484 (1970).
4814 ILM, 596(1985).
49 19 ILM, 327(1985).
50 24 ILM 571 (1985).
51 O J L 229/91,p. 3.
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The Community also signed agreements with a number of Mediterranean 
countries. Some of these countries received special treatment from the Community 
because of their historic link with European countries.52 For example, see inter alia 
the Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria,53 the Co-operation Agreement between 
the European Economic Community and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,54 the 
Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the 
Lebanese Republic,55 the Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Kingdom of Morocco,56 the Co-operation Agreement between 
the European Economic Community and the Syrian Arab Republic57 and the Co­
operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic 
of Tunisia.58 During this period, the creation of ‘The global Mediterranean policy” 
took place. This nomenclature was not very precise since it suggested the idea of 
similar agreements with all partners. However, the agreements were very different 
from those completed between 1973 and 1975.
Agreements were also designed to help some Asian countries meet the 
problems that arose from the loss of certain preferences from the Commonwealth.59 
This was the case with India,60 Pakistan,61 Sri Lanka62 and Bangladesh.63 In Latin
52 Wellenstein, E. ‘Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations,” CMLRev 16 
(1979), p. 413.
53 O J L 263/78,p. 1.
54 OJL 268/78,p. 1.
55 OJ L 267/78, p. 1.
56 OJ 264/78, p. 1.
57 OJL 269/78, p. 1.
58 OJL 265/78, p. 1.
59 The implementation of the “declaration of intent” does not require the conclusion of any agreement.
60 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic o f India on cane sugar, 
OJ L 292/84, pp. 1 & 5.
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America, agreements were concluded with Argentina,64 Uruguay,65 Brazil66 and
fflMexico. We also have, inter alia, the Interregional framework Co-operation 
agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), of the other part68 as well as 
the Framework Agreement for Co-operation between the European Economic 
Community and the Federative Republic of Brazil.69 Regarding preferential access to 
the Community’s markets, it must be said that Iran requested such a negotiation, but 
the response was less than positive.
In 1976, the Community signed with Canada the first bilateral 
agreement with an industrialized nation outside Europe. It was simply a co-operation 
agreement,70 because trade policy between developed countries is covered by GATT. 
Co-operation agreements71 were also signed with the Andean group72 as well as with 
ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) 73 in 1980. There is an 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and Malaysia on trade in
61 Agreement for commercial, economic and development co-operation between the European 
Economic Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, OJ L 108/86, p. 1.
62 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic o f Sri Lanka on trade in 
textile products, OJ L 301/90, p. 1.
63 One early agreement with Bangladesh was on commercial co-operation, OJ L 319/76, p. 1.
64 Framework Agreement of Commercial and economic Co-operation between the European 
Economic Community and the Republic of Argentina, OJ L 295/90, p. 66.
65 Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Community and the Eastern 
Republic o f Uruguay on trade of sheep and lamb meat, OJ L 275/80, p. 37.
66 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Brazil on 
trade of textile products, OJ L 40/91, p. 1.
67 Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Economic Community and 
the United States of Mexico on trade of textile products, OJ L 292/87, p. 73.
68 OJ C 14/96, p. 3 and OJ L 69/96, p. 1.
69 O J L 262, p. 53.
70 Framework Agreement for commercial and economic co-operation between the European 
Communities and Canada, OJ L 260/76, p. 1.
71 Framework Agreement for co-operation between the European Economic Community and the 
Cartagena Agreement and its member countries Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, OJ 
C 25/93, p. 32.
72 The Andean Pact is composed of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia.
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textile products74 and a Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, all 
member countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations.75
The Community’s role in the UNCTAD negotiations was less satisfactory 
than its fully integrated stand in GATT. This is due to the application of Article 
116,77 which is far more complicated than that of Article 133EC.78 There was also a 
general problem of the position of the EC (Commission) representatives in 
international organizations, especially those of the UN family. Since at that time only 
States could be members of these organizations, the Commission’s representatives 
had many difficulties. Whatever their constitutional powers may have been under EC 
Law (for example, the exclusive right to negotiate), the Commission’s 
representatives were at best “observers.”79
There were also problems with the European Conference on Security and Co­
operation. The Commission representative had to find his place within the delegation 
of the Member State exercising the Presidency of the EU Council. The conference 
began with a Dane exercising the presidency and finished with an Italian. The 
primary goal for the Security Conference was to make clear in all statements and 
documents that certain matters simply could not be addressed unless the Community
73 The six Founding Countries of ASEAN are Malaysia, Indonesia, The Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Brunei.
74 OJL 339/90,p. 42.
75 OJL 144/80,p. 1.
76 Petersmann, E.-U. “Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities”, 
Common Market Law Review  20, 1983, pp. 397-437, at 420.
77 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), 
(1992) 1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, 
February 7,1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
78 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), 
(1992) 1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, 
February 7,1992, OJC 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
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through its competent institutions agreed to it. Already in 1967, this point made the 
USSR give up its resistance to Community participation in the international wheat 
agreement.
A.- A Note on Commercial Policy
A brief note can be written on the evolution of the concept of “commercial policy” 
as used in Article 133 of the EC Treaty. The Article lists several examples, such as 
tariff changes and liberalization.80 There has been a tendency on the part of national 
administrations to limit the application of the Article to the examples given above. 
However, this is not a logical interpretation. First of all, from Article 133 EC we can 
deduce that the enumeration is not meant to be exhaustive; secondly, among the 
examples listed, there is one with the general wording “export policy”;81 thirdly, 
there are many examples of commercial policy outside of those listed in Article 
133EC. A Community that would deprive itself of those possibilities would weaken 
itself in relation to other entities, whereas the rationale of the common commercial 
policy is to strengthen the EC.
The scope of “commercial policy” became relevant on different occasions 
during the 1970s.82 An important case arose when a number of Western countries 
tried to introduce more discipline onto export credit policies with state backing.
79 McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law o f the European Union, Longman, 1997, p. 41.
80 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), 
(1992) 1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, 
February 7,1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719.
81 Volker, E. L. M., (ed.) Protectionism and the European Community, Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1987.
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These policies indeed risked degenerating into a competition between the treasuries 
of different Western countries, with the effect of providing highly industrialized 
States in Eastern Europe, for example, with credits below the market rate. Was this, 
then, a matter for the Community or for Member States individually? The European 
Commission seized the occasion of a rather minor arrangement in this field within 
the framework of the OECD to ask for an opinion from the Court under Article 300 
EC. The advisory Opinion83 left no doubt as to the “commercial policy nature” of 
such export credit arrangements with state backing.
The status of so-called “cooperation” activities vis-a-vis Article 133 EC is 
another issue of considerable importance. Member States can still sign individual co­
operation agreements (especially with East European countries), but since 1975, 
there is an obligation of full consultation on the practical application and the terms. 
The EC can also conclude agreements when co-operation is the primary concern. 
Commodity agreements are covered by this policy. History and evolving 
jurisprudence have gradually provided a much clearer and more convincing outline 
of the concept of common commercial policy.84
B.- External Political Power
EC external relations are in no way limited to the field of trade policy. Unfortunately 
the Treaty is not very explicit about other dimensions, but the European Court of
82 Demaret, P. Relations exterieures de la Communaute europeenne et marche interieur: aspects 
juridiques et fonctionnels, Story-Scientia, 1988.
83 Opinion 1/75, given in November 1975, [1975] ECR 1355.
84 Hartley, T. C. The Foundations o f European Community Law. An Introduction to the Constitutional 
and Administrative Law o f the European Community, Oxford University Press, 1998.
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Justice has attempted to clarify them. In the famous ERTA case on road 
transportation (Case 22/70 Commission v Council)*5 the Court ruled that a matter 
already regulated by the EC institutions could not be dealt with internationally 
without Community participation and approval, precisely because it has been 
regulated by an EC institution. External activity can take three main forms: 1) 
autonomous legislation, to set out rules for relations for the outside world; 2) 
negotiation, to arrive at agreements with third parties; and 3) dialogue, to gain a 
better understanding of other parties in order to better determine one’s own 
attitudes.86 It was the dialogue that gained importance in the late 1970s.87
In this context, we see that the EC now has diplomatic delegations in many 
capitals as well as in the UN headquarters (where it obtained official observer status 
in 1975). Since 1973, the EC has conducted a systematic dialogue with the U.S., 
Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, apart from the periodic discussions that 
take place regularly within the OECD. Since 1977, the EC has also been involved in 
the economic world summits of the seven major industrialized nations, the so-called 
G 7.
Already in the late 1970s, the Community had become an important 
interlocutor in most of the areas concerned, not only in trade but also energy, 
fisheries and development policies, inter alia. The Community was already a major 
actor in most world fora, often speaking with one voice, even if some aspects of the 
debate were not under its direct competence. An example of this was the Conference
85 [1971] ECR 263.
86 Bourgeois, J. H. J. “External Relations Powers of the European Community”, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol 22, 1999, pp. 149-73.
87 Dashwood, A. “External Relations Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty”, Common Market Law 
Review  35, 1998, pp. 1019-1045.
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on International Economic Co-operation (the so-called “North-South Dialogue”) in 
Paris in 1976-1977, when the Community had one single delegation to cover all 
points of the agenda. Another example was the Euro-Arab dialogue. However, the 
same cannot be said about UNCTAD negotiations.
In early 1978 a trade agreement was concluded with China and in 1985, a 
Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the People’s Republic of China88 replaced the previous commercial 
Agreement of April 3, 1975.
All of the Eastern European countries now have arrangements on 
agricultural, steel and textile products, inter alia. Romania was the first country to 
approach the EC and was granted special treatment for some of its exports under the 
generalized scheme of preferences in 1974. A more recent agreement with Romania 
is the Additional Protocol to the Europe Agreement on Trade in textile products 
between the European Economic Community and Romania.89
The Community was founded to create a framework within which the 
economies of the Member States could develop beyond their national borders. It was 
also founded to promote stability in the world. The preambles of the treaties of Paris 
and Rome give an idea of the very wide objectives which the founders of the EEC 
had in mind. The place their creation now occupies in the world lays enormous 
responsibilities on the institutions. Without the constructive contributions of the EC, 
many world problems can simply not find an appropriate solution.
88 OJ L 250/85, p. 1.
89 OJ L 123/94, p. 476.
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V. Recent Developments of the EU in International Affairs90
There were a few important examples of EU action in the international arena in 
1997. In the trade sector, the EU played an important role in two significant WTO 
agreements: the first agreement being the Telecommunications Service Agreement,91 
which covers about 90% of world revenues in the telecommunications sector; and 
the second was the Agreement on Financial Services,92which covers about 95% of 
trade in the banking, insurance and security sectors. In this same year, the EU 
donated ECU 438,000,000 in humanitarian aid. An EU special envoy was sent to 
support the Middle East Peace process. The EU has adopted a strong position with 
regard to problematic states such as Cuba and Burma. The EU also led the 
industrialized nations in their decision to reduce greenhouse emissions by the year 
2010 at the Kyoto Summit on Climate Change in the Conference of the Parties to the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, in December 1997.93 
All this shows that the EU has developed into a significant actor in many 
international spheres.
Having said that, it is important to note that more than just traditional 
external policies will define the EU's external role. We can perceive that as the EC 
has integrated to create a single European Market with a single currency, its 
domestic policies are increasingly influencing its role in the international arena.94
90 Whitman, R. From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity o f the European 
Union, MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998.
91 WTO: Agreement on Telecommunications Services, February 15,1997, 36 ILM, p. 354.
92 There is no publication available.
93 December 10,1997, 37, ILM p. 22 (1998).
94 OKeeffe, D. “Community and Member State Competence in External Relations Agreements of the 
EU”, European Foreign Affairs Review  4 ,1999, pp. 7-36.
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Since 1958, the vision of the EEC Founders has expanded geographically as the EU 
has grown from six members to the current 15. With the Single European Act,95 
together with the completion of the single market, economic integration has created a 
cohesive entity. In 1973, with the first enlargement of the EC to nine Member States, 
the EC became the world’s largest trading bloc.
The original Treaty of Rome96 contained three major provisions for external 
relations. First of all, the treaty established a special regime for development aid and 
co-operation, which initially aided developing countries that had a long-standing 
relationship (mostly former colonies) with founding Member States. The regime was 
further developed through the Yaounde and Lome Conventions, which linked 70 
developing countries to the EU.97
Secondly, the Treaty of Rome provided for the conclusion of association 
agreements in Article 310 EC. Agreements with various degrees of commitment and 
different economic and political purposes have been concluded with almost every 
country, except for some of the most developed countries such as the U.S., Japan and 
Australia. These association agreements represent the closest relationship with the 
EU and usually involve some kind of reciprocal obligation. Agreements with 
countries of the European Economic Area,98 the Mediterranean Agreements,99 the 
Europe Agreements with Central and Eastern European countries and the Euro- 
Mediterranean Association Agreements fall within this category.
95 Single European Act, OJ L 169/1 (1987), (1987) 2 CMLRev, p. 741.
96 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 25,1957, 298 UNTS, 11.
97 See earlier comments supra on the Yaounde and Lome Conventions.
98 Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ L 1/1 (1994).
99 Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Arab Republic of 
Egypt, OJ L 266/78, p. 1. Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters relating to Article 9 of
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The Europe Agreements are a series of association agreements into which the 
European Community entered with various Central European countries pursuant to 
the authority granted in Article 310 EC.100 As examples of Europe Agreements we 
have, in the case of Central Europe, inter alia, the Europe (association) Agreement 
between the European Communities and the Republic of Bulgaria,101 the Europe 
(association) Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States and the Czech Republic,102 and the Europe (association) Agreement between 
the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Hungary.103
In contrast to the association agreements, the “non-preferential trade and co­
operation agreements” provide closer relationships between the EU and many 
countries of Southeast Asia and Latin America. These agreements are usually aimed 
at lesser-developed countries. In addition to these two types of agreements,104 the EU 
has developed a hybrid of “partnership agreements”, which share features of co­
operation accords and Europe agreements to manage its relations with the successor 
States of the former USSR. One example is the Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the 
Russian Federation.105
Finally, since the Founding Fathers chose a customs union as the way to 
proceed towards a unified Europe, a common trade policy vis-a-vis the rest of the
Protocol 1 to the EEC-Israel Agreement and concerning the Community of tomato paste originating 
in Israel, OJ L 23/77, p. 13.
100 See Goebel, R. “The European Community and Eatem Europe: Deepening and Widening the 
Community Brand of Economic Federalism”, 1 New Eur. L.Rev. 163,1993, pp. 218-23.
101 OJL 358/94, p. 1.
102 OJ L 360/94, p. 1.
103 OJ L 347/93, p. 1.
104 The Association Agreements and the Non-Preferential Trade and Co-operation Agreements.
105 OJ 1997 L 327/1.
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world was inevitable.106 The Community has retained exclusive competence in this 
field, and the European Commission acts on behalf of the European Community with 
a qualified majority vote from the Council. However, there are trade issues where 
Member States have competence (despite the EC “exclusive” competence in 
commercial policy).107
It was at that moment that an internal debate arose between the EU Member 
States and the European Commission about the coverage of the existing commercial 
policy provisions (the famous Article 133 of the EC Treaty)108 in the areas of 
intellectual property and services. The Commission negotiated agreements covering 
both of these areas, using standard European Economic Community commercial 
policy procedures. When the European Court of Justice was consulted, it stated in 
Opinion 1/94 that only certain aspects of the two sectors could be considered as 
falling under Article 133 EC, and thereby under the European Community’s 
exclusive competence.109 During the Intergovernmental Conference that produced 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Commission, reacting against Opinion 1/94, made a 
proposal to enlarge the scope of the relevant treaty provisions to explicitly include
106 MacCormick, N. “Beyond the Sovereign State”, The M odem Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 1, January 
1993, pp. 1-18.
107 Rosas, A. “The External Relations of the European Union: Problems and Challenges” in The 
Forum fo r  US-EU Legal-Economic Affairs, The Mentor Group, 1998, pp.59-71.
108 Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 (1992), 
(1992) 1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, 
February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719. The Treaty on European Union 
amended the EEC Treaty.
109 Opinion 1/94, (1994) EC R 1-5267,1-5401, (1995) 1 CMLRev 205, p. 316.
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services and intellectual property.110 The Member States obviously refused because 
they still wanted their participation in international trade agreements.111
The EC, however, continues to face some difficulties in creating a 
coherent commercial policy. Although the Treaty of Amsterdam included some 
amendments stating that Article 133 procedures can extend over intellectual property 
and services, it still represents a hurdle because most decisions relating to these 
sectors must be unanimous,112 in reference to the use of Article 133 (5). However, 
not all agreements on intellectual property and services would have to be concluded 
by unanimous vote, since there are aspects of services and intellectual property 
which already fall within the scope of the EC common commercial policy. In 
addition, if Member States are forced to reach a consensus, it will be more difficult 
to reach a Community position, even though the Commission has the power to act as 
a spokesperson in such negotiations according to the Amsterdam Treaty, provided 
the Council agrees to that application by unanimity.113
Some WTO members have introduced cases related to these sectors against 
individual Member States instead of against the EC as a whole. For instance, the 
United States has brought various TRIPS114 cases against Denmark, Sweden and 
Ireland. In this last case, the USA brought a case against Ireland regarding measures
110 Dash wood, A. “External Relations Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty”, Common Market Law 
Review  35, 1998, pp. 1019-1045.
111 For a general discussion on this issue, see Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The EC in the WTO and 
Advisory Opinion 1/94: An Echtemach Procession, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. (1995).
112 See the consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, article 133 (5), 
1997 O.J. (C 340) 173, 238; 3 7 1.L.M. 79,108.
113 Article 2 (20) Treaty of Amsterdam, inserting Art. 113(5) into EC Treaty, OJ C 340/1, at p. 35 
(1997).
114 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments: Results o f the 
Uruguay Round, Vol 31, 33 ILM 81 (1994).
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affecting the grant of copyrights and neighboring rights.115 The main argument of the 
Commission in the discussion for expanding EC competence over intellectual 
property and services was based on the need for the EC to be effective in 
international negotiations. However, Member States were not readily convinced, 
perhaps because the success of the Uruguay Round (General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, of October 30, 1947),116 revealed concerns about the balance between the 
respective roles of the EC and its Member States in international affairs.117
As mentioned earlier, there are areas where internal policies are likely to spill 
over and impact the international arena. One example is that of competition policy, 
an area in which the Commission has been active since the early 1960s. With 
increasing worldwide economic interdependency and the emergence of global 
markets for a large number of products, more competition cases involve actions that 
take place outside of the EU,118 like the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas merger. In 
this respect, the EC-U.S. Co-operation Agreement (which provides the background 
to the McDonnell Douglas case) is worth mentioning. Competition authorities on 
both sides of the Atlantic examined the issue and came to different conclusions. This 
case shows that even in carrying out policies that have traditionally been domestic, 
the European Union is increasingly influencing economic matters in other parts of 
the world.
115 Bourgeois, J. H. J. “The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: an Echtemach Procession”, 
Common Market Law Review 32, 1995, pp. 763-787.
116 61 Stat. A3, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 187.
117 Brittan, L. “Europe must grow to Change”, The World in 1996, 1996, p. 48.
118 Eeckhout, P. The European Internal Market and International Trade: a Legal Analysis, Clarendon 
Press Oxford, 1994.
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Despite this, nowhere is the effect of domestic policies likely to be as 
relevant as with EMU.119 EMU is essentially a domestic issue. However, it is hoped 
that the Euro will benefit international trade. EMU is likely to have a major impact 
not only on international markets, but also on the weight attributed to the European 
Union as an international actor. That said, the variable geometry of the EMU with its 
ins and outs also poses a challenge for the unity of external representation in the 
economic sphere.120
119 Breton, P., Scott, H. & Sinclair, P. International Trade. A European Text, Oxford University Press, 
1997.
120 Emiliou, N. & OTCeeffee, D. The European Union and World Trade Law. After the GATT 
Uruguay Round, Wiley, 1996.
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I. Introduction
In this first section of the current chapter we shall firstly explain what is meant by a 
Mixed Agreement (section II) and then see the various types of Mixed Agreements1 that 
exist in the field of the External Relations of the European Community (section III). In 
order to have a definition of Mixed Agreements we shall see what Dominic McGoldrick 
has said in this respect.2 We shall see that the European Community appears to be a 
unique creation from the perspective of international law.3 We shall then look into the 
effects of the EC’s international agreements vis-a-vis third parties (section IV). 
Attention shall be paid to the fact that problems raised by Mixed Agreements do not 
exist within the context of exclusive European Community competence (section V). 
Some of these problems have to do with the functioning of the European Community. 
We shall see how the Member States have delegated their authority to negotiate 
international trade agreements to the supranational level.4
We shall also see that within the European Community treaty-making, there is a 
tendency to sign Mixed Agreements rather than agreements of European Community 
exclusive competence in areas dealing with the External Relations of the EU. This
1 For types of mixed agreements, see Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. 
(ed.) International Law Aspects o f the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 128-33 and 
Schermers, H. G. “A Typology of Mixed Agreements” in O'Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed 
Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 23-33.
2 See McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law o f the European Union, Longman, 1997.
3 McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law o f the European Union, Longman, 1997, p. 1.
4 See Meunier, S. "Talking with a Single Voice: European Integration and EC-US Trade Negotiations", 
Abstract; paper prepared for delivery at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, The Sheraton Washington Hotel, August, 28-31,1997.
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shows their importance for the European Community and for its position in the world.5 
Although the EC increasingly wants to become an international actor and somehow 
assert its international personality and identity, it also has to accept that Member States 
and third parties have legitimate interests.6 EC Treaty practice has become increasingly 
dominated by mixed agreements7 for they reflect the legal and political reality that the 
EC is not a single State for the purposes of international law.8 We shall see how the 
EC's membership of and participation in international organisations9 is highly variable 
for an organisation which pretends to act as a single actor.10
This chapter does not deal with treaties that are entered into by the Member 
States alone (if that were the case, they would not be mixed agreements stricto sensu), 
but treaties which in substance cover matters of exclusive EC competence. If it is not 
possible to have Community adherence to such treaties (because the treaty is only open 
to States), the EC competence may be exercised “through the medium of the Member 
States acting jointly in the Community’s interest.”11 Nor does this chapter deal with 
treaties concluded in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
5 See Ehlermann, C. D. “Mixed Agreements: A List of Problems” in O’Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed 
Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, p. 3.
6 The relationship between the EC and third States is a unique experience in international law and 
international relations.
7 See McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law o f the European Union, Longman, 1997, chapter 5.
8 This is also the case for the EU, “it is difficult to see anything short of a major war provoking a 
transition to a statehood”, Hill, C., “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe's 
International Role” (1993) 31 JCMS, 305-28, p. 325.
9 For the participation of the EC in International Organisations, see Frid, R. The Relations between the EC  
and International Organizations. Legal Theory and Practice, Kluwer Law Inemational, 1995.
10 See McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law o f the European Union, Longman, 1997, chapters 2 &
10.
11 Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention No. 170 [1993] ECR 1-1061, para. 5. See also McGoldrick, D., 
International Relations Law o f the European Union, Longman, 1997, pp. 82-83.
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(CFSP), where the EU technically has not yet legal personality.12 However, the situation 
with respect to the EU legal personality has fundamentally changed since the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Amsterdam,13 and Article 24 TEU refers to the conclusion of 
CFSP agreements by the Council.14 The final subtitle will be devoted to concluding 
remarks on the issue of mixity in the EC external relations.
II. Definition of Mixed Agreements
Dominic McGoldrick holds that “an agreement can be regarded as mixed if the 
European Community and one or more of the Member States are parties to it...An 
agreement can also be regarded as mixed if the European Community and the Member 
States share competence in relation to it, even if only Member States can be parties. 
Finally, an agreement can be in a mixed form because of requirements relating to its 
financing or relating to its provisions on voting.”15 His explanation continues by saying 
that “if competence in the subject matter of a Treaty lies partly with the European 
Community and partly with the Member States, then the agreement is described as a 
mixed one.”16 Furthermore, he gives a more precise description of mixed agreements by
12 Eaton, M. R. “Common Foreign and Security Policy” in O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.) Legal 
Issues o f the Maastricht Treaty, Chichester, Wiley Chancery, 1994, p. 224.
13 See Rosas, A. “The European Union and mixed agreements” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The 
General Law o f  EC External Relations, 2000, p. 203.
14 See Paasivirta, “The European Union: From an Aggregate of States to a Legal Person?,” 2 Hofstra Law 
& Policy Symposium, 1997, pp. 37-59.
15 See McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law o f  the European Union, Longman, 1997, p 78.
16 Ibid., p. 79.
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saying that “the expression mixed agreement more accurately describes agreements 
where the European Community and the Member States genuinely share competence”.17
While it may be largely unknown to the general public, mixity (or mixed 
agreements) has become part of the daily life of the EC external relations. Mixity has 
also been a very complex topic of scholar debate.18
Interestingly enough, mixed agreements were not foreseen in the Treaty of 
Rome. However, the concept does appear in the Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community.19 As Granvik correctly points out, “the very same article 
[Article 102 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community] has
17 Ibid., p.79.
18 Most of the relevant literature is in the more general context of the EC external relations; see, 
Timmermans, C. & Volker, E. (eds.) Division of Powers between the European Communities and their 
Member States in the Field o f External Relations, Kluwer, 1981; O'Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed 
Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983; Dolmans, M.J.F.M. Problems o f Mixed 
Agreements: Division o f  Powers Within the EEC and the Right o f  Third States, Asser Insstituut, 1985; 
Groux & Manin, The European Communities in the International Order, Commission of the European 
Communities, 1995, pp. 57-88; Conze, A. Die voelkerrechtliche Haftung der Europaeischen 
Gemeinschaft, Nomos, 1987, pp. 73-87; Neuwahl, “Joint Participation in International Treaties and the 
Exercise of Powers by the EEC and its Member States: Mixed Agreements”, Common Market Law 
Review, 28, 1991, pp. 717-740; idem, “Shared Powers or Combined Imcompetence? More on Mixity”, 
Common Market Law Review, 33, 1996, pp. 667-687; Frid, R. The Relations between the EC and 
International Organizations. Legal Theory and Practice, Kluwer Law Inemational, 1995, pp. 111-116; 
Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon Press 
Oxford, 1996, pp. 142-164; Kaniel, M. The Exclusive Treaty-Making Power o f  the European Community 
up to the Period o f the Single European Act, Kluwer, 1996, pp. 145-174; McGoldrick, D., International 
Relations Law o f the European Union, Longman, 1997, pp. 78-88; Bourgeois, J., Dewost, J. & Gaiffe, M. 
La Communaute europeenne et les accords mixtes, Quelles perspectives?, Presses Interuniversitaires 
Europ6ennes, 1997; Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects o f the European Union, Kluwer 
Law International, 1998, notably articles written by Dashwood (pp. 113-123), Rosas (pp. 125-148) and 
Granvik (pp. 255-272).
19 It is precisely in Article 102, which reads as follows: “Agreements or contracts concluded with a third 
State...to which, in addition to the Community, one or more Member States are parties, shall not enter 
into force until the Commission has been notified by all the Member States concerned that those 
agreements or contracts have become applicable in accordance with the provisions of their respective 
national laws”.
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later been accepted [by EC law-makers] as a suitable model for the EC.”20 In this same 
line of thought, Macleod et al. point out that there is no doubt about the existence and 
legal validity of the concept of "mixed agreement". Proof of it is Article 102 of the 
Euratom Treaty, where “a form of mixed agreement is recognised and which [Art 102] 
makes explicit provisions for treaties which are to be concluded by the Community and 
one or more Member States."21
In addition to what has been said above, there are various important clarifications 
to be mentioned in this subtitle in order to facilitate the understanding of the issue. Here 
are some of them:
1. The European Court of Justice has recognised in its Ruling 1/78, Opinion 
1/78, Opinion 2/91 and Opinion 1/94 {Re WTO Agreement) inter alia that 
some agreements require the participation of both the Community and the 
Member States22 From here one can deduce that not all Community 
competence is exclusive. Furthermore, in the everyday practice of the 
Community institutions we see that the concept of mixed agreement is a 
well-established part of EC Law.23 An example of this is Case 12/86,
20 See Granvik, L. "Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of 
Bindingness" in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects o f the European Union, Kluwer Law 
International, 1998, p. 256.
21 Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 143-4.
22 Ruling 1/78 [1978] ECR 2151; Opinion 1/78 [1979] ECR 2871; Opinion 2/91, [1993] ECR 1-1061 at 
para. 5; and Opinion 1/94 [1995] 1 CMLR 205.
3 Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f  the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p. 144.
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Demirel v. Stadt Schwaebisch Gmuend,24 in which the European Court of 
Justice used the term "mixed agreement" to describe the Association 
Agreement between the Community and the Member States on the one hand 
and Turkey on the other.
2. It is a fact of life that mixed agreements raise difficult and interesting legal 
and political issues about the role of the Communities and the Member States 
in the international arena. Despite the legal uncertainties, in practice the 
Community and the Member States participate together effectively in various 
international agreements.25 It is precisely in the field of international treaty 
law that mixed agreements show the changes that international law has 
undergone through the establishment of entities such as the EC.
3. In this same line of thought, Allan Rosas27 argues that “the European Union 
being a hybrid conglomerate situated somewhere between a State and an 
intergovernmental organisation, it is only natural that its external relations in 
general and treaty practice in particular should not be straightforward. The 
phenomenon of mixed agreements28 [...] offers a telling illustration of the
24 [1987] ECR 3719 at 3751, paragraph 8.
25 See Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p. 144.
26 Tomuschat, C. “Liability for Mixed Agreements” in O’Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed Agreements, 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 125-32.
27 Allan Rosas is Principal Legal Adviser of the Legal Service in the European Commission.
28 The possibility o f mixed agreements is expressly recognised in Article 102 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The expression “mixed agreements” has been 
used by the Court of Justice, e.g., in Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECJ 3719 at 3751 (paragraph 8). See also 
O'Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983; 
Dolmans, M. J. F. M. Problems o f Mixed Agreements: Division o f Powers within the EEC and the Right 
o f Third States, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985; Neuwahl, N. “Joint Participation in International
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complex nature of the EU and the Communities as an international actor”.29 
We speak of complex nature since the circumstance which has to occur is to 
have an agreement which is a Community and a national agreement at the 
same time. This means that Europe has 15 voices (one for each Member 
State) plus one more voice coming from any of the European Communities.
4. The phenomenon of mixed agreements is, therefore, not only deeply 
interrelated to EC Law and its division of powers doctrine but it is also 
interrelated to public international law. As for the division of powers. 
McGoldrick points out that “each international agreement will require 
consideration of its subject matter to determine the allocation of competence 
between the EC and the Member States, and the nature of that 
competence.”30 This allocation of competence can evolve over the lifetime of 
an agreement [this is so even during the drafting of an agreement, being an 
example of it Case C-25/94, Commission v Council (FAO Fisheries 
Agreement)]31 or series of agreements. This has been the case with the 
GATT.32 According to public international law, the rights and obligations 
which derive from an agreement form an undivided entity. This, however,
Treaties and the Exercise of Powers by the EEC and Its Member States: Mixed Agreements”, (1991) 28 
CMLRev, pp. 717-740; Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f  the European 
Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 142-164.
29 See Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects 
o f  the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 125.
3 McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law o f the European Union, Longman, 1997, pp 78-9.
31 [1996] ECR 1-1469.
32 For further detail, see Petersmann, E.-U. “Participation of the European Communities in the GATT: 
International Law and Community Law Aspects”, in O’Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed Agreements,
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does not necessarily mean that the EC and its Member States cannot respect 
the internal division of competence according to EC Law.33
III. Typology of Mixed Agreements34
Since there are many different types of mixed agreements, depending on how they are 
categorised, the answer to the question they raise may vary very much. Let us, then, see 
some ways of classification. Allan Rosas makes a basic distinction between parallel and 
shared competencies:35
A.- Type of Competence
The terminology used in the doctrine is very unclear: non-exclusive, shared, parallel, 
joint, concurrent and divided competence of the EC. These terms are used here to 
describe the same phenomenon, i.e. the potential powers which the EC may exercise if
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp 167-98. See also McGoldrick, D., International Relations 
Law o f  the European Union, Longman, 1997, chapter 7, pp. 118 and 121.
33 See Gaja, G. “The European Community’s Rights and Obligations undo: Mixed Agreements” in 
O’Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp 133- 
140.
34 See Schermers, H. “A Typology of Mixed Agreements,” in O’Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed 
Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 22-33; Dolmans, M. J. F. M. Problems of  
Mixed Agreements: Division o f Powers within the EEC and the Right o f Third States, Asser Instituut, The 
Hague, 1985, p. 25, 39-42; Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.j 
International Law Aspects o f  the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 125-148 at 128- 
133; Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p. 143.
35 See Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects 
o f the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 128-33.
79
The European Community and Mixed Agreements Rafael Leal-Arcas
Chapter 3
the Council so decides and which, when exercised, may turn into exclusive EC 
competence.
A.I.- Parallel Competencies
Parallel competencies “implies that the Community may adhere to a treaty, with full 
rights and obligations as any other Contracting Party, this having no direct effect on the 
rights and obligations of Member States being parties to the same treaty.”36 However, 
this situation might have indirect effect on the rights and obligations of the Member 
States. As an example, we have the Agreement establishing the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),37 which is open to States and the EC alike,38 
and obliges “each Contracting Party to provide financial resources as a loan or grant to a 
third State or international fund (assuming that the participation of the EC would be 
covered by the Community budget).”39 The given situation can be more complex if 
financial assistance does not come from the Community budget but from a separate 
fund, consisting of Member States’ contributions and based on a separate internal 
agreement between the Member States. An example of it could be Case C-316/91
36 As far as parallel competence is concerned, Schermers, H. G. notes in “A Typology of Mixed 
Agreements” in O'Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
1983, that such treaties, which are covered by a formal (as distinct from a substantial) definition of mixed 
agreements, are “inherently.. .not of a mixed nature”.
3 For more information on EBRD, see Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the 
European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 187-89.
38 [1990] OJL372/1.
39 See Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p. 129.
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Parliament v Council40 as well as Opinion 1/78 {Re Draft International Agreement on 
Natural Rubber)*1
Another example could well be the adherence to the 1989 Protocol Relating to 
the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, prompted by 
the need to protect the Community trade mark.42 According to Article 10 of the Madrid 
Protocol, each Contracting Party, including the EC, has one vote. This implies that the 
EC and its Member States may have altogether 16 votes, a principle contested by the 
United States, which have so far refused to adhere to the Protocol.43
A.2.- Shared Competencies
As for shared competencies, they imply some division of the rights and obligations in 
the agreement between the Community and the Member States. According to Dolmans, 
one can distinguish between mixed agreements with coexistent competence and mixed 
agreements with concurrent competence.44 Let us start with the latter case.
40 [1994] ECR 1-625.
41 [1979] ECR 2871.
42 Commission Proposal for a Council decision approving the accession of the EC to the Protocol, COM 
(96) 367 final of July 22,1996.
43 See Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) 
The General Law o f  EC External Relations, 2000, p. 203.
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A.2.a.~ Concurrent Competencies
Mixed agreements with concurrent competencies implies that the agreement in question 
forms a certain whole or totality which is indivisible or cannot be separated into two 
parts. P. Allot, when referring to concurrent competence, speaks of mixed agreements 
“in the strong sense”, meaning that the Community and Member States participation is 
“inextricably confused”.45 Such a truly shared-competencies situation may arise 
principally if there is a non-exclusive Community competence covering the whole and 
entire agreement. Articles 111, paragraph 5 (agreements relating to economic and 
monetary policy), 174, paragraph 4 (environmental agreements) and 181 (agreements 
relating to development co-operation) of the EC Treaty provide that not only the 
Community, but also the Member States, may negotiate in international bodies and 
conclude international agreements. Nevertheless, according to a Declaration on Articles 
111, 174 and 181 EC contained in the Final Act of the TEU, this (non-exclusive) 
competence is subject to the ERTA judgement of the Court of Justice, that is to say, the 
principle by which the adoption of common rules by the Community may create 
exclusive Community competencies also on the fields covered by the said Articles.
There are also other areas where the Community may have a non-exclusive 
competence to conclude agreements if it has a corresponding competence to establish 
internal rules and this specific competence has not yet been used. In this respect, we
44 Dolmans, M. J. F. M. Problems o f Mixed Agreements: Division o f Powers within the EEC and the Right 
o f  Third States, Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1985, p. 25, 39-42, 97.
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have as examples the joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Kramer,46 as well as Opinion 2/91 (ILO 
Convention No. 170)47 and Opinion 2/92 (OECD National Treatment Instrument)48 
According to A. Rosas, even if this specific competence has been used, "the external 
competence may rest at least partly non-exclusive if the common internal rules are 
considered as minimum rules only49 ...[as an example we have Opinion 2/91 (ILO 
Convention No. 170)50]... or [if the common internal rules] do not cover the whole area 
regulated in the international agreement."51 An example of the latter case is Opinion 
1/94 (WTO Agreement).
A.2.b.~ Coexistent Competencies
As for mixed agreements with coexistent competence, since the agreement contains 
provisions which fall under the exclusive competence of the Community and/or the 
Member States, respectively, it is “in principle possible to divide it into two separate 
parts, for which either the Community or the Member States are responsible.”52 Rosas 
suggests, as an example of this, a treaty containing one chapter on trade in goods and
45 Allot, P "Adherance and Withdrawal from Mixed Agreements" in O'Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed 
Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, p. 118-9.
46 [1976] ECR 1303 at 1308-1309 (paragraphs 19-34).
47 [1993] ECR 1-1061 at 1076-1077 (paragraphs 7,12).
48 [1995] ECR 1-521 at 558-560.
49 See Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p. 66.
50 [1993] ECR 1-1061 at 1078-1080.
51 Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects o f  
the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 131.
52 See Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects 
o f the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 129.
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another on military defence. This situation could be seen as if we were dealing with two 
different treaties presented in one document.53 In this respect, P. Allot notes that for 
such mixed agreements “in the weak sense” it should not be possible to separate 
completely the Community and Member States parts of the agreement.54 In the book by 
Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European 
Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, the authors mention as an example the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention discussed in Ruling 1/78 (See 
Ruling 1/78, Re the Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, 
Facilities and Transports).55
If there are real national competencies involved which "coexist" with EC 
competencies, then the nature of the agreement may make it difficult to separate the 
agreement into two parts.56 In this respect, the ECJ has said that the Community and the 
Member States share competence where an agreement covers both matters within the 
exclusive competencies of the Member States and matters within the exclusive 
competence of the EC.57 An example which gives evidence of this is the Natural Rubber 
Opinion 1/78, which addressed a scheme where under a commodities agreement, 
Member States would have directly financed the agreement, with the pertinent 
implications for its decision-making procedures, even if the essential policy of such an
53 See Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) 
The General Law o f EC External Relations, 2000, p. 204.
54 Allot, P. "Adherence to and Withdrawl from Mixed Agreements" in O'Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. 
(eds.) Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 97-121 at pp. 118-119.
55 [1978] ECR 2151.
56 See Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon
Press Oxford, 1996, p. 131.
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agreement came within the Community's exclusive competence under Article 133 EC.58 
On the relevance of Member State financing of the agreement, see Opinion 1/94 {Re 
WTO Agreement)59 and Case C-316/91, Parliament v. Council60 and Opinion of 
Advocate-General Jacobs, paragraphs 55-59. This Natural Rubber case is related to 
Community participation in commodities agreements in pursuance of the common 
commercial policy.
In the case of coexistent competence, there is what Rosas calls a presumed 
"horizontal" (sectorial) distribution of competencies (commercial policy, due to trade in 
goods, and defence policy, due to military policy). One can also imagine a more 
"vertical" distribution of competencies. By this, we mean a situation in which "the 
Community would be competent to conclude the main substantive parts of the 
agreement, while Member State participation would be deemed necessary because of the 
nature of its obligations relating to the implementation and enforcement of those 
substantive parts." 61 As an example we can take into account the agreement considered 
in Ruling 1/78 {Re the Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials, Facilities and Transport), in which, as far as its provisions on penal sanctions 
and extradition were concerned, Member State participation was required.
57 See Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f  the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p. 65.
58 See [1979] ECR 2871, at 2917-2918 (paragraphs 57-60); [1978] ECR 2151, at 2180 (paragraph 36); 
Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press 
Oxford, 1996, p. 65.
59 [1995] 1 CMLR 205 at paragraphs 19 and 20.
60 [1994] ECR 1-625.
61 See Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects 
o f  the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 130.
“  Ruling 1/78 [1978] ECR 2151, at 2180 (paragraph 36).
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One more example could be that of the 1995 UN Agreement Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks. This agreement, mainly because of its provisions on compliance and 
enforcement (Part VI), has been defined by the Council of the EU as a mixed agreement. 
Following this line of argument, in an EC Declaration submitted upon signature in 
accordance with article 47, it is noted that, while the Community has exclusive 
competence with respect to the conservation and management of living marine 
resources, including the regulatory competence granted under international law to the 
flag State in this respect, measures such as refusal, withdrawal or suspension of 
authorisation to serve as masters and other officers of fishing vessels, as well as certain 
enforcement measures relating to the exercise of jurisdiction by the flag State over its 
vessels on the high seas, are within the competence of the Member States.63
However, in many cases the provisions relating to possible "coexistent" Member 
States competencies may be of such a limited relevance that they should be seen as 
ancillary (subsidiary) to the essential objectives of the agreement.64 The ECJ has cases 
on subsidiary provisions, which are often related to Article 133 on common commercial 
policy. I would like to illustrate one case and two opinions from the ECJ as examples of 
what has been previously said: Opinion 1/78 {Re Draft International Agreement on
63 See (1996) Law of the Sea Bulletin 32, p. 26.
64 See Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects 
o f the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 130.
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Natural Rubber),65 Opinion 1/94 {Re WTO Agreement)66 and Case C-268/94 Portugal v. 
Council61 In this last case, the ECJ concludes in its paragraph 77 as follows:
Furthermore, with regard to the linking o f  Article 10 o f  the Agreement 
[Co-operation Agreement between the European Community and the 
Republic o f India on Partnership and Developm ent] to com m ercial 
policy, it is sufficient to point out that the Community is entitled to  
include in external agreements otherwise falling within the ambit o f  
Article 133 ancillary provisions for the organisation o f  purely 
consultative procedures or clauses calling on the other party to raise 
the level o f  protection o f intellectual property (see, to that effect,
Opinion 1/94, paragraph 68).
MacLeod et al. (1996) assert that “the principal consequence of shared 
competence is that the Member States still have power to enter into agreements and to 
take action in the areas in question [...]. Although the concept of shared external 
competence is well established in Community law and practice, it has not always been 
possible to persuade third States to recognise that the legal powers and interests of the 
Community and Member States co-exist.68 Third States have tended to insist that either 
the Community or the Member States should accept legal responsibility for a given 
matter, and that both cannot be responsible, or exercise rights at the same time, on the 
same matters. The extent to which international law recognises the concept of "shared 
competence" is therefore open to debate”.69
65 [1979] ECR 2871 at 1917 (paragraph 56).
66 [1994] ECR 1-5278, at 1-5408 (paragraphs 66-68).
67 Judgement of 3 December 1996, paragraphs 75,77.
68 This is mainly the case in the World Intellectual Property Organisation.
69 Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f  the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p. 63.
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At the same time, it must be said that the fact that Member States will have 
obligations concerning the implementation and execution of the agreement does not 
classify the agreement as mixed. As means of evidence, we have Opinion 1/75 
(Understanding on a Local Cost Standard).70 Here the Court held that “it is of little 
importance that the obligations and the financial burdens inherent to the execution of the 
agreement envisaged are borne directly by the Member States.”71 Another example is 
Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention No 170).72
B.- Type of Mixitv
Mixity can also be classified as facultative and obligatory, i.e. legally necessary. Where 
the competence of the EC is non-exclusive but there are no competencies specifically 
reserved for Member States either, then as a matter of EC Law this mixity becomes 
facultative, optional, non-compulsory. An example of it are the Environmental 
Agreements. As Rosas argues, in cases of concurrent competencies, mixity is facultative 
ab initio. However, if the Council and the Member States insist on mixity for political 
reasons, the question arises as to whether parts of the agreement become reserved for the 
Member States, in which case they should all become Contracting Parties.73 We should 
also illustrate, in this same line of argument, the example of an Opinion (No. 20/1995)
70 [1975] ECR 1355.
71 [1975] ECR 1361 at 1364.
72 [1993] ECR 1-1061 at 1082 (paragraph 34).
73 See Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects 
o f the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 132.
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given on 30 November 1995 by the Constitutional Committee to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Finnish Parliament. This Opinion discusses problems concerning the 
ratification of the 1995 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, on the one part, and the Republic of 
Estonia, on the other part.74
As far as obligatory mixity is concerned, it is understood that it is necessary to 
have the participation of both the Member States and the EC on a particular issue. A 
classical example of obligatory mixity is the Law of the Sea Convention, where it is 
highly difficult to have one voice representing the EU. In such a case, we deal with what 
is called “subordination clauses”,75 which provide that the EC can become a party only 
if one or more of the Member States have become parties. As an example we have 
Article 3 of the Annex IX to the Law of the Sea Convention (1982), which advocates 
that the EC may become a party only if a majority of the Member States ratify or 
accede.76
This distinction between obligatory/facultative mixity is not always recognised 
in practice. Proof of it are the discussions in the framework of the Council of the EU 
(including COREPER and the Working Groups) on the European Community v. mixed
74 Ibid. p. 143.
75 See Close, G. “Subordination Clauses in Mixed Agreements” (1985), 3 4 ICLQ, pp. 382-91.
76 See Simmonds, K. R. “The Communities Declaration Upon Signature of the UN Convention of the 
Law o f the Sea” (1986) 23 CMLRev, 521-44. The LOSC entered into force on 16 November 1994. 
However, an agreement on Part DC of the LOCS has meant that there is a much greater likelihood that 
more Member States will ratify. Ratification of the LOSC by the EC is under active consideration. A 
delay in ratification already announced by the UK in May 1996 may delay EC ratification.
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character of a given agreement, where it is almost always taken for granted that the lack
*7*7of exclusive Community competencies of necessity requires mixity.
However, it may sometimes be difficult to apply to certain cases, as can be 
deduced from uncertainties such as whether Opinion 1/94 implies that Member States 
participation in the WTO Agreements on services (GATS) and intellectual property 
rights (TRIPS) was legally necessary or simply legally possible. Here we must 
remember that the Court was asked by the Commission to rule that the Community had 
exclusive competence to adhere to GATS and TRIPS, either under Article 133, the 
ERTA doctrine, implied powers in accordance with Opinion 1/76,78 or Articles 95 and 
235 EC. In denying their existence of exclusive competencies for the whole subject 
areas covered by these two treaties, the Court concluded GATS and TRIPS. Some of the 
Member States had argued that those provisions of TRIPS fall within their competence. 
The Court replied that "if that argument is to be understood as meaning that all those 
matters are within some sort of domain reserved to the Member States, it cannot be 
accepted. The Community is certainly competent to harmonise national rules on those 
matters...".79
What has been said so far concerning the types of competencies in the External 
Relations of the EU can be graphically shown as follows: «
77 See Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects 
o f  the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 132, note 34.
7 Opinion 1/76 (Re the Draft Agreement for a Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels) (Rhine 
Navigation Case) [1977] ECR 741.
79 [1994] ECR 1-5418-5419, paragraph 104.
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A.- Type of competence 










Lena Granvik denotes that "mixed agreements are concluded especially in the 
field of the environment, entailing that both the European Community and some or even 
all of its Member States individually become parties to the international environmental 
agreement."80 According to this author there are two types of mixed agreements: 
complete and incomplete mixed agreements. Complete mixed agreements means that 
both the EC and all its Member States are treaty-parties, whereas the concept of 
incomplete mixed agreements implies that only some of the EC Member States have 
acceded to the agreement in question along with the EC. However, it must be said that 
incomplete mixed agreements bind all the Member States of the Community.81 What the 
case-law and primary legislation indicate is that Member States, whether they are parties 
or not, “have the obligation to co-operate with the EC in the implementation of the
80 See Granvik, L. "Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of 
Bindingness" in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects o f the European Union, Kluwer Law 
International, 1998, p. 255.
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Community’s international obligations.”82 In addition to that, a mixed agreement, which 
does not distinguish between the rights and obligations of the EC and the Member 
States, gives obligations to both the EC and its Member States under all its provisions.
It should be mentioned that the above given typology should only and merely be 
seen as a tool to assist in the structuring of the discussion on the legal nature an 
implications of mixed agreements.83 Some agreements may fall under several of these 
categories, as can be seen from the ILO Convention No. 170 as interpreted by the Court 
of Justice in its Opinion 2/91.84 In this Opinion, the Court seemed to hold that Part ID of 
the Convention belonged to exclusive EC competence and the other parts to non­
exclusive EC competence. This is due to the fact that the relevant Community directives 
set minimum standards only. With respect to the representation of certain dependent 
territories, it belonged to the competence of some Member States. However, this right of 
representation is, strictly speaking, not a question of mixity, as the Member States 
involved do not act in their capacity as EU Member States.85
81 See Granvik, L. "Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of 
Bindingness" in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects o f the European Union, Kluwer Law 
International, 1998, p 269.
82 See Granvik, L. "Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of 
Bindingness" in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects o f the European Union, Kluwer Law 
International, 1998, p. 270.
83 Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The 
General Law o f EC External Relations, 2000, p. 207.
84 [1993] ECR 1-1061.
85 Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The 
General Law o f EC External Relations, 2000, p. 207; Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External 
Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 65-66.
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IV. Implications of Mixed Agreements for Third Parties
In this subtitle we shall evaluate the validity and the effects that the EC's international 
agreements have on non-Member States of the EU. As we know, mixed agreements are, 
together with the exclusive Community agreements, one of the two methods by which
O /T
the Community undertakes contractual international obligations. The answer to be 
given to specific legal problems arising from the issue of mixity may vary depending on 
the subject-matter, in other words, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the field of 
mixed agreements and the responsibility and liability of the EC and its Member States 
vis-a-vis third States, inter alia}1 This, then, leads me to the next section of this subtitle.
A.- Liabilities of the EC and the Member States to Third Parties
Within the EC legal order, the Community and the Member States are responsible for 
the implementation of those parts of a mixed agreement which fall within their 
respective competencies. The only authoritative discussion of the liability of the 
Community and the Member States under a mixed agreement is in the opinion of 
Advocate-General Jacobs in Case C-316/91, where he literally said:
86 See Ehlermann, C. D. “Mixed Agreements: A List of Problems” in O’Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. 
Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, pp. 3-21.
87 Rosas, A. “The European Union and Mixed Agreements,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The 
General Law o f EC External Relations, 2000, p. 207.
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The Lome Convention was concluded as a mixed agreement (i.e. by 
the Community and its Member States jointly) and has essentially a 
bilateral character. This is made clear in Article 1 which states that the 
Convention is concluded between the Community and its Member 
States of the one part, and the ACP States of the other part. U nder a  
m ixed agreem ent the Community and the M em ber States are jo in tly  
liable unless the provision s o f  the agreem ent p o in t to the opposite  
conclusion. (Emphasis added).88
Generally each party to an international agreement is responsible for 
performance of its own obligations, and joint liability under an agreement is not usually 
to be presumed. However, the special circumstances of the EC and the Member States 
may lead to an exception to this rule. The EC and the Member States generally work 
together in pursuit of a common policy. Since it is very difficult to determine where 
legal powers he between the EC and the Member States, for the third party the most 
convenient conclusion is that the EC and the Member States assume joint obligations 
and that they are required to assure these joint obligations. This is also the view of the 
ECJ, with its emphasis on the “requirement of unity” in the external representation of 
the Community. The ECJ also emphasises this view in cases such as Ruling 1/78 (Re 
Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials)89 and Case 104/81 
Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg.90
In agreements where the rights and obligations of the EC and the Member States 
are inter-linked, the problem of the respective liabilities of the Community and the 
Member States will arise quite clearly. In other words, we are dealing here with cases
88 [1994] ECR 1-625, at para. 69.
89 [1978] ECR 2151, at para. 35.
90 [1982] ECR 3641, at paras. 13 and 14.
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where the nature of the agreement is such that a third party is entitled to respond to 
Community or Member State action in one area covered by the agreement by retaliation 
of another area. The main example is the WTO Agreement and those agreements 
associated with it, but in principle the issue could arise in any international agreement to 
which the Community and the Member States were parties. Macleod et al. (1996) go 
further in the explanation by saying that “if the action and retaliation take place in 
respect of matters entirely within the competence of the Community or entirely within 
the competence of the Member States, the problems are less intractable. If, however, the 
third party responds to action in an area of Member State competence by retaliation in 
an area within the competence of the Community, the need for close co-operation 
between the Community and the Member States is evident.”91
When an agreement is covered by a general rule of the law of treaties, by which 
a party is responsible for all obligations of the treaty unless it makes a reservation, we 
are dealing with an agreement which is not mixed under a formal or under a substantive 
definition of mixed agreements. In extreme cases, as Schermers mentions, the position 
might be defended that, in such a case, adherence by the Community implies a tacit 
reservation in the sense that the EC cannot be held liable for matters which are outside 
its competence.92 In these cases, Article 46 of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law
91 Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f  the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 159-60.
92 See Schermers, H. G. "A Typology of Mixed Agreements' in O'Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. (eds.) 
Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983, p. 28.
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of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between International 
Organisations (VCLTIO)93 will apply. It reads as follows:
1.- A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a 
treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law 
regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent 
unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal 
law of fundamental importance.
2.- An international organisation may not invoke the fact that its 
consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of the 
rules of the organisation regarding competence to conclude treaties as 
invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and 
concerned a rule of fundamental importance.
3.- A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any 
State or any international organisation conducting itself in the matter 
in accordance with the normal practice of States and, where 
appropriate, of international organisations, and in good faith.
B.- Effects on Third Parties of Mixed Agreements Concluded in Violation of EC Law
Despite the fact that the internal legal competence of the Communities and the 
Communities’ procedures for concluding agreements are matters of EC Law, both the 
validity and the effects of agreements, in relation to third countries, concluded in the 
framework of any rules of EC Law must be taken into consideration in terms of 
international law, and not EC Law.94 As Brownlie points out, the rules of customary law 
on these issues are not easy to state with certainty.95
93 The 1986 Vienna Convention has not yet entered into force but it follows almost to the letter the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331.
94 See in this respect Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European 
Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 129-32.
95 See Brownlie, I. Principles o f Public International Law, Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 622-24.
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Within the doctrine, some argue that international law leaves the matter to the 
internal rules of the international organisation to determine the procedures by which its 
consent to be bound has to be expressed. Therefore, any violation of the internal rules of 
the organisation “vitiates the expression of such consent, and renders the agreement 
which has been concluded void or voidable.”96 Others believe that the acts of a 
representative of an organisation acting within his authority bind the organisation in 
international law, “even if the internal rules of the organisation have not been complied 
with.”97 As a matter of fact, the principles which appear in Article 46 of the 1986 
VCLTIO fall somewhere between the two previously cited schools and represent the 
views of the majority of jurists.
When looking carefully at Article 46, it will be noted that agreements concluded 
in the framework of an organisation’s internal rules are not ipso facto void. As Macleod 
et al. (1996) argue, the rule in Article 46 applies in principle in favour of the State or 
international organisation which has acted in violation of its own internal rules and 
amounts to a defence against a claim for performance of the agreement by the 
“innocent” party. Therefore, the rule in Article 46 would not apply to a State or 
organisation which has concluded an agreement with the EC to claim that such an 
agreement was void because it had been concluded against a rule of the EC’s internal 
legal order. The rest of Article 46 reinforces this presumption in favour of the validity of 
agreements which have been duly concluded. One of the parties in the agreement must
96 See Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford 1996, p. 130.
97 Ibid.
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show that the violation of its internal rules was “manifest” in order to invoke an 
expression of consent to be bound by that agreement. In order to determine whether a 
violation is “manifest”, Article 46(3) clarifies the situation: the violation must have been 
“objectively evident” to a party acting in accordance with normal practice and in good 
faith. In addition to that, the internal rule involved must have been “of fundamental 
importance”.
To determine the extent to which the powers of the Communities go in relation 
to a given agreement is not always easy. Same thing applies to saying whether these 
powers are exclusive or shared with the Member States. Sometimes the particular roles 
and competencies of each of the Community institutions in the process of concluding 
agreements may not be so obvious. In this regard, irregularities when concluding an 
agreement may not be “manifest” to third parties. This is so because if an agreement 
which has been irregularly concluded is voided, it could be a problem for third parties.
The ECJ supports this view in Case C-327/91 France v. Commission.98 This case 
was about whether the Commission had power to conclude an agreement between the 
Community and the United States in relation to competition. The Court’s opinion was 
that the Commission had no such power, but this did not affect the validity of the 
agreement in international law: “there is no doubt... that the [Competition] Agreement 
is binding on the European Communities...In the event of non-performance of the 
Agreement by the Commission, therefore, the Community could incur liability at
98 Case C-327/91 France v Commission [1994] ECR 1-3641, at para. 25.
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international level.”99 Thus, an agreement concluded by, or in the name of, one of the 
Communities will almost always be binding on that Community as a matter of 
international law. In the light of this argument, Schermers comments that “[Foreign 
States] cannot be expected to know the extent of the competence of the Community. 
Whenever the Community concludes a treaty, foreign States may presume that it has 
power to do so. If the Community acted beyond its powers, it will nonetheless be bound 
unless it or its Member States can prove both its lack of competence and its manifest 
character. The latter will be especially complicated because of the complicated nature of 
EC Law.” 100
In this regard, it is pertinent to mention Article 230 EC, which suggests that 
international acts are unusual in that, unlike other acts, they cannot be voided. From the 
reading of Article 230 EC, first paragraph, however, one could interpret that it is 
possible to annul the conclusion of international agreements concluded by the European
99 Ibid., at para. 25.
100 Schermers in “The Internal Effect of Community Treaty Making” in O’Keeffe & Schermers (eds.) 
Essays on European Law and Integration, Kluwer, 1982, pp. 167-78 at p. 173,
101 Article 230 EC reads as follows:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the European Parliament 
and the Council, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the ECB, other than recommendations 
and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third 
parties.
It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the Council or 
the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, 
infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions bought by the 
European Parliament, by the Court of Auditors and by the ECB for the purpose of protecting their 
prerogatives.
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings against a 
decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a 
decisions addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former.
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Community. An example of it could be the case mentioned earlier where the European 
Commission concluded an agreement vis-a-vis the USA on behalf of the EC on 
competition (Case C-327/91 France v Commission)}Q1 The French Republic argued that 
the Commission had no power to conclude agreements for it is only the Council of the 
European Union the institution which has competence to conclude international 
agreements on behalf of the EC. In this particular case-law, in its paragraph 7, the Court 
literally arguments as follows (I cite the position of the ECJ):
As we know, under the first paragraph of Article 230, the Court 
reviews the legality of acts of the institutions “other than 
recommendations or opinions”. According to the relevant case-law, 
however, for the purposes of judicial review, it is not the form of the 
act which matters but its effects and its content which must be 
verified.103 The Court pointed out in the ERTA judgement104 that an 
action for annulment must be available against “all measures adopted 
by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended 
to have legal effect”.105
Concerning the European Community institutions and the Member States, it is 
not easy to see how they could be obliged as a matter of EC Law to give effect to an 
agreement which was out of the demarcation of the EC’s powers or which had been 
concluded in the framework of constitutional principles of EC Law. However, as 
Macleod et al. mention, if agreements concluded in violation of internal rules of EC
The proceedings provided for in this article shall be instituted within two months of the 
publication of the measure, or of its notification of the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on 
which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be.
102 [1994] EC R 1-3641.
103 See most recently, the judgement in Case C-325/91 France v Commission [1993] ECR 1-3283, at 
paragraph 9.
04 Judgement in Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263, at paragraph 42.
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Law usually remain valid within international law and, therefore, bind on the 
Community vis-a-vis third States, then the institutions and the Member States must 
make sure that the rights of the third State or international organisation under the 
agreement are respected.106 According to Macleod et al. (1996), there are three ways by 
which the EC institutions and the Member States would have to take steps to align both 
the internal and external effects of the agreement: 1) by withdrawing from the 
agreement, supposing this is possible, 2) by rectifying the defect of EC Law or practice 
which has made that agreement invalid or 3) by securing the participation of the 
Member States in the agreement along with the Community. A good example of the 
second way is the Commission’s proposal for a Council decision concluding the 
Competition Agreement with the US which was the subject of annulment proceedings in 
Case C-327/91 France v. Commission}01
However, although the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organisations or between International Organisations almost 
completely assimilates international organisations to States, its main weakness is that it 
does not make a distinction as to treaties between an international organisation and one 
or more of its Member States and third parties.108 Nevertheless, the International Law 
Commission proposed a new Article 36 bis, which reads as follows:
105 Case C-327/91 France v Commission [1994] ECR 1-3647, at paragraph. 7.
106 See Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, 
Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, p 132.
107 [1994] ECR 1-3641. See Dec. 95/145 ([1995] OJ L95/45).
108 See Granvik, L. "Incomplete Mixed Environmental Agreements of the Community and the Principle of 
Bindingness" in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects o f the European Union, Kluwer Law 
International, 1998, pp 262-63.
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Obligations and rights arise for States members of an international 
organisation from the provisions of a treaty to which that organisation 
is a party when the parties to the treaty intend those provisions to be 
the means of establishing such obligations and according such rights 
and have defined their conditions and effects in the treaty or have 
otherwise agreed thereon, and if: a) the States members of the 
organisation, by virtue of the constituent instrument of that 
organisation or otherwise, have unanimously agreed to be bound by 
the said provisions of the treaty, and if: b) the assent of the States 
members of the organisation to be bound by the relevant provisions of 
the treaty has been duly brought to the notice of the negotiating States 
and negotiating organisations.109
This proposal of a new Article 36 bis came into existence mainly because 
Member States of an international organisation appear as “third States” in regard to 
treaties to which the international organisation is a party. Following the words of 
Riphagen, “this fiction is manifestly absurd in most cases” due to the fact that Member 
States are usually closely involved in the conclusion of a treaty by an international 
organisation and also because the other party to that treaty expects performance of the 
Member States. This proposed Article 36 bis followed very closely the idea underlying 
Articles 34 to 37 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. In other words, it 
followed the requirement of consent of a third State. In the eyes of Professor Riphagen, 
Article 36 bis conserves the idea of consent, “be it possibly given (1) before the fact, i.e. 
before the determination of the rights and obligations by the Treaty concluded with the
109 Yearbook of International Law Commission 1982, Vol. II (part 2), p. 43.
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international organisation, and (2) given collectively.”110 In addition to that, Member 
States are usually very involved in the performance of the treaty.111
The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties did not address the question of 
direct effect. In the eyes of Professor Riphagen, this attitude of a system of general 
international law ignoring the domestic legal systems is remarkable in view of the 
emphasis nowadays [1987] placed on the international protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.
V. Exclusive EC competence in International Relations112
With respect to the EC position in international organisations, when a matter falls within 
the exclusive competence of the EC, only the Community acts with regard to that matter 
on the international level.113 Therefore, only the EC, not the Member States, expresses a 
position or a vote on such matters. When dealing with EC competencies, a main 
distinction can be drawn between: a) exclusive and non-exclusive EC competencies, b) 
external and internal EC competencies and c) implicit and explicit attribution of external 
EC competencies.
110 Capotorti, F., Ehlermann, E.-D., Frowein, J., Jacobs, F., Joliet, R., Koopmans, T. & Kovar, R. (eds.) 
Du droit international au droit de I’integration, Nomo Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987, p. 568.
111 See Riphagen, W. “The Second Round of Treaty Law” in Capotorti, F., Ehlermann, E.-D., Frowein, J., 
Jacobs, F., Joliet, R., Koopmans, T. & Kovar, R. (eds.) Du droit international au droit de Vintegration, 
Nomo Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987, pp. 565-581.
112 A good article that deals with the exclusivity of Community competencies vis-a-vis shared 
competencies is the following one: Torrent, R. “Whom is the European Central Bank the Central Bank 
of?: Reaction to Zilioni and Selmayr”, Common Market Law Review 36, 1999, 1229-41, especially pp. 
1236-38.
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A.- Exclusive and Non-Exclusive EC Competencies
When the services of the Commission assure that the content of an international 
agreement belongs to “Community competence”, do they mean European Community’s 
exclusive competence or non-exclusive competence? This same question could be 
addressed to civil servants, Community or national ones, who very often use the 
expression “concerning the first pillar” to refer to works done in the framework of 
ASEM meetings.114 These assertions have a completely different meaning depending on 
whether we are dealing with exclusive or non-exclusive Community competence. In the 
framework of exclusive competencies, only the Community can act, whereas in the 
framework of non-exclusive competencies, if the Community does not act, Member 
States may do so and, in certain cases, they may continue to act even if the Community 
also acts.
A.I.- Exclusive EC Competence
The case-law of the ECJ has established that the EC has exclusive competence in the 
field of common commercial policy. Therefore, Member States are no longer competent 
to act in areas dealing with common commercial policy. The Court clearly
113 MacLeod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p 171.
114 ASEM meetings are held between the European Union and the Asian States.
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acknowledges in its Opinion 1/75115 the exclusivity of the EC on the basis that the 
commercial policy was conceived in the context of the common market and for the 
defence of the common interests of the EC. The ECJ concluded that it could not be 
accepted that the Member States could exercise powers which were concurrent with 
those of the EC in this field. As a logical consequence, one could say that national 
commercial policy measures are only permissible by virtue of specific authorisation by 
the EC. As an example of it we have Case 41/76, Criel, nee Dockenwolcke et al. v. 
Procureur de la Republique au Tribunal de Grande Instance, Lille et al.116 The 
exclusive nature of the EC’s competence has most recently been confirmed in Opinion 
1/94.117
A.2.- Effects of Exclusivity
The main effect of exclusivity in EC competence is that Member States may no longer 
act in the areas in which the EC has exclusive competence. The Court has pronounced 
itself in this way in Opinion 1/75 (Re OECD Local Costs Standard) by saying that “the
1 I  Q
exercise of concurrent powers by the Member States in this matter is impossible.” In 
Case 804/79 Commission v UK (which is not an external relations case), the ECJ 
expressed herself in the same terms when saying that “the power to adopt 
measures...has belonged fully and definitively to the Community. Member States are
115 Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR 1355, at 1363-4.
116 [1976] ECR 1921, at 1937.
117 Opinion 1/94 [1995] 1 CMLRev 205, paras. 22-34.
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therefore no longer entitled to exercise any power of their own in [these matters]. The 
adoption of...measures is a matter of Community Law. The transfer to the Community 
of powers in this matter being total and definitive,...a failure [of the Council] to act 
could not in any case restore to the Member States the power and freedom to act 
unilaterally in this field.” 119
In legal theory, the powers of the Member States have been transferred 
completely to the EC level, and the Member States may not enter into any international 
agreements which could affect measures adopted by the EC or change the scope of these 
measures. It must be clarified, though, that the exclusivity of the EC Common 
Commercial Policy is not the same as the exclusivity of the EC’s implied powers under 
the ERTA principle. In this respect, we have Case 22/70 Commission v Council at 
paragraph 22 as an example given by the Court. Paragraph 22 reads as follows:
If these two provisions are read in conjunction, it follows that to 
the extent to which Community rules are promulgated for the 
attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, the Member States 
cannot, outside the framework of the Community institutions,
assume obligations which might affect those rules or alter their
120scope.
As we see in Opinion 1/75 (Re OECD Local Costs Standard), Member States no 
longer have the right to adopt positions which differ from those which the EC intends to 
adopt in relations with third countries, or take over actions which would hinder the EC
118 [1975] ECR 1355, at 1364.
119 [1981] ECR 1045, at paras. 17,18 and 20.
120 [1971] ECR 263, at 275.
106
The European Community and Mixed Agreements Rafael Leal-Areas
Chapter 3
191in the exercise of its tasks. Nor may they adopt internal legislation which undermines, 
or contradicts, measures adopted, externally or internally, by the Community.
Another effect of exclusivity is that the EC must be allowed to exercise its 
powers with total freedom. Ruling 1/78 {Re the Draft Convention on the Physical 
Protection o f Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports) in this respect concludes 
that “the Member States, whether acting individually or collectively, are no longer able 
to impose on the EC obligations which impose conditions on the exercise of 
prerogatives which thenceforth belong to the EC and which therefore no longer fall 
within the field of national sovereignty.”122 Therefore, the EC may have to become party 
to international agreements which relate to areas of exclusive competence, in order to be 
in a position to comply with the obligations in the agreements in question,123 and in 
order that the fulfilment of the tasks given to the European Communities by the Treaties 
is not put in jeopardy.124 In addition to that, as we can gather from the Joint Cases 3, 4 
and 6/76 Comelis Kramer, Member States are under a duty to use all the political and 
legal means at their disposal in order to ensure the participation of the Community in 
such agreements.125
121 [1975] ECR 1355, at 1364.
122 [1978] ECR 2151, at para. 32.
123 Ibid., at para. 22.
124 Ibid., at para. 33.
125 [1976] ECR 1279 at paras. 44-45 of the judgement.
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A. 3.- Non-Exclusive EC Competence
As for non-exclusive Community competence, there are two types depending on the 
kind of exercise of these competencies. This exercise may be alternative or parallel (or 
complementary) with the exercise of Member States’ competencies. In the first case 
(when the exercise of non-exclusive Community competence is alternative with the 
exercise of Member States’ competencies), if the Community exercises its non- 
exclusive competence, Member States lose the possibility to exercise theirs. However, 
from the moment in which the Community exercises its non-exclusive competence and 
to the extent where it will do so, this exercise pushes away the possibility for Member 
States to act individually. The second case (when the exercise of non-exclusive 
Community competence is parallel or complementary with the exercise of Member 
States’ competencies) appears in two occasions:
a) when the Community is competent to put into practice “action’s programmes” 
over a Community policy which co-exists with national policies on the same 
field. The typical example would be the one of research policies or co-operation 
policies to development.
b) when the Community produces a regulation which, by its own nature, can co­
exist with non-harmonised national rules. This is an exceptionally hypothetical
126 See Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures elans I'Union Europeenne, 
<<http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html>>, 1998, at chapter 2.
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case which occurs in practice only in the field of intellectual property: the 
Community introduces a title and/or a mechanism for protection of the additional 
intellectual property which co-exists with the titles and/or mechanisms of the 
various Member States. Some people may say that this hypothetical case shows 
an exclusive Community competence (and not non-exclusive competence) since 
only the Community can create a Community title of protection of intellectual 
property. This argument, however, runs the risk of transforming all Community 
competencies in exclusive competencies; since only the Community can act at a 
Community level, all Community actions belong to the exclusive Community 
competence. It is, then, preferable to reserve the term “exclusive” for cases 
where Community competence excludes any possible national regime in the 
same field.
One should also observe that the analysis of Community competencies must be 
done in relationship with specific legal situations which are the subject of a potential 
regulation. An international agreement can regulate different legal situations. Those 
situations which do not belong to EC exclusive competence keep belonging to Member 
States’ competencies (unless the Community exercises its non-exclusive competence, 
assuming that it exists in an specific issue).
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B.- External and Internal EC Competencies
Concerning the distinction between external and internal competence, this is a 
problematic issue.127 During the early times of the Community, there was a strong 
tendency to consider that the EC external competence had a more limited scope than the 
internal competence. The evolution of the ECJ case law in its European Road Transport
19RAgreement (ERTA) case [Case 22/70, Commission v Council] and its Opinions 1/68 
and 1/76129 consolidated the thesis of “parallelism” between external and internal 
competencies.130 McGoldrick explains this thesis as follows:
“[The doctrine of parallelisml asserts that the competence of the EC to 
enter into international agreements should run in “parallel” with the
development of its internal competence -in intemo in foro
w  ” 131 extemo.
With regard to the ERTA Case, I would like to write a few lines. The thesis of
1 'I?parallelism previously mentioned gained approval in the ERTA Case. It was in 1962 
when five of the then six Member States of the EEC had signed an agreement known as 
the first ERTA with certain other European States. Such an agreement was not ratified
127 See Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans VUnion Europeenne, 
<<http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html>>. 1998, chapter 2.
128 The ERTA Case (1970): [1971] ECR 263.
129 Opinion 1/76 (Re the Draft Agreement for a Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels) (Rhine 
Navigation Case) [1977] ECR 741.
130 For a deeper understanding of the issue, see Groux, J. "Le parallelism des competences internes et 
extemes de la Communaute economique europeenne" (1978), Cahiers de droit, europeenne, pp. 3-32 and 
McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law o f the European Union, Longman, 1997, pp. 48-50.
131 McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law o f the European Union, Longman, 1997, p. 48.
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by enough of the contracting States, which meant that the Member States began 
negotiations to conclude a second ERTA. In the mean time, the Council issued a 
regulation deriving from its internal power covering the same areas. The Commission 
objected to the Council’s decision to allow negotiations to continue and tried to annul 
the resolution to that effect in the ECJ. The second ERTA was nevertheless concluded in 
1970. According to Kent, “the ECJ held that the EC had the authority to enter into such 
an agreement. Authority may arise not only out of express provision in the Treaty but 
also from other Treaty provisions and from secondary legislation. When the EC had 
adopted common rules to implement a transport policy in 1960, Member States lost their 
competence to conclude international agreements in this area.” 133
The European Court of Justice, in its Case C-327/91 France v 
Commission,134 deals with parallel internal and external powers of the European 
Community. In the above case, the Court gives the following view: “the ERTA
t ' l c
judgement, as we know, is the frame of reference for identifying the external powers 
of the Community, the Court having stated that the possibility of concluding 
international agreements exists not only in the situations exhaustively listed in the 
Treaty but also whenever the Community has internal powers.136” The ECJ goes further
132 For a good explanation of the ERTA Case (1970), Case 22/70, Commission v Council [1971] ECR 
263, see McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law o f the European Union, Longman, 1997, pp. 50-61.
133 Kent, P. Law o f  the European Union, Financial Times Pitman Publishing, 1996, p. 28.
134 [1994] ECR 1-3661, paragraph 35.
135 Judgement in Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263, paragraphs 12 to 15 and 20 to 22.
136 For the same view see, most recently, Opinion 1/92 of 10 April 1992 on the draft agreement between 
the Community and the EFT A countries concerning the creation of a European Economic Area [1992] 
ECR 1-2821, paragraph 39.
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by saying in this same judgement [Judgement in Case 22/70 Commission v Council]131
that “with regard to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty the system of
internal Community measures may not...be separated from that of external relations.
Clearly, if no account were taken to the fact that the point at issue in that case was the
division of powers between the Community and the Member States, such a statement
could be used for recognising, on the assumption that the conditions are fulfilled, the
Commission's limited power to conclude international agreements, which would thus
1 1 8constitute a corollary, as it were, of its specific internal powers in a given area.”
Under this theory of parallelism (or implied powers), the treaty-making or 
external competence of the EC should reflect its internal jurisdiction. The reasoning 
behind this theory is that if the EC has the powers to legislate internally, it should also 
be competent to enter into international agreements in the same fields. In this line of 
argument, one should recall that the EC’s treaty-making powers may be divided into two 
categories: express powers and implied powers. Agreements are negotiated by the 
Commission and concluded by the Council, normally after consultation with the 
European Parliament.139
However, during the 70s, the Commission and an important part of the doctrine 
developed the thesis by which the exclusive competence had a larger scope in the 
external level than in the internal one. In other words, the Community would have an 
exclusive competence to conclude international agreements on issues that, in the internal
137 [1971] ECR 263, paragraphs 16 to 19.
138 See Case C-327/91 France v Commission [1994] ECR 1-3661, paragraph 35.
139 See Kent, P. Law o f the European Union, Financial Times Pitman Publishing, 1996, p. 28.
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sphere, still belong to Member States’ competencies. This thesis has been invalidated by 
the Court of Justice in its Opinions 1/94 and 2/94 which, grosso modo, follow the thesis 
of parallelism between external and internal competencies.
C.- Implicit and Explicit Attribution of External EC Competencies
The third distinction which I would like to present deals with the implicit and explicit 
attribution of external EC competencies. This distinction deals only with the external EC 
competencies. It is the result of the interpretation given by the ECJ to the provisions of 
the Treaty in a constant case law whose main steps are, in the past, the principle 
ERTA140 and Opinion 1/76 “Rhine and Mosselle Navigation Case”141 and, more 
recently, Opinions 2/91, 1/94 “Uruguay Round”142 and Opinion 2/92 “OECD national 
treatment”.143 The Court has decided in its Opinion 1/76 that “competence to be 
internationally engaged can result not only from an explicit attribution by the Treaty but 
also as an implicit consequence from its [the Treaty’s] provisions”144 “and from acts 
taken, in the framework of these provisions, by the Community’s institutions.”145
Two more points concerning this distinction between the implicit and explicit 
attribution of EC external competencies:
140 Case of 31 March 1971, ERTA, ECR p. 273.
141 ECR 1977, p. 741.
142 ECR 1994, p. 1-5267.
143 ECR 1995, p. 1-521.
144 Opinion 1/76, para. 3.
145 See ERTA Case, para. 16.
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1.- among the explicitly attributed external competencies, some are 
exclusive (mainly article 133 EC, dealing with the Common Commercial 
Policy) and others are not (such as article 181 TEU, dealing with co­
operation to development).
2.- among the implicitly attributed external competencies, some are 
exclusive (see ERTA case) and others are not. An example of implicitly 
attributed external competencies which are non-exclusive is the general 
principle by which a non-exclusive competence can be exercised directly 
on the external sphere to conclude an international agreement without any 
prior exercise on the internal sphere.
VI. Conclusion
To sum up this chapter, and following the line of thought of Timmermans, C. & Volker 
E. (1981), "mixed agreements are one of the most distinctive features of the external 
relations law and practice of the Communities as well as one of the most difficult."146 
We find three types of competence for matters covered by an international agreement: 1) 
competence exclusively with the Community; 2) competence shared between the 
Community and the Member States; 3) competence exclusively with the Member
146 See generally, Timmermans, C. & Volker, E. (eds.) Division o f Powers between the European 
Communities and their Member States in the Field o f External Relations, Kluwer, 1981; O'Keeffe, D. & 
Schermers, H. (eds.) Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983.
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States.147 In the case where the Community is the only one competent for matters 
covered by an international agreement, then the Community alone should become party 
of that agreement. However, there are some cases where even if the substance of the 
agreement is of exclusive Community competence, the participation of Member States 
may also be necessary.148 In such cases it is important to distinguish between the 
theoretical situation and how it is in practice. Theoretically speaking, in these cases 
Member States do not participate in the table of negotiations alongside the European 
Community.149 Nevertheless, in practical terms the agreement itself may require the 
participation of Member States in the agreement so that the Community can exercise its 
competencies and participate effectively.150
In the case where Member States and the Community share competence, there 
are several ways to carry out this task. Some of the obligations in the agreement may 
have to do with matters for which the Community is exclusively competent. Others have 
to do with issues for which the Member States are exclusively competent.151 Sometimes 
it is so that by virtue of the provisions of the Treaties the agreement is related to an area 
in which the Member States and the Community share competence to act. In other 
occasions the agreement may deal with issues where the powers of the Member States 
and the Community run in parallel so that each has an independent and separate interest
147 See Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, 
Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, p. 142.
148 Ibid., p. 142.
149 This is so because Member States have transferred their competencies to the Communities.
150 See Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, 
Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, p. 142.
151 Ibid.
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in participating in the agreement. As we see in the book of MacLeod et al (1996) 
"where competence for the subject matter of an agreement is shared between the 
Community and the Member States, the full implementation of the obligations in the 
agreement will usually require the participation in the agreement of the Communities 
and the Member States together, each in respect of their powers and interests."152
Though most mixed agreements involve just the EC (with the Member States, 
obviously), agreements involving the EC and the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) are not rare. In this sense we find many association agreements in the EC 
legislation. However, agreements involving all three Communities153 are uncommon. An 
example of this are some of the regional environmental agreements.
In the view of Allan Rosas, “pure Community agreements may be preferred not 
only by the Commission but sometimes also by some or all of the Member States, 
mainly in order to speed up the process and avoid complications of various sorts. There 
have been situations where third States, out of similar considerations, have expressed a 
preference for a pure Community agreement.”154 A practical alternative seems to be the 
adoption of soft law instruments in the form of a declaration plan, which may be 
adopted by the Council and in some cases also signed by the Council Presidency and/or 
the Commission, but without the need of 15 national ratifications. Examples are the
152 See Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, 
Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, p. 143.
153 The European Communities are composed of: European Coal and Steel Community -Treaty of Paris, 
1952; European Economic Community -Treaty of Rome, 1957 and European Atomic Energy Community- 
Euratom, 1957.
154 See Rosas, A. “The European Union and mixed agreements” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The 
General Law o f EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 216.
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Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 27-28 
November 1995 and the New Transatlantic Agenda signed by President Clinton, Prime 
Minister Gonzalez of Spain (representing the then Spanish Council Presidency) and 
President Santer of the European Commission.155
With regard to treaties, and notably bilateral agreements, one could try to devise 
the negotiation directives to be adopted by the Council,156 and to conduct the actual 
negotiations in order to avoid areas of national competence. One should note that 
Member States are often unwilling to authorize the Community alone to conclude
1 S7bilateral agreements containing concurrent competencies. An example would be the 
existence of substantive provisions relating to intellectual property rights (as well as in 
services and direct investment). Such provisions in a bilateral agreement would almost 
inevitably lead to mixity, as some Member States seem to interpret Opinion 1/94 as 
establishing exclusive national competence in this field. On the potential competence of 
the Community to conclude international agreements in the field of intellectual property 
rights, it is pertinent to see Case C-53/96 Hermes International,158 The Commission
155 (1996) 1 European Foreign Affairs Rev. 125. See also the documents adopted at the EU-US Summit in 
London on May i8 , 1998 with a view to resolve the so-called Helms-Burton dispute (Understanding with 
Respect to Disciplines for the Strengthening of Investment Protection, Transatlantic Partnership on 
Political Co-operation , Understanding on Conflicting Requirements). See Smis, S. & Van der Borght, K. 
“The EU -U S Compromise on the Helms-Burton and D ’Amato Acts”, (1999) 93 American Journal of 
International Law, 227-236; idem. “The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 
Some Aspects from the Perspective of International Economic Law”, Revue Beige de Droit International 
1998/1, pp. 217-258.
156 See Article 300(1) EC.
157 See Rosas, A. “The European Union and mixed agreements” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The 
General Law o f EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 217.
158 [1998] ECR 1-3603.
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may try to avoid provisions on questions such as intellectual property rights, services, 
investment or monetary policy in order to avoid assertions of mixity.
Development co-operation agreements and environmental agreements often 
belong to the category of concurrent competencies above mentioned, as concurrent 
competencies are spelled out in the EC Treaty,159 but a potential competence may exist 
in many other areas such as intellectual property rights, investment or services, covered 
by the EC Treaty as well. It should be recalled that concurrent competencies are subject 
to the ERTA principle (Case 22/70 Commission v. Council)160 on exclusive Community 
competence, i.e., that the adoption by the EC of common rules may create exclusive 
Community competence also in the fields covered by Articles 111, paragraph 5, 
(agreements relating to economic and monetary policy) 174, paragraph 4 (environmental 
agreements) and 181 paragraph 2 (agreements relating to development co-operation) of 
the EC Treaty, which provide that not only the Community but also the Member States 
may negotiate in international bodies and conclude international agreements.
It, then, remains to be seen to what extent the Council will agree to the 
Community becoming a party to such agreements and conventions, without insisting on 
Member States participation. In most cases, this will probably not be the case and mixity 
will continue to exist.161 The fact that the last Intergovernmental Conference in Nice in 
December of 2000 did not want to broaden Article 133 EC so as to cover all questions 
of services, intellectual property rights, and investment is a clear sign of the
159 Article 174 EC, para. 4, and Article 181.
160 [1971] ECR 263.
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unwillingness of Member States to give up mixity even in areas of commercial policy. 
Another example is that of a trade and co-operation agreement negotiated with South 
Africa that Member States refused to accept in the spring of 1999 as a pure Community 
agreement, even if it was obvious that there was no legal need to conclude the 
agreement as a mixed agreement. The agreement was signed on October 11, 1999.162 
While the Commission preferred a Community agreement, the great majority of 
Member States wanted the agreement to become mixed.
161 See Rosas, A. “The European Union and mixed agreements” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The 
General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 219.
162 The proposal from the Commission to the Council to conclude an agreement on trade, development 
and co-operation between the Community and South Africa is contained in document COM (1999) 245 
final of May 11, 1999.
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CHAPTER IV: EC INSTITUTIONS IN THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
I. Introduction
II. European Union, European Community & European Communities
III. Role of the national ministers responsible. What Member States have to say
IV. The Commission as a negotiator
V. The Council as a consultator and concluder
A.- The Council of the EU versus the 15 Member States
VI. The European Parliament as a consultator
VII. Decision Making Process
A.- The three internal tensions 
A.I.- Competence 
A.2.- Control
A.3.- Efficiency vs. Accountability
VIII. Conclusion
I. Introduction
This chapter is meant to arise a problem which has always existed in the construction of 
Europe, i.e. the logical disagreement over the division of powers between the EC and 
the Member States.1 This provokes internal tensions in European policy-making. Proof 
of it is the EC commercial policy, which is carried out by technocrats (from national and
1 Timmermans, C. & Volker, E. (eds.) Division o f  Powers between the European Communities and their 
Member States in the Field o f External Relations, Kluwer, 1981.
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European Administrations). This chapter will also deal with the main actors in the EC 
external trade relations and will analyse the role they play in the European Commercial 
policy-making. It intends to go actor by actor and see their influence in the policy­
making process.3
The major institutions dealing with the External Relations of the European 
Community will also be analysed in the current chapter. Here we shall see that as far as 
actors (by actors we understand Contracting Parties) are concerned, “third States may 
face [in mixed agreements] one or more of the Communities, one or more of the 
Communities together with one or more of the (by now 15) Member States, the Member 
States acting jointly, for instance, under the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) spelled out in Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and the Member 
States acting in a more individual capacity.”4
The European Union, acting under Title V (or Title VI) of the TEU, is not a legal 
person in its own right (but the three Communities, constituting the foundation of the 
Union [see Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Treaty on European Union, according to which 
the Union “shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the 
policies and forms of co-operation established by this Treaty”] remain legal persons). 
Thus, when the EU Administration for the City of Mostar was set up in September 1994 
by a Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and the Western European Union,
2 Maresceau, M. The European Community's Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal Dimension, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993.
3 Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996.
121
Institutions in EC External Relations Rafael Leal-Arcas
Chapter 4
on the one hand, and various ex-Yugoslavia actors, on the other, the EU side was 
defined as “the Member States of the European Union acting within the framework of 
the Union in full association with the European Commission”. At the Intergovernmental 
Conference in Amsterdam, the question whether the Union should be endowed with 
legal personality in its own right was raised (possibly implying at the same time a 
merger of the three existing legal persons -the Communities).
To this can be added that, while Community treaties should normally be 
concluded by the Council, the Commission, too, has certain powers to enter into 
international agreements (albeit on behalf of the Communities), and a general right to 
represent the Union in its external relations. Even some quasi-independent Community 
agencies have been given certain external functions.”5 In this respect, it should be 
mentioned that Article 300 paragraph 2 EC6 states that agreements shall be concluded 
by the Council “subject to the powers vested in the Commission in this field.” 
Therefore, the Commission can conclude, inter alia, technical co-operation agreements 
under Article 302 of the EC Treaty and financing agreements under Article 106 of the 
Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977.7 According to Article 3, paragraph. 2, 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), it is not only the Council, but also the Commission, 
which is responsible for ensuring the consistency of external activities of the Union. The
4 See Rosas, A. “Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects o f the 
European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 126.
5 See Rosas, A. “Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects of the 
European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 126.
6 On Article 300 of the EC Treaty, see Frid, R. The Relations between the EC and International 
Organisations: Legal Theory and Practice, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995, p. 126.
7 OJ N. L 356, 31 December 1977, p. 1.
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Commission negotiates international agreements to be concluded by the EC (Article 
300, para. 1, EC Treaty) and is responsible for representations (called Commission 
delegations) in about 130 countries.8
In section II of this chapter, we intend to clarify some terminological concepts in 
the European integration project, which often are misused in the literature. Section III 
analyzes the role of national ministers in the External Relations of the EC. A thorough 
analysis of certain European institutions such as the Commission (Section IV) shall also 
be taken into account. We shall see, inter alia, how the Commission, the negotiator of 
international agreements, is limited by the Council in its initiatives and in its negotiation 
autonomy.9 Many of these issues deal with the division of roles between the 
Commission and the Presidency of the EU in the field of international trade.10 The 
Council, i.e. the intergovernmental body of the Union and consultator of international 
agreements, shall be analysed as the responsible authority for conclusion of agreements 
(Section V). We shall study how far the Community is competent to adhere to a certain 
international agreement and what is left to the Member States’ competence.11
Section VI is devoted to the role and competence of the European Parliament is 
these issues. The last sub-title of this chapter (Section VII) is devoted to the decision 
making processes in EC commercial policy and the analysis of why the EU has been
8 See Article 16 TEU.
9 See Louis, J.-V. “Preface” in Flaesch-Mougin, C. Les Accords Extemes de la CEE. Essai d ’une 
Typologie, Editions de l ’Universite de Bruxelles, 1980, at p. 12.
10 See Beseler, H. F. “The representation of the European Community on issues of international trade”, in 
a note to the attention of the Heads of Delegations of the EU, 12 April 1999.
11 See Grosses, S. I. H. “Contribution to the Discussion” in Timmermans, C. & Volker, E. (eds.) Division 
o f Powers between the European Communities and their Member States in the Field o f External 
Relations, Kluwer, 1981, at p. 127 ss.
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criticised for its commercial policy, for being unable to negotiate without internal 
agreement and incapable of negotiating with one voice, due to a constraining mandate.12
1 1II. European Union, European Community & European Communities
As Ramon Torrent14 indicates, the institutional system of the European Union (EU) is 
perceived in a confusing way, not only by the citizens of the Union but also by those 
who direct the Union, those politically responsible for it, and by the civil servants of the 
European Institutions.15 In such a case, we must approach the institutional system of the 
EU with a double perspective, a double side: a legal side and a political side. A legal 
side, because one cannot direct or guide a system without knowing the rules of the 
game; a political side, because one must know the reasons for a malfunctioning of the 
system.16
Since the Treaty on the European Union came into force (Maastricht Treaty or 
TEU)17 on the 1st of November 1993, the use of the expression "European Union" has 
been generalised. At the same time, among the experts, the use of "pillars of the 
European Union" is very much a la mode. These two phenomena are to be regretted
12 See Woolcock, S. “The European Union’s Role in International Commercial Diplomacy”, p. 9. 
(Unpublished Article).
13 See Westlake, M. The Council o f the European Union, Cartermill, 1995, pp. 5-7.
14 Ramon Torrent is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Barcelona and was Director 
responsible for the External Trade Relations of the European Community in the Legal Service of the 
Council of the European Union until May 1998.
15 Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans I'Union Europeenne, 
<<http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html>>. 1998, introduction.
16 Ibid
17 OJ C 224/1, (1992).
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since they tend to create confusion (with an indiscriminate use of the expression 
"European Union") or they tend to introduce a kind of false compartmentalisation (i.e. 
division of competencies in the EU by pillars) on the institutional reality to which these 
expressions make reference. The reasons which motivate this regret are mainly political: 
the fact of knowing who does what, and therefore who is responsible for certain issues, 
constitutes the conditio sine qua non, on one hand, for policy-makers to master the 
nature of their decisions and, on the other hand, for a minimum of democratic control to 
be possible.18
Throughout this dissertation, terms such as European Union, European 
Community or European Communities appear continuously. The European Parliament, 
as well as other institutions, uses the term European Union for making reference to the 
external trade relations. However, lawyers should know that it is the European 
Community, and not the European Union, the one which has competence in the field of 
international trade relations. The Community is part of the Union. The European Union 
is not a member of international organisations.19 That is why it is said that the EU does 
not negotiate in the World Trade Organisation’s agreements and is not a member of such 
an organisation. It may be politically convenient to refer to the European Union rather 
than to the European Community as an international economic actor but it is incorrect.20
18 Ibid., at chapter 1.
19 Paemen, H. “The European Union in International Affairs: Recent Developments”, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol. 22, 1999, pp. 136-48.
20 See Van den Bossche, P. L. H., “The European Community and the Uruguay Round Agreements” in 
Jackson, J. & Sykes, A. Implementing the Uruguay Round, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1997, footnote 1, p. 
23.
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Furthermore, Ambassador Hugo Paemen21 accepts the importance of making a 
terminological distinction between the EC and the EU when dealing with external trade 
relations. I cite him literally:
“I should make a clear distinction between the terms “European 
Community” (or EC) and “European Union”. After all, until the 
Treaty o f Amsterdam22 com es into force, only the European 
Community w ill grant it legal personality. Therefore, please forgive 
me if  occasionally I use the terms European Union where it is not 
correct: W e went through a very painful adjustment period to go  from  
the European Community to European Union, so  it is somewhat 
difficult now to make the distinction.” 23
Lawyers have long discussed, within the external relations of the EU, whether 
the EU can have external relations at all. This is so because the Treaties confer legal 
personality to the three Communities and not to the Union as such. By legal personality 
we understand the capacity to enter into contractual and other relations with third States 
and to bear full responsibility for one’s actions.
There are interpretations on the capacity of external action of the EU.24 However, 
such a capacity is not supported by the preparatory work of the Maastricht Treaty or 
subsequent practice. As an example of this we have a Memorandum of Understanding of 
1994, which set up an EU administration for the City of Mostar. This Memorandum was
21 Former Head of the European Commission Delegation to the United States.
22 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, October 2, 1997, OJ C 340/1 (1997).
23 See Paemen, H. “The European Union in International Affairs: Recent Developments”, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol 22, 1999, p. 136.
24 See, in this respect, Klabbers, J. “Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International Law”, 
in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) International Law Aspects o f the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 
1998, pp. 231-53.
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prepared within the context of the second pillar and had to be concluded on behalf of the 
“Member States of the European Union acting within the framework of the Union in full 
association with the European Commission.”25 Here one could ask whether the 
cumbersome title of the Mostar Memorandum of Understanding is conductive to assert 
the “identity” of the EU on an international scene which, according to Article 2 of 
TEU,26 is one of the objectives of the Union. Legally binding agreements concluded by 
the EU are still made on behalf of one or more of the three Communities. It must be said 
clearly that the EC, and not the EU, is a member of the World Trade Organisation or 
regional fisheries organisations, to give two examples.27
In the post-Maastricht era the concept of the Union stands out as a signpost. The 
general public, as well as third States and international organisations, may well be under 
the impression that the EC no longer exists. It is normally the EU that enters into an 
engagement when policy documents, which are not going through the formalities of a 
treaty, are drown up. As an example we have the comprehensive political arrangement 
relating to the EU-US dispute over US unilateral sanctions policy, i.e. Helms-Burton 
Act. This arrangement was concluded at the EU-US Summit in London on May 18, 
1998, and refers continuously to the EU as one of the parties.
The package adopted at this Summit includes an “Understanding with Respect to 
Disciplines for the Strengthening of Investment Protection”, the ‘Transatlantic
25 See Bury, C & Hetsch, P. “Politique etrangere et de securitd commune” Rep. Communataire Dalloz, 
October 1996, pp. 1-11, at p. 8.
26 Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992).
27 In this respect see Sack, J. “The European Community’s Membership of International Organisations”, 
Common Market Law Review, 32, 1995, pp. 1227-1256.
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Partnership on Political Co-operation” and an “Understanding on Conflicting 
Requirements.” The negotiations leading up to this package were based on an EU-US 
Understanding of 11 April 1997. This Understanding enabled the EU to suspend a case 
against the US in the context of the World Trade Organisation.28 Also a Joint 
Declaration on EU-Palestinian Security Co-operation agreed with the Palestinian 
Authority on April 20, 1998, refers to the EU as the other party. In these two examples 
above illustrated, there are concrete commitments of a political rather than of a legally 
binding nature (soft law).
As Ramon Torrent explains in his book (Torrent, 1998),29 the EU involves the 
European Community (EC) and its Member States. The European Union is the political 
and institutional framework in which the EC's and certain Member States' competencies 
are exercised. In the case of Member States, the competencies which are within the 
institutional framework of the EU are the second and third pillars (Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs, respectively) of the EU. The EU, 
established by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) [also known as the Treaty of 
Maastricht],30 now has 15 Member States and a complex structure including both 
integrationist and intergovernmental elements, known as “pillars”. According to the 
TEU, the Union is founded on the European Communities (Article 1) and is served by a 
single institutional framework (Article 3). However, there are important legal
28 For the background to the dispute, see Sterm, B. “Vers la mondialisation juridique? Les lois Helms- 
Burton et D ’Amato-Kennedy”, Revue Generate de Droit International Public, 1996, pp. 979-1003.
29 I have referred to his book earlier in this chapter.
30 OJC 191, M y 29, 19992.
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differences between the European Communities and the EU (of which the Communities 
form apart, called the first pillar).31
One terminological precision is vital for understanding well what we are trying 
to say. In this study the term European Community is often used to refer to the three 
Communities (The European Economic Community -which became European 
Community with the Maastricht Treaty-, The European Community of Steel and Coal 
and Euratom). In fact, the three Communities work as one entity which functions in the 
framework of three Treaties, even if they are legally different.
As for the European Communities it must be said that the WTO-Agreement was 
concluded by the European Communities and not by the European Community.32 It was 
thought that, to the extent the Uruguay Round Agreements concerned matters falling 
within the scope of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) or Euratom 
Treaty, these agreements fell outside the competence of the European Community.
Now it must also be said that within the EC there is exclusive and non-exclusive 
Community competence.33 In addition to that, Torrent speaks as well of other 
competencies of the Member States which are exercised outside the institutional 
framework of the EU. However, in those cases where Member States exercise their 
competencies outside the institutional framework of the EU, they must respect the 
obligations imposed by EC Law (and by the Maastricht Treaty, as well). As we can 
deduce from this framework, the actors with a given legal personality and competencies
31 See Kennedy, T. Learning European Law. A Primer and Vade-mecum, Sweet and Maxwell, 1998, pp. 
49 et seq.
32 WTO, The Uruguay Round Results. The Legal Texts (Geneva, 1995), 6.
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are the EC and its Member States. On one hand, the Community always acts in the 
framework of the EU since its institutional system has been taken by the TEU as an 
institutional system of the Union. On the other hand, its Member States may act outside 
the EU’s institutional system.
Examples where Member States act outside the EU’s institutional system are 
inter alia when in January 2000 the German Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Fischer (or 
any Minister from any Member State) went to Moscow to see the current Prime Minister 
of Russia, Mr Putin. In this case, the German Minister visited Moscow on a bilateral 
basis and not representing the EU. A more recent example has been the decision adopted 
by 14 Member States against Austria in February of 2000 because of the creation of a 
new Government in Vienna with a nationalsocialistic coalition. Measures at the highest 
political level were taken to show the other 14 Member States disagreement with the 
creation of such a Government. Again, these measures were taken individually by each 
and every Member State. Also the humanitarian aid donated by Member States 
individually to the terrible events occurred in Rwanda in 1997 is another example of 
Member States acting outside the EU’s institutional system.34
However, in certain cases Member States' competencies can be exercised within 
the institutional system of the Union. Here one should understand that there are two 
functions of the TEC which must be distinguished: 1) application’s scope of the TEC 
and 2) competence’s scope of the TEC. By this we mean, for example, that although
33 See in this dissertation the chapter on Mixed Agreements and the European Community in this respect.
34 Bajwa, S. & Jason-Lloyd, L. The Legal Framework o f the European Union, Frank Cass, 1997.
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Criminal Law is not outside the application’s scope of the TEC, it is competence of the 
Member States. Another clear example is with education policies. At the moment, there 
is no common education policy in the EU. Therefore, it is an issue of national 
competence. However, it is no longer possible to discriminate other nationals of any 
Member State of the Union when applying for a post as a teacher for not being nationals 
of the country where the application is taking place. In other words, it is no longer 
possible to restrict eligibility to a public teaching post on the basis of the nationality 
within the EU.
As a personal interpretation, it is obvious that there is a commitment among the 
Member States to put into practice all the necessary tools in order to achieve the goals of 
the EC Treaty. Perhaps this table might clarify in a visual way what has been said so far:
35 See Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans I'Union Europeenne,
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Scope Actors Competence










Parliament and interest 
groups)
CFSP,42
police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal 
matters43
Pillar44
Outside the European 
Union’s institutional 
framework
Member States act 
independently from the 
EU45
<<http://vyww.ub.es/dpeq3/ep/livreT0rrent.html>>. 1998, chapter 1.
36 This new entity embraces both the Treaty of Rome and the two pillars of intergovernmental activity -  
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice/Home Affairs-.
37 As mentioned above, the EC is a supranational organisation, i.e. one to which the Member States have 
transferred specific legislative and executive powers and whose decisions are binding on them and their 
citizens. For further details, see Drost, H. What’s what and Who’s who in Europe, Cassell, 1995, p. 207.
38 By European Institutions, we understand those institutions which deal with European issues and which 
are not national institutions. In the Community terminology, the first pillar deals with the European 
Communities (I should like to remind that throughout this dissertation the term European Community 
shall be used to refer to the 3 European Communities), whereas the second and third pillars have an 
intergovernmental character and, therefore, Member States deal with them. This clarification should be 
shown later on the dissertation.
39 For a definition of Exclusive EC competence, see the chapter which deals with it in this dissertation.
40 Ibid.
41 Member States, as actors in EC legislation, deal with CFSP and JHA, which are forms of 
intergovernmental co-operation. They retain full sovereign rights, and hence, decision making is by 
unanimity. See, for further details, Drost, H. What’s what and Who’s who in Europe, Cassell, 1995, p. 
207.
42 CFSP stands for Common Foreign and Security Policy, which appears on Title V of the Treaty on 
European Union.
43 It appears on Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.
44 The idea of the “fourth pillar” is a creation of Professor Torrent.
45 However, formally speaking, Member States have to follow the EC legal order. Even if  Member States 
act bilaterally, they will be affected by the EC legal order.
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III. Role of the national ministers responsible. What Member States have to say46
John Peterson and Helene Sjursen argue that the move from EPC -in retrospect, a 
strikingly anodyne construction- to the CFSP was propelled by ambitions to create a 
“common” EU foreign policy analogous to, say, the Common Agricultural Policy or 
Common Commercial Policy.47 Yet, French national foreign policy decisions to test 
nuclear weapons in the Pacific, send troops to Bosnia, or propose a French candidate to 
head the European Central Bank could be viewed as far more momentous and 
consequential than anything agreed within the CFSP between 1995 and 1997. It is 
plausible to suggest, as David Allen does, that the EU simply does not have a “foreign 
policy” in the accepted sense. Going one step further, the CFSP may be described, 
perhaps dismissed, as a “myth”. It does not, as the Maastricht Treaty promises, cover 
“all areas of foreign and security policy”. Obviously, it is not always supported “actively 
and unreservedly by its Member States in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity”.
Having said that, and knowing that the presumption in the European Union is to 
have collective action,48 is there really a “common” European interest? If so, is this 
interest so great as to assume that in certain circumstances Member States will act with a 
single voice? Do Members States have enough proximity in their national interests to act 
with one voice in the international sphere?
46 Goldstein, J. & Keohane, R. (eds.) Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, 
Cornell University Press, 1993.
47 Peterson, J. & Sjursen, H. “Conclusion. The Myth of the CFSP?”, in Peterson, J. & Sjursen, H. (eds.) A 
Common Foreign Policy fo r  Europe? Competing Visions o f the CFSP, Routledge, 1998, p. 169.
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Following the same authors49 the European Union has not yet reached its apogee 
in terms of its ability to act with power and unity in international affairs.50 However, 
some competencies are exclusively of the European Community. Customs duties and 
protective NTBs (quantitative limits, safety norms, health and hygiene standards, etc.) 
were and are fixed by the Union as a whole, not by the individual Member States.51
The first pillar of the EU (i.e. European Communities)52 makes use of the legal 
instruments set out in the Treaty of Rome, unlike the second and third pillars,53 which 
have an intergovernmental character. This means that in the first pillar Member States 
have permanently transferred some of their powers to the EC, so limiting their 
sovereignty. Evidence of it is Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL.54 As a consequence, "certain 
competencies (or powers) are now held by the EC -they have been conferred on it, or 
attributed to it by the Member States. Ex Article 5 (new Article 10) of the EC Treaty 
refers to the powers "conferred" upon the EC by the Treaty. The EC has only those 
specific powers which have been conferred upon it. Thus, the presumption of 
competence lies with the Member States."55 It can, then, be said that in the first pillar of
48 Carlsnaes, W. & Smith, S. (eds.), European Foreign Policy. The European Community and Changing 
Perspectives in Europe, SAGE Publications, 1994.
49John Peterson & Helene Sjursen.
50 Cafuny, A. & Peters, P. The Union and the World: The Political Economy o f  a Common European 
Foreign Policy, Kluwer Law International, 1998.
51 Piening, C. Global Europe. The European Union in World Affairs, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, p. 
13
52 The European Communities are composed of the European Coal and Steel Community, by the Treaty of 
Paris, 1952, the European Economic Community, by the Treaty of Rome, 1957 and the European Atomic 
Energy Community-Euratom, 1957.
53 The second pillar of the EU deals with the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The third pillar, 
however, deals with police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. See 
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000p.htm#p3.
54 (1964) ECR 585 at 593-4.
55 McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997, p.42.
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the European Union Member States have to operate with one voice and they have 
accepted that the Commission should act on their behalf.
As Professor Weiler points out, will Member States lose their right to engage in 
international relations in those areas where the Community has competence?56 This is an 
obvious question to ask in issues dealing directly with the first pillar of the EU, where 
Member States are willing to cede the negotiating role over the negotiations to the EC. 
Furthermore, this aspect of Member States losing their right to engage in international 
relations in those areas where the Community has competence "is usually the most 
problematic, as it is this which most directly affects their autonomy and results in then- 
being increasingly dependant upon EC Institutions to further their national interests.
From an EC perspective, however, exclusive competencies have many benefits. 
They result in an increased autonomy for the EC by forcing third States to deal 
exclusively with the Community; contribute to a Community identity by making the EC 
the external representative of internal interests, and strengthen the EC Institutions' 
negotiating position vis-a-vis Member States on internal matters by giving the former an 
additional source of power which they can wield."57
56 Weiler, J. "The External Legal Relations of Non-Unitary Actors: Mixity and the Federal Principle" in 
O'Keeffe, D. & Schermenrs, H. (eds.) Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1983.
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IV. The Commission as a negotiator
In this subtitle attention shall be paid, inter alia, to the Commission’s competence in 
commercial policy as defined by the treaties and the European Court of Justice. 
According to Articles 300(1) EC and 101 Euratom, international treaty negotiations in 
respect of matters involving an element of Community competence should be 
conducted a priori by the Commission. In theory, the Member States and the 
Community could each negotiate independently their respective competencies. 
However, in practice it is unusual for the Member States and the Community to 
negotiate independently.58 This puts the Commission in a position in which it is the 
natural representative, the spokesman and the only negotiator of the Community.59 
"The basic rule under the EC Treaty has always been that the Commission negotiates 
agreements on behalf of the Community".60 Article 300 (1) EC reads as follows:
W here this Treaty provides for the conclusion o f agreements between  
the Community and one or m ore States or international organizations, 
the Com m ission shall m ake recommendations to the Council, which  
shall authorize the C om m ission to open the necessary negotiations. 
The Com m ission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with  
special committees appointed by the Council to assist it in this task  
and within the framework o f  such directives as the Council may issue  
to it.
57 Chalmers, D. & Szyszczak, E. European Union Law. Volume II. Towards a European Polity?, 
Dartmouth, 1998, p. 178.
58 Macleod, I., Hendry.I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p. 152.
59 Beseler, H. F. “The representation of the European Community on issues of international trade”, in a 
note to the attention of the Heads of Delegations of the EU, 12 April 1999, p. 2.
60 Macleod, I., Hendry.I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p. 85.
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In exercising the powers conferred on it by this paragraph, the Council 
shall act by a qualified majority, except in the cases provided for in 
the second sentence of paragraph 2, which it shall act unanimously.
With regard to the management of the EC external relations, there are two types 
of international agreements to take into account, bilateral and multilateral agreements. In 
bilateral agreements, in Article 300 (l)61 the Treaty of Rome imposes a duty on the 
Commission to “negotiate in consultation with any committees established for the 
purpose by the Council. Secondly, the Treaty requires the Commission to respect the 
Council’s instructions regarding the conduct of the negotiations, as such instructions 
may from time to time be given in directives of the Council.” The participation of a 
Community representative in the negotiation of the agreement must be based on an 
authorization obtained by the Commission in accordance with the appropriate procedure 
pursuant to the relevant Treaty provision.63 In the context of Article 300 (1) EC, a 
negotiating directive constitutes an instruction to the Commission on the content of the 
negotiation.64 It must be said, though, that negotiations under Article 300 EC are not 
affected by the bilateral or multilateral nature of the agreements.
61 Article 300 (1) EC reads as follows:
Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or 
more States or international organisations, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, 
which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Commission shall conduct 
these negotiations in consultation with special committees appointed by the Council to assist it in this task 
and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it.
In exercising the powers conferred on it by this paragraph, the Council shall act by a qualified 
majority, except in the cases provided for in the second sentence of paragraph 2, for which it shall act 
unanimously.
62 See Macloeod, I., Hendry. I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, 
Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, p. 88.
63 See Macloeod, I., Hendry. I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, 
Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, p. 151.
64 Ibid.
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In the eyes of Macleod et al (1996), negotiating directives are generally attached 
to the authorization given to the Commission by the Council at the beginning of the 
negotiation.65 This mandate of negotiation must be discussed by the EU Council. In 
certain cases, it is evident that the bulk of the agreement relates to matters within the
competence of the Member States but that certain incidental aspects involve the
competence of the EC.66 The 1998 Vienna Convention on Illicit Trafficking in Drugs 
related for the most part to matters that fell under the competence of the Member States, 
such as penalizing certain conduct and arrangements for extradition, inter alia. 
However, one part of what would become Article 12 of the Convention related to trade 
in precursors, and the Commission sought and obtained from the Council authorization 
to participate in the negotiations with respect of that Article. It is these cases in which
fnthe Commission seeks to participate to safeguard the interests of the Community.
In bilateral agreements, the European Commission ‘shall make 
recommendations.’68 The right to initiate proposals for Community action rests with the 
Commission:
“In the first instance, therefore, it is for the C om m ission to consider
whether it would be appropriate for the Community to enter into
agreements in a particular area or with a particular State, and to make the 
necessary recommendations to the Council. In practice, such 
recommendations take the form o f  a com m unication from  the 
Com m ission to the Council, explaining why it is thought that conclusion  
o f  an agreement would be desirable, and proposing that the Council 
should authorize the Com m ission to negotiate such an agreement in
65 Ibid
66 [19901 OJ 326/56.
67 Ibid
68 See article 300, para. 1 EC Treaty.
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accordance with a set o f  negotiating directives suggested by the 
Com m ission, and annexed to the recom m endation.”69
In the case of multilateral agreements like the GATT Agreements, on certain 
issues such as services or intellectual property rights, Member States have competence 
to decide whether they want to be a party to the proposed agreement, such as the WTO 
Agreement where Member States play a secondary role and the Community negotiates.
Macleod et al (1996)70 comment that the EC should be able to participate and 
take action internationally in areas in which it has competence to legislate for itself 
internally. To decide what the correct legal basis should be in a case of conclusion of an 
agreement in the process of being negotiated is not always possible.71 Within the 
Council of Ministers, or between the Council and the Commission, there was argument 
as to know the correct legal basis for Community action. This issue was solved by 
saying that only after the agreement had been negotiated did the Council have a view on 
the legal basis for conclusion of an agreement.
In the case of the European Commission, as it is stipulated in the Treaty of 
Rome, it will negotiate on behalf of the European Community in issues dealing with the 
first pillar. The intention to have the Commission as the organ in charge of exercising 
the role of representative of the external relations of the Community appears as well in 
Article 302 EC, which says that the Commission shall “ensure the maintenance of all
69 See Macloeod, I., Hendry. I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities,
Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, pp. 86-7.
70 See Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p. 51.
71 See Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p 89.
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appropriate relations with the organs of the United Nations and of its specialised 
agencies.”72 When there is exclusive Community competence, the international 
representation of the EC should only be assured by the Commission. The Commission is 
engaged in negotiations with the authorisation of the Council.73
However, “the Commission cannot act as the sole negotiator [in mixed 
agreements]. The [European] Court [of Justice] has established a practice of 
emphasizing “the duty of close cooperation” in order to ensure consistency of the 
external activities of the EU as a whole. This “duty of close cooperation” is a 
fundamental feature of the legal basis of EC external relations. It is intended to ensure 
some degree of democratic legitimization in the external trade policy process.”74
Since we are dealing with the EC external trade relations, we must examine the 
special role of the European Commission which, according to Art. 133 EC, has the 
exclusive competence in the field of European Commercial Policy, leading the 
negotiations with third parties under a mandate of the Council.75 In order to oversee the 
Commission in negotiating, the 133 Committee was set up, which consists of high-level 
Member States civil servants. This proves that even in “exclusive” areas, such as Article
72 Beseler, H.-F. “La representation de la Communaute europ^enne pour les questions du commerce 
international”, Note to the attention of the Heads of Delegation of the European Commission, 12 April 
1999.
73 Bridge, J. W. & Lasok, D. Law & Institutions o f the European Union, Butterworths, 1994.
74 See Mortensen, J. L. “The institutional challenges and paradoxes of EU governance in external trade: 
coping with the post-hegemonic trading system and the global economy” in Cafruny, A & Peters, P. (eds.) 
The Union and the World: The Political Economy o f a Common European Foreign Policy, Kluwer Law 
International, 1998, p. 217.
75 This information has been gathered from a paper written by students from the Political and 
Administrative Studies Department, 1998-99, College of Europe, Brugges, Belgium, with the title EU-US 
Relations.
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133, negotiations are still held jointly through the 133 Committee, which means that
7Member States do not fully renounce control.
7 7V. The Council as a consultator and concluder
The Council consists of representatives of the Member States. Its composition may vary 
according to the subjects discussed. It is assisted by a General Secretariat under the 
responsibility of a Secretary-General, High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, assisted by a Deputy Secretary-General. The General Secretariat carries 
out all the necessary work for the activities of the Council, the Permanent 
Representatives Committee (COREPER)78 and all the committees and working parties 
set up within the Council. The Council is assisted by a Committee consisting of 
Permanent Representatives of the Member States. The Permanent Representatives 
Committee’s task is to prepare the Council’s work and to carry out any instructions 
given to it by the Council. In order to deal with all the tasks entrusted to it, the 
Permanent Representatives Committee meets in two parts: Part 1 (Deputy Permanent 
Representatives) and Part 2 (Ambassadors). Items for examination are divided between 
the agendas for each part of the Committee.
76 Johnson, M. 113. European Co-operation in Action, 1998.
77 For a general overview of the EU Council, see Westlake, M. The Council o f the European Union, 
Cartermill, 1995.
78 COmite des REpresentants PERmanents. For a precise definition of COREPER, see Cassel, What's 
what and who s who in Europe (1995) p. 102.
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In EC practice, “conclusion” within the meaning of the relevant EC Treaty 
provisions (Articles 114 [now repealed], 300 and 310), thus covers simultaneously two 
different measures: (1) the measure whereby the internal procedure to conclude an 
agreement is completed and (2) the measure whereby the EC binds itself internationally. 
This final act of the Council takes the form of a decision or a regulation. This decision 
or regulation is published in the Official Journal of the EC.79
As it is mentioned in this subtitle, the Council remains as the institution whose 
role is to conclude (mixed) agreements. The Council takes its decision of signing the 
agreement by the Community and decides upon one or more people for this purpose. In 
most cases, it is a Commissioner and a member of the President of the Council. It is, 
therefore, the Council who, in commercial policy, concludes and ratifies international 
agreements. The conclusion of these agreements is according to a procedure which 
follows the different phases of revision of Treaties. First of all, the Commission 
negotiates, with or without the participation of Member States. The European 
Parliament is called for his opinion (this is certainly the case since the entry into force of 
the Single European Act.) when we are dealing with an association agreement or a co­
operation agreement based on Article 310 EC. The Council concludes the agreement on 
behalf of the EC. Member States ratify the agreement according to their respective
79 See Bourgeois, J.H.J. “The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challenges” in 
Weiler, J.H.H. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law o f International Trade?, 
Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 77.
142
Institutions in EC External Relations Rafael Leal-Areas
Chapter 4
constitutional rules.80 Ratification of agreements by Member States is only necessary 
where agreements are mixed.
The 133 Committee, which is provided for in Article 133 EC, is a Council 
committee chaired by the Council Presidency and it is responsible for assisting the 
Commission in the negotiations on trade and tariff matters which the latter conducts on 
behalf of the Community.81 It has a key role in ensuring that the Council accepts the 
final results of negotiations, and therefore in the formation of unity.
In order to have a close co-operation between the national and the European 
levels in issues of exclusive and mixed competence, there are continuous informal 
negotiations between the Article 133 Committee, composed of national Civil Servants, 
and the Commission. Different commercial issues are discussed at the 133 Committee 
before being sent to the WTO for negotiation.82 Most issues are, then, treated in 133 
Committee, so in principle there is no need to go into the political level (COREPER, 
General Affairs Council) for solving problems. The Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER is the French abbreviation for Comite des Representants 
Permanents) is an institution of the European Union. Composed of the Member 
States'ambassadors to the Community, it is responsible for preparing meetings of the 
Council (composed of ministers from the national governments) and following up its 
decisions. It liaises closely with the European Commission, the organisation’s
80 Beseler, H.-F. “La representation de la Communautd europeenne pour les questions du commerce 
international”, Note to the attention of the Heads of Delegation of the European Commission, 12 April 
1999, p. 3. Unpublished document.
81 See Woolcock, S. “The European Union's Role in International Commercial Diplomacy”, unpublished 
paper, p .ll .
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administrative and executive arm, and is assisted by a large number of working parties. 
The ambassadors are assisted by committees of national civil servants.
With regard to the EU Council of Ministers, some national experts have 
proposed to have a Trade Ministers Council instead of the General Affairs Council.83 
The reason behind this is to have a more efficient European commercial policy. It is said 
that Ministers of Foreign Affairs are more concerned with political issues than technical 
ones. They usually do not show much interest in trade issues, which makes commercial 
policy-making less efficient. This takes me two the next point, which is very 
controversial, i.e. the trade-off between efficiency and accountability.
Here one could ask whether the accomplishment of this procedure does not annul 
any possibility of control of legality a posteriori in all these agreements. The possibility 
of judicial control remains untouched for those provisions which deal with EC 
competence.84 These provisions can be interpreted by the ECJ: in a judgment of 30 
September 1987, Case 12/86, Demirel,85 the Court affirmed its competence to interpret 
provisions of mixed agreements (for example, the association agreement with Turkey 
and the additional protocol).
Trade agreements concerning goods can be concluded on the basis of Article 133 
EC, which provides for the Council to act by qualified majority. However, if an
82 Hayes, J. P. Making Trade Policy in the European Community, MacMillan, 1993.
831 have personally gathered this information at a round table held at the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs in February 1998 during the discussion of a paper written by Johnson, M. 113. European Co­
operation in Action, 1998.
8 Louis, J.-V. L ’Ordre Juridique Communautaire, Office des Publications Officielles des Communautes 
Europ6ennes, 1993, pp. 117-18.
85 Judgment of 30.09.1987, Case 12/86, Demirel, [1987] ECR, pp. 3719 et seq.
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agreement (also or solely) concerns concessions relating to services, intellectual 
property or investments, the general rules of the Treaty apply. Under those rules, 
agreements are concluded by qualified majority or unanimously depending on whether 
the Community’s internal decisions in that area are taken by qualified majority or 
unanimously. In addition, Member States often wish to exercise their residual powers in 
those fields in which no internal Community rules apply or do not yet apply.86
In the case of mixed agreements, they “require a number of different procedures, 
including consultation procedures with the European Parliament and unanimous 
decision-making in the Council.”87 Acts of the Council dealing with the conclusion of 
agreements could require the Council to follow the co-operation procedure.88 The 
decision-making process leading to Community conclusions does not depend on 
whether the agreement is mixed (except for the fact that as a matter of practice, the 
Council will not formally conclude a mixed agreement until all Member States have 
ratified). It is a function of the legal base chosen. An example of this is the Council 
decision relating to the conclusion of the Framework Agreement on Science and 
Technology with Iceland.89
86 « http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/igc2000/geninfo/fact-sheets/fact-sheet6/index_en.htm»
87 See Macleod, I., Hendry.I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996.
88 Macleod, I., Hendry.I. & Hyett, S. The external relations o f the European Communities, Claredon Press 
Oxford, 1996, p. 83.
89 See (1990) Official Journal L 14/18.
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It is important to explain the difference between the Council of the European Union and 
the 15 Member States.91 Journalists have made fashionable to write statements such as 
this one: ‘The Commission proposes the 15” a directive on accepted added values on 
alimentation products. At this point we do not know whether it is the 15 who adopt the 
new directive or whether the 15 agree that the Commission adopt it (the above statement 
tends to transmit this second idea). What is serious is not so much that journalists use 
this kind of statements but that the public opinion perceives the functioning of the 
Community in such a way: to the eyes of the public opinion, EC regulations are the 
work of eurocrats in Brussels. What is even more serious is that civil servants perceive 
what they do in such a way. Let us examine this mistaken perception a bit closer:
1.- a national civil servant who participates in a meeting of a working group 
at the Council of the European Union goes often to Brussels as the football 
player who plays a match away from home, without knowing the match field. 
His main aim is not to produce a good Community legislation but to prevent 
this legislation from being uncomfortable for his country and from obliging 
him to modify national legislations. His attitude is not one of deciding but 
one of trying to control (without much hope) what “Brussels does”.
90 Hartley, T. C. The Foundations of European Community Law. An Introduction to the Constitutional and 
Administrative Law o f the European Community, Oxford University Press, 1998.
91 Demaret, P. Relations exterieures de la Communaute europeenne et marche interieur: aspects 
juridiques et fonctionnels, Story-Scientia, 1988.
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2.- when an official from the Commission that represents this institution in a 
working group at the Council of the European Union addresses himself to his 
interlocutors, he never uses the expression “you, the Council” or “you, 
members of the Council”. The expression used in a more systematic way is 
“you, the Member States”, that is to say, “you, the 15”, as the journalists 
from before.
3.- the most common Freudian slip among national civil servants is to speak 
of the Commission’s competencies instead of the Community’s 
competencies.
4.- Representatives from national Administrations at meetings in the 
framework of the CFSP talk to each other using the term partners (there are 
16 partners, the 15 Member States and the Commission). However, when an 
issue from the first pillar appears during the negotiation at these meetings, 
national representatives no longer use the term partner to refer to the 
Commission. This is a clear prove of the exclusive competencies of the EC in 
the so-called first pillar. In the CFSP both the European Commission and the 
15 Member States are inter pares.
So what do all these attitudes and expressions have in common? Well, the 
answer is the disappearing of the Council of the European Union as an institution. The 
15 are there but the Council does not exist anymore. The Council is the access key to 
any institutional building of the European Union since only the Council can integrate in
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a coherent way all the subdivisions of the table shown above.92 The Council has a 
horizontal decision power in the framework of Community treaties,93 as it is also an 
institution which has in exclusivity the decision power in the framework of CFSP and 
JHA. However, the Council, by the fact that it is composed of representatives from the 
15 national governments, could always get these 15 countries together, allowing the 
right permeability of the borderline between Member States’ competencies inside and 
outside the EU’s institutional framework. On the other hand, if the Council plays a 
minimal role on the European integration process, then “the Community” will be 
wrongly interchanged with “the Commission” and the Union will only become an 
intergovernmental grouping of 15 Member States, with a six-month rotation 
presidency.94
However, since it is obvious that there is “something else” apart from the 15 
Member States, this “something else” is identified with the 16th partner, i.e. with the 
Commission. This is how to the eyes of certain people the Commission becomes not 
only synonymous of European Community but also of European Union.95 One should 
also point out that the Council integrates the 15 Member States but it is not limited to 
just being “the 15”. According to Torrent, “the Council is the only institution capable of 
guaranteeing coherence in the single external action of the EU.”96 The question that the
92 Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans I'Union Europeenne, 
<<http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html>>. 1998, at chapter 1.
93 This institution is the Council of the European Communities.
94 Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans I’Union Europeenne, 
<<http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html>>. 1998, at chapter 1.
95 For further clarification, see Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans 
I'Union Europeenne, <<http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html>>. 1998, at chapter 1.
96 Ibid.
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reader should think about is to know how the Council can exercise in a proper way its 
role if the Council and the people who compose it are not conscious of its existence or 
believe that the Council is just the place where 15 Ministers get together with the 
Commission. How can a self-proclaimed “Presidency of the European Union” properly 
fulfil its functions if it does not understand that it has only powers by the fact of being 
the Presidency of the Council of the EU and to the extent to which the powers of the 
Council are respected, being the rest just empty protocol?
VI. The European Parliament as a consultator97
For the conclusion of international agreements, the European Parliament is consulted 
generally speaking by avis simple. An exception to this rule are those agreements based 
on Article 133 EC, in which in theory the Parliament does not have to be consulted at 
all. Certain agreements can only be concluded if the Parliament takes a favourable avis 
conforme. This form of consultation gives the Parliament a real right to veto. It is used 
in the conclusion of association agreements, agreements with a specific institutional 
framework, agreements having obvious budgetary implications as well as agreements 
which imply modifications of an act adopted for a co-decision procedure.98
97 Beseler, H.-F. “La representation de la Communaute europeenne pour les questions du commerce 
international”, Note to the attention of the Heads of Delegation of the European Commission, 12 April 
1999, p. 3. Unpublished document.
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VII. Decision Making Process
There has been much criticism on the EC commercial policy, mainly for being unable to 
negotiate without internal agreement and for being incapable of negotiating with one 
voice, due to a constraining mandate. Such criticism has come from the EU’s trading 
partners and in particular from the USA99 and has been largely focused on the EC’s 
position on agriculture.100 Work on the Uruguay Round suggests, however, that although 
some of what has been stated above may be true, the EC has in general performed as 
well as most of its trading partners in developing and articulating common positions.101 
The EU’s policy making processes have worked remarkably well given the diversity of 
interests within the EU, even if, inevitably, the policies it has produced have not been to 
everyone’s liking.102 The EU decision making process is coming under strain as a result 
of the deepening of the multilateral system. The strain is creating tensions in EU 
decision making on the following issues:
• the competence issue: EC or national competence in commercial policy
• the control issue: who controls the EC’s position in negotiations
• the tensions between efficiency and accountability.
98 Article 300 paras 1 & 2 EC Treaty.
99 Frellesen, T., Jones, E. & Ludlow, P. EC-US Relations. Priorities fo r  the Next Four Years, Center for 
European Policy Studies, 1993.
100 Johnson, M. 113. European Co-operation in Action. 1998.
101 See Hodges, M. & Woolcock, S. “The European Union in the Uruguay Round: the Story behind the 
Headlines”, in Wallace, EL & Wallace, W. Decision Making in the European Union, Oxford University 
Press, 1996.
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Out of the three tensions, it is the second one (the issue of who controls the EC’s 
negotiating position) which has created the most difficulties for the EU.103 However, it 
is likely that the dilemma of efficiency vs. accountability will be of greater importance 
in the near future. As commercial policy participates more and more in areas of 
domestic competence, there will be a necessity for transparency and accountability in 
policy-making.
Before getting into more details about these three tensions, let us see and clarify 
some aspects of the EC Commercial policy-making process. The approach towards EC 
commercial policy decision making is somehow technocratic, which is obvious since the 
treaties did not give competence to the European Parliament in commercial policy 
issues.104 In addition to that, the difficulty in co-ordinating 15 different national 
parliaments excluded them from getting into the details of commercial diplomacy. Until 
recently, the trade policy community in Europe has been composed of officials and very 
few experts from the private sector. This leads us to what has been said previously about 
the lack of democratic action in the process of policy making. However, it is evident that 
the technocratic approach in the EU has been more efficient than the approach based on
102 Woolcock, S. “The European Union’s Role in International Commercial Diplomacy”, p. 9. 
Unpublished paper.
103 See paper by Stephen Woolcock, presented at the American Political Science Association Conference 
in San Francisco, August/September 1996, under the title ‘The European Union as an International Actor 
in Commercial Policy”, p. 11.
104 Breton, P., Scott, H. & Sinclair, P. International Trade. A European Text, Oxford University Press, 
1997.
151
Institutions in EC External Relations Rafael Leal-Arcas
Chapter 4
parliamentary control. If it is already difficult to reach an agreement between 15 trade 
ministries, then trying the approval of an agreement by each of the 15 legislatures would 
have been a tremendous amount of time-consuming and not very effective.
On the other hand, such a technocratic approach of policy making makes it 
incompatible with it being democratic. There have been critiques in this respect by 
interest groups, which have questioned the legitimacy and accountability of common 
commercial policy decisions. Here the real problem is that to reach an agreement 
between 15 different Member States makes it far more complicated than when there is 
just one single voice. If the EU wants to be heard differently and have more efficiency 
and coherence in its actions, it needs to speak with one single voice, i.e. to have one 
single executive power. Therefore, it is obvious that by reacting separately European 
countries can do little to influence events. If Member States are to act together more 
effectively and to make themselves heard, they urgently need to establish mutual trust. 
This takes me to the first of the three points which I pointed out, the issue of 
competence.
A.I.- Competence
The issue of competence is not always clearly defined and therefore causes tension 
between the Member States of the European Union and the European Institutions, 
especially the Commission (the negotiator of agreements). A considerable part of this 
tension would be minimised should the EU became a sovereign State, for the principal
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actors in International Law are States.105 As McGoldrick says “once an entity satisfies 
the international law requirements for being a state, it is, in normal circumstances, 
accepted as a member of the international community of states and entitled to sovereign 
equality with other states”.106 It is accepted as having various rights and being subject to 
various obligations.107 As a state, it also has certain powers. This combination of rights, 
obligations and associated powers is described by McGoldrick as expressions of the 
sovereignty of the state. “If the European Union underwent a sufficient metamorphosis 
and became a single, federal state, it would then be treated as a State rather than a sui 
generis international organisation”.108
Since the beginning of the then EEC, there has been a constant development of 
the EC competencies. However, only in certain sectors such as the common commercial 
policy, the common agricultural policy, fisheries,... the Community competencies are 
exclusive. In other words, Member States are a priori barred from acting in their own 
name. There is shared competence between the EC and its Member States in other areas. 
The European Court of Justice, in its Opinion 1/94109 on the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements, held that EC competencies are exclusive as far as trade in goods in
105 See Jennings, R.Y. & Watts, A. (eds) Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edn, Harlow, Longman, 
1992, pp. 117-329.
106 McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law o f the European Union, Longman, 1997, p. 40.
107 Jennings, R.Y. & Watts, A. (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edn, Harlow, Longman, 1992, 
pp. 330-554.
08 See McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law o f the European Union, Longman, 1997, p. 40.
109 See Opinion 1/94 [ 1994] EC R 1-5267.
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concerned but are non-exclusive with respect to services (GATS)110 and intellectual 
property rights (TRIPS).111
An expansion of the EU goes together with a desired gradual increase of its 
competencies. The issue of national sovereignty is of course very delicate when it comes 
to ceding powers and competencies to the European level. However, the Member States 
have accepted the fact that the Commission of the EC will act on behalf of the European 
Community and of all the Member States in order to defend their commercial interests. 
The Amsterdam Treaty has the intention to extend the competence of the Common 
Commercial Policy to the key issues of intellectual property and services -New Article 
133(5) EC Treaty-. This is a sensible acceptance by the Member States since they have 
recognised that a divided Europe is less likely to defend its interests in international 
negotiations. Unfortunately, Article 133 of the Amsterdam Treaty makes no definition 
of “commercial policy.”
That said, one could say that the originality of the European integration tends to 
the fact that for certain objectives that have been assigned to it, Member States have 
transferred to the EC their original sovereign competencies. By the principle of 
“attribution of competencies”, EC law is conceived and built upon terms of “issues”, 
which are often called “common policies”. The division of roles and competencies 
should be done on the basis of issues.112 In the field of the common commercial policy, 
the international representation is exercised by the Commission. Only in the field of
110 GATS stands for General Agreement on Trade in Services.
111 TRIPS stands for Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
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CFSP and JHA (the so-called second and third pillars) is the EU represented by the 
Presidency of the Council.113 This means that the Community can be a member of an 
international organisation or a contracting party in an agreement. However, as far as the 
EU is concerned, it constitutes the common institutional framework for the “three 
pillars” of the European integration. In other words, the EU covers the Community 
policies from the first pillar, but also CFSP and JHA.
Back to the field of trade, both the EC and the Member States are members of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO).114 During the GATT (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade) the EC was not a member although it acted as if it were one. Since 
the Uruguay Round there is a tendency to give the EC the right to act on behalf of all the 
Member States. On multilateral trade agreements it is the Commission which speaks for 
the EC. From a legal point of view there is one Opinion by the European Court of 
Justice (Opinion 1/94) by which we find a clear classification of competencies, those 
which are exclusive competence of the EC and those which are mixed competence 
between the Member States and the EC. However it must be said that in practical terms 
of the everyday activity of the WTO it is the Commission which intervenes in 
multilateral negotiations. In other words, the mixed competence issue does not cause a 
problem at all.
112 Cafiiny, A. & Peters, P. The Union and the World: The Political Economy o f a Common European 
Foreign Policy, Kluwer Law International, 1998.
113 Beseler, H. F. “The representation of the European Community on issues of international trade”, in a 
note to the attention of the Heads of Delegations of the EU, 12 April 1999, p. 1.
114 Lanjouw, G. J. International Trade Institutions, Longman, 1995.
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The European Community and the Member States are under a legal duty to co­
operate on the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of mixed agreements. This 
duty results from the “requirement of unity in the international representation of the 
Community.”115 Proof of it are Ruling 1/78 (Natural Rubber), paragraphs 34-6;116 
Opinion 2/91 (ILO), paragraph 36117 and Opinion 1/94 (WTO), paragraph 108.118 Such 
co-operation is “all the more necessary” if the European Community cannot become 
party to the agreement. With regard to co-operation obligations, Article 5 European 
Community and Article 3 of the TEU deal in the treaties directly with it.
In the context of the WTO, it has been largely possible to have the Commission 
as the spokesman for the entire EC, acting of behalf of the EU, even in cases of mixed 
competence. As an example we have the case where the USA has initiated consultations 
with some EU Member States rather than the European Commission in issues dealing 
with TRIPS and GATS. Proof of this are Cases Nos. 80 (against Belgium concerning 
commercial telephone directory services), 82 (against Ireland concerning copyright and 
neighbouring rights), 83 and 86 (against Denmark and Sweden, respectively, concerning 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights). The US has also started a Panel case 
against two Member States in an area of exclusive EC competence: European 
Communities-Customs Classification of certain Computer Equipment, Report of the
115 McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997.
116 [1978] ECR 2151.
117 [1993] ECR 1-1061.
118 [1994] ECR 1-5267.
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Panel of 5 February 1998.119 In all previous consultations and cases the Commission has 
shown its interest in being involved.
The Commission believes that the EC should be a co-defendant in cases dealing 
with the GATS and TRIPS, given the fact that both the EC and its Member States are 
jointly responsible for their implementation. In this respect, there is a recent judgment 
by the Court of Justice (Hermes) which shows a new tendency in this direction (Case C- 
53/96 Hermes International)}20 The Court, in refuting the argument of three Member 
States that a certain provision of the TRIPS agreement is outside the scope of 
Community law, noted that “the WTO agreement was concluded by the EC and ratified 
by its Member States without any allocation between them of their respective 
obligations towards the other contracting parties.”121
Following the same logic, offensive GATS and TRIPS cases initiated by the EU 
against third countries should be taken jointly between the EC and its Member States as 
has been the case until now. As examples we have United States-The Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity Act (Panel established but case suspended until 21 April 1998; 
Panel mandate lapsed on that date), India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products and, last but not least, Canada-Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products. Canada-Measures Affecting Film Distribution Services. This 
is a clear case of the duty of co-operation and unity of representation, which is 
articulated by the European Court of Justice inter alia in its Opinion 1/94 and in its Case
119 Report of the Appellate Body AB-1998-2 of 19 May 1998.
120 Judgment of 16 June 1998.
121 Ibid.
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C-25/94 Commission v Council.122 With regard to trade in goods, the WTO Appellate 
Body has confirmed in the Case European Communities-Customs Classification of 
Certain Computer Equipment that in this area (let us remember that trade in goods is an 
area of exclusive EC competence) the export market for third countries “is the European 
Communities, not an individual Member State.”123
The context of the WTO shows that also in areas of non-exclusive EC 
competence it is necessary to have co-ordinated action in an EC framework.124 It is 
important to note that non-exclusive EC competence does not mean non-existent EC 
competence. In areas of non-exclusive EC competence the EC can, if the Council so 
decides, enter into agreements with third countries without formal adherence of Member 
States to these agreements. However, Member States normally insist on the mixity of 
international agreements even if mixity would not be legally necessary. Speaking with 
one voice has in many domains to be ensured through co-operation between the EC and 
its Member States, with the idea of achieving unity of representation.125
122 [1996] ECR 1-1469.
123 Report of the Appellate Body AB-1998-2 of 19 May 1998 in the Case European Communities- 
Customs Classification o f Certain Computer Equipment, p. 39, paragraph 96.
124 Professor Torrent speaks of a fourth pillar, meaning by that the use of national competencies in a 
European Union framework. See Torrent, R. “Le quatrieme pilier de l’Union Europeenne”, in Bourgeois, 
J. Dewost, J.-L. & Gaiffe, M.-A. (eds.) La Communaute Europeenne et les Accords Mixtes, College 
d’Europe, 1997, pp. 49-63.
125 Rosas, A. “The External Relations of the European Union: Problems and Challenges” in The Forum 
fo r  US-EU Legal-Economic Affairs, The Mentor Group, 1998, p. 66.
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A. 2.-Control
Who controls the EU’s negotiating strategy or policy has caused serious problems in the 
past. Treaty provisions and established practice give the Commission the right of 
initiative in areas of EC competence. So the Commission makes proposals on 
negotiations and policy positions. These are then discussed in the 133 Committee or 
COREPER and finally adopted by the General Affairs Council.126 The Council decision, 
formally on a qualified majority, authorises the Commission to negotiate in consultation 
with the 133 Committee. This authorisation is sometimes called a mandate. This 
Commission mandate to negotiate on behalf of the Member States does not imply a 
transfer of competencies, which remain with the Member States.
Article 133 also provides for the Council to issue directives at any time to the 
Commission on the substance of negotiations. In other words, the Commission is the 
sole negotiator but the Member States have plenty of opportunity to intervene in 
negotiations as they progress.127 There is also scope for differing interpretations of 
mandates. This has led to tensions over negotiating tactics, and differences between 
Commission and Council have emerged at critical times inflicting considerable damage 
on the credibility of the EC’s negotiating position.128 As an example of such a conflict 
over negotiating tactics is the EC’s position in the critical agricultural negotiations at the 
Ministerial Meeting of the GATT in 1990 which was due to complete the Uruguay
126 Le Heron, R. Globalized Agriculture. Political Choice, Pergamon Press, 1993.
127 Heidensohn, K. Europe and World Trade, Pinter, 1995.
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Round.129 The Commission, seeking to break a deadlock in negotiations, engaged in 
informal talks with its leading negotiating partners. In the course of these talks, the 
Commission discussed EC concessions which went beyond the restricting mandate laid 
down by EU agricultural ministers. When national ministers learned of the move, they 
called the Commission to task, denounced any such concession and thus undermined the 
credibility of the EC’s negotiating position.130
The following question can, then, be raised: what if a Member State does not 
agree with the Commission’s view or its interests are not the same as the Commission’s 
in the international trade arena? Mixed competence issues must be decided on the basis 
of unanimity. There is a process of co-ordination before.131 Meetings take place between 
the Commission and the Member States, where the lines of the Commission in the WTO 
are explained. This is discussed with the Member States. There is a close relationship 
between the Member States and the EC when dealing with mixed competence issues. 
The countries of the EU accept, then, a single voice in multilateral negotiations in areas 
of mixed competence, on the condition that there is co-ordination with Article 133 
Committee, since it is considered to be more effective.132
Another issue which affects relations between the Commission and the Council 
is the de facto practice of only adopting agreements by consensus. The Treaty provides
128 See Woolcock, S. “The European Union's Role in International Commercial Diplomacy”, unpublished 
paper, p . l l .
Le Heron, R. Globalized Agriculture. Political Choice, Pergamon Press, 1993.
130 See Woolcock, S. “The European Union's Role in International Commercial Diplomacy”, unpublished 
paper, endnote N. 16, p. 17.
131 Bridge, J. W. & Lasok, D. Law & Institutions o f the European Communities, Butterworths, 1987.
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for a qualified majority vote on the adoption of commercial agreements under Article 
133. However, in practice the Council has felt obliged to seek consensus on all major 
commercial policy issues. The expectation that consensus will be required has a clear 
impact on the EC’s negotiating position, since the Commission must ensure that all 
Member States are in agreement with any position. If the Council applied the Treaty and 
voted by qualified majority on the adoption of commercial agreements, there would be 
much more flexibility in negotiations.
As an example we have the Uruguay Round, where the Commission, with the 
backing of a qualified majority of the Member States, negotiated the so-called Blah- 
House agreement with the United States on the inclusion of agriculture in GATT 
disciplines.133 This agreement would have formed the key element in conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round at the end of 1992.134 France rejected the Blair House agreement and 
insisted on further modification. This meant that a further 18 months were needed before 
the round could be concluded. Agreement could only be reached when both the Belgian 
Presidency of the Council and the Commission accepted that the results of the round 
would only be adopted by unanimity.135
The tensions over the control of the EC commercial policy can only increase 
with the greater membership of the EU due to enlargement. A number of suggestions
132 Lopes, G. (ed.) Las Relaciones Exteriores de la Comunidad Europea, Facultad Latinoamericana de 
Ciencias Sociales, 1993.
133 Wallace, H. & Wallace, W. Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford University Press, 1996.
134 Latter, R. A New-Transatlantic Bargain, London: HMSO, 1993.
135 See Devuyst, Y. “The European Community and the Conclusion of the Uruguay Round” in Rhodes, C. 
& Mazey, S (eds.) The State o f the European Union. Vol. 3. Building a European Polity? Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, Inc., 1995.
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have been made to ease the management of such tensions. For example, various 
Member States have suggested that the Presidency of the Council should be present in 
the room when the Commission negotiates in order to ensure that the Council be 
involved in any negotiating stance that the Commission adopts during meetings. The 
EC’s position is agreed before negotiations. However, the Commission has opposed this 
reduction in its power and argued that it would result in the removal of any negotiating 
flexibility for the Commission and thus the EU.136
An alternative approach would be for the Council to desist from intervening in 
negotiations and give the Commission scope to negotiate. The EU Council still retains 
ultimate authority to accept or reject the outcome, but the Commission would have 
scope to negotiate a package. This approach is rejected by the Council because it would 
reduce the ability of the EU Council and the Member States to shape negotiations. In the 
absence of any reform, the only means to avoid damaging conflicts between the 
Commission and the EU Council is for continuous efforts by both institutions to ensure 
that communication is effective.
A. 3.- Efficiency vs. Accountability
If the EU has been relatively efficient in its commercial policy making despite the 
difficulties reaching a common position among the sometimes diverging interests of the 
15 Member States, this has come at the price of democratic accountability. Decision
136 See Woolcock, S. “The European Union's Role in International Commercial Diplomacy”, unpublished
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making in EC commercial policy is predominantly technocratic in nature. EC 
commercial policy is created by a technocratic core comprising the officials in the 
European Commission's Directorate-General for Trade and national trade officials who 
compose the 133 Committee.137 This lacks a democratic approach to policy-making 
although it has the advantage of being considerably efficient.138 The General Affairs 
Council provides nominal political and democratic legitimacy to the process. However, 
given the technical nature of commercial policy and the wider interests of foreign 
ministers, it is not surprising that the full General Affairs Council seldom debates 
detailed technical issues. In other words, Foreign Ministers are more concerned with 
developments in Bosnia or Kosovo, for example, than on the permissible level of BST 
(hormones) in beef and whether science can be used to determined this level.139
The concept of democratic deficit in EU decision making is well known and 
some efforts have been made to address the problem. In the area of commercial policy, 
difficulties are accentuated by the technical nature of the negotiations. National 
ministers reporting back to national legislatures tend to limit their comments to the 
objectives of policy. By doing so, effective scrutiny of the negotiations is lost. 
Concerning national parliaments, they also have difficulties following the detail of 
negotiations and the fact that negotiations take place at two steps removed from national
paper, p. 12.
See Woolcock, S. “The European Union's Role in International Commercial Diplomacy”, unpublished 
paper, p. 12.
38 See paper by Stephen Woolcock, presented at the American Political Science Association Conference 
in San Francisco, August/September 1996, under the title ‘The European Union as an International Actor 
in Commercial Policy”, at p. 18.
139 See Woolcock, S. “The European Union’s Role in International Commercial Diplomacy”, unpublished 
paper, p. 12.
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parliamentary control (one in Brussels and the second in Geneva) means that national 
politicians do not believe they can influence the outcome of negotiations. The result is 
that national legislatures tend not to undertake any effective scrutiny of EC commercial 
policy.140
At a European level, the European Parliament does its best to provide some 
scrutiny of EC commercial policy. However, since it has very limited powers, this is not 
always an easy task. The Parliament might give its assent to bilateral agreements under 
Article 310 EC, such as between the EC and South Africa141 or the Europe Agreements 
but it has no power under Article 133 EC, which is the main multilateral instrument of 
the European Union.142 Nor does the European Parliament have a say in changes to EC 
commercial instruments such as anti-dumping measures.143
The Council of the EU and the Commission have reached informal agreements 
with the European Parliament on consultation. However, the views of the Parliament are 
not sought until the Commission has reached a deal with the EU’s trading partners and it 
has been endorsed by the 133 Committee, if not the EU Council.144 Having said that, the 
chances of the EP having any impact on the substance of the agreement is almost non­
existent. The assent of the EP is required when a commercial policy agreement has 
budgetary implications, when there are institutional implications for the EU and when
140 Ibid., at p. 13.
141 Henig, S. External Relations o f the European Community. Associations and Trade Agreements, 
Chatham House: PEP, 1971.
142 Geiger, T. & Kennedy, D. Regional Trade Blocs, Multilateralism and the GATT: Complementary 
Paths to Free Trade?, Biddles, 1996.
143 See Woolcock, S. “The European Union's Role in International Commercial Diplomacy”, unpublished 
paper, p. 13.
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policy areas are concerned in which the EP has co-decision rights. As co-decision 
making is slowly increasing, this suggests that the EP may have to give its asset to more 
international commercial agreements.
In this sense, the Luns-Westerterp Procedures were developed for association 
agreements (Luns) in 1964 and international commercial agreements (Westerterp) in 
1973.145 These provide for the Council and Commission to give information to the 
relevant committees of the European Parliament on the content of an agreement and for 
a debate to be held in the European Parliament (EP) before the negotiations begin. The 
Council is also to provide information to the relevant EP committees after an agreement 
is signed but before it is concluded. During the Uruguay Round, the then Commissioner 
with responsibility for commercial policy, Sir Leon Brittan, made special efforts to 
inform the European Parliament of developments in commercial policy.
Although the European Parliament is continuously informed of the EC external 
trade relations, it has little influence over multilateral trade negotiations and national 
parliaments have even less. We can, then, talk of a lack of effective scrutiny by the 
European or national parliaments. In addition to that, although there are no formal 
procedures for consultation with non-governmental organisations, the Commission does 
have informal contacts with them. There has been criticism of the endogamic, 
technocratic nature of EU policy.
144 See Breton, P., Scott, H. & Sinclair, P. International Trade. A European Text, Oxford University Press, 
1997.
145 Markusen, J., Melvin, J., Kaempfer, W., & Maskus, K. International Trade. Theory and Evidence, 
McGraw-Hill, 1995.
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In order for the EU to be in a real position of strength in multilateral trade 
negotiations, it is a necessity to speak with one voice.146 This is so even in the case of 
services, where Member States sit along with the Commission in the WTO and have the 
right to speak in negotiations. Whenever the EC deals with the WTO in issues 
concerning goods (Article 133 EC), the Commission negotiates itself, according to 
Article 300 EC. Member States “sit” behind the Commission during the negotiations. In 
other words, Member States are physically present but it is the Commission that carries 
the negotiations on behalf of the EC and the Member States.147 However there are co­
ordinations between the Commission and the Member States in Brussels and Geneva 
before negotiating in the WTO. There are occasions when Member States do not agree 
with the Commission’s proposals. They try to reach a common position. So far there has 
not been a strong resistance from Member States to the Commission’s proposals.
In addition to accountability via public representative bodies such as the national 
and European Parliaments, accountability and legitimacy can be achieved through 
contacts with representative interest groups, such as producer groups, environmental and 
consumer NGOs, trade unions and other such organisations. In this respect, we see that 
active NGOs such as environmental NGOs see the Article 133 Committee as closed and 
undemocratic. National and Commission trade officials resist the “politicisation” of EU 
commercial policy. On the other hand, the Economic and Social Committee is consulted
146 Featherstone, K. & Ginsberg, R. The United States and the European Union in the 1990s. Partners in 
Transition, Macmillan Press Ltd. 1996.
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on important policy initiatives by the Commission and feeds its opinion, along with that 
of the European Parliament into the policy debate.
Trade policy is probably the most important tool of Foreign Policy. Hence a 
division between trade and politics should not be made radically since they both go 
together. There is a risk of losing some accountability since the everyday work in 
commercial policy is driven by different Directorate-Generals (DG) in the Commission, 
although the main responsible one is DG Trade, concerned with the EC external trade 
relations. The Commission keeps the Member States informed of what they are doing. 
Before any major decision is taken the Commission notifies the Member States.
To sump up on efficiency versus accountability, the EU policy process may have 
been relatively efficient to date, but has not been especially open. There is also no 
scrutiny of decision making outside the nominal structures of accountability through the 
Council, which is less effective. As the WTO agenda deepens and gets more and more 
into domestic policy making, the number of parties expands. For example, linking trade 
and environment means that the environmental policy communities in the EU will have 
an active interest in trade policy in order to ensure that their policy preferences are not 
undermined by EU commercial diplomacy. Given the trends in international commercial 
diplomacy, this tension between efficiency and accountability can be expected to 
increase.148
147 This clarification has been gathered from an interview with Mr Alain Van Solinge, Legal Adviser in 
the Legal Service of the European Commission, held on May 24, 2000.
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Trade is no longer just about negotiations on tariffs on goods between industrialized 
economies. Trade policy has become complicated on both sides of the matrix -new 
actors and new issues-. Trade policy needs to change to become more efficient and more 
accountable. At the same time, it is important to address the issue of lack of 
transparency and legitimacy of the current system of governance, including trade policy 
matters handled in the WTO.
With regard to transparency, it means ensuring that a given organization is more 
internally accountable to its members. As for efficiency and accountability, the world 
has moved on, and so must the Treaty of Rome. It is necessary to ensure that 
negotiations on services, intellectual property rights and investment are handled the 
same way as negotiations on trade in goods by qualified majority voting. Unanimity, 
specially in an enlarged EU of over 30 Member States, makes no sense in policy­
making. That said, the Commission’s compromise proposal allows for a Member State 
to call for unanimity on a point or real national sensitivity. It also calls for the European 
Parliament to be fully involved in EU trade policy-making. There needs to be a change 
in the EU’s negotiating methods.149 On the other hand, having the Commission as the
148 See Woolcock, S. “The European Union’s Role in International Commercial Diplomacy”, 
(Unpublished Article).
149 See Lamy, P. ‘Trade is changing -so  must Europe,” in 
<<http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/speeches articles/spla41 en .h tm » .
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trade negotiator on behalf of the EC Member States implies a more efficient but less 
democratic system of EU trade policy-making.150
150 Information gathered from an interview in June of 2001 with Mr. Richardson, Head of the Delegation 
of the European Commission to the UN.
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I. Introduction
The main focus of study in this chapter is the explanation of why the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the various Agreements which form an integral part of the 
Agreement establishing the WTO raise problems and are challenges for the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities (ECJ).
Section II deals with the ECJ’s jurisdiction as it is organized by the EC 
Treaty and focuses on the role of the ECJ in relation to exclusive and shared 
competence. Section III is devoted to the question of the status of international 
agreements in EC Law, while section IV deals with the status of the WTO in the EC 
legal system. Section V deals with the discussion of Case Hermes v FHT Marteking1 
concerning the interpretation of Article 50 of the Agreement on Trade-related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) annexed to the 1994 Agreement 
establishing the WTO -the first case where the jurisdiction issue is addressed by the 
Court outside the context of association agreements. The judgment and its 
implications will be analyzed in the light of the ECJ’s earlier case law.2
The EC is a major player in the GATT both before and after the creation of 
the WTO. It plays a major role in the shaping of the GATT/WTO and is a common 
player in dispute resolutions. The EC, together with the U.S., Japan and Canada, is 
one of the four major players of international trade law. The new mechanisms
1 Case 53/96, [1998] ECR 1-3603.
2 Heliskoski, J. "The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to Give Preliminary Rulings on the 
Interpretation of Mixed Agreements", Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 69, No. 4, 2000, p. 
395.
3 Weiler, J.H.H. “Cain and Abel -Convergence and Divergence in International Trade Law” in 
Weiler, J.H.H. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law o f International 
Trade?, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 2.
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introduced by the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding are not perhaps 
comparable to the full judicial system within the EU, but they have changed both the 
rules and legal culture concerning the adjudication and enforcement obligations. 
Although the WTO is still an intergovernmental organization, powerful private 
actors have already learnt to manipulate the system to reach legal adjudication under 
the guise of intergovernmental disputes.4 All these issues will be analyzed 
throughout this chapter.
II. The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in International Trade
A.- An Overview
We will analyze the jurisdiction of the ECJ with regard to international trade, as well 
as the acts susceptible to judicial review and to interpretation by the Court in 
Luxembourg. Both agreements entered into by exclusive EC competence and shared 
competence will be treated.
A.I.- Limited Jurisdiction in the ECJ
The ECJ has jurisdiction only in so far as the EC Treaty and other legal instruments 
have conferred jurisdiction upon it, as can be inferred from Article 7, paragraph 1 EC 
Treaty. The ECJ’s jurisdiction may be implied. By implied jurisdiction we mean 
situations where there is a prevailing need for it in order to fill a lacuna in the system
4 Ibid., at p. 4.
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of remedies expressly provided for, such as where the complete absence of any other 
form of legal redress creates a serious injustice and is inconsistent with the rule of 
law in the EC.5
The ECJ relied on the concept of “a Community based on the rule of law” to 
develop a more general theory on which it can base the so-called implied 
jurisdiction. In this sense, in Les Verts the ECJ stated as follows:
[T]he European Econom ic Community is a Community 
based on the rule o f law, inasmuch as neither its M ember 
States nor its institutions can avoid a review o f  the question  
whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity 
with the basic charter, the Treaty...
...the Treaty established a com plete system  o f legal remedies 
and procedures designed to permit the Court o f  Justice to  
review the legality o f  measures adopted by the institutions.6
In the “Chernobyl Case” {European Parliament v Council)? the ECJ 
believed that in order to perform its task under Article 220 EC, it had to be able to 
guarantee the maintenance of the institutional balance and the respect for the 
European Parliament’s prerogatives. Even if Article 230 EC did not provide for an 
application for annulment by the European Parliament, the ECJ concluded that it 
had jurisdiction in an annulment proceeding brought by the European Parliament to 
the extent that the purpose of the proceeding was to protect the European
5 Lasok, K.P.E. The European Court o f Justice. Practice and Procedure, 2nd edn. (Butterworths, 
London, 1994), 9.
6 European Court of Justice, Judgment of 23 April 1986, Les Verts v European Parliament, [19861 
ECR 1339.
7 [1990] ECR 1-2041.
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Parliament’s prerogatives. Therefore, in the absence of expressed authority, the 
ECJ has the freedom to intervene and allows the correction of defects in the system 
of remedies created by the Treaties.9
A. 2.- Acts Susceptible to Judicial Review bv the ECJ
Article 230 EC10 provides for an action of annulment against acts adopted jointly by 
the Council and the European Parliament, acts of the Council, of the Commission 
and the European Central Bank, other than recommendations or opinions, and of acts 
of the European Parliament intended to produce legal effect vis-a-vis third parties.
Within the EC external relations, two groups in the ECJ’s case law can be
made:
8 This case can be contrasted to the so-called “Comitology Case” European Parliament v Council 
[1988] ECR 5615. See, in this respect, Weiler, J. “Pride and Prejudice-Parliament c. Council”, 14 EL 
Rev. (1989) 334, for a more detailed comment.
9 Amull, A. “Does the Court of Justice have inherent jurisdiction?” 27 CMLRev. (1990), 683 at 701.
10 Article 230 EC reads as follows:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the European Parliament and 
the Council, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and the European Central Bank, other than 
recommendations or opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament intended to produce legal effect 
vis-a-vis third parties.
It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the Council or the 
Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, 
infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions brought by the 
European Parliament, by the Court of Auditors and by the ECB for the purpose of protecting their 
prerogatives.
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings against a decision 
addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision 
addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former.
The proceedings provided for in this Article shall be instituted within two months of the publication 
of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of hte day on which it 
came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be.
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A.2.a.- Council Decision to Leave to the Member States the 
negotiation of an International Agreement.
The position of the Commission in the ERTA case (1970), Case 22/70, Commission v 
Council11 was to ask the Council for authorization to renegotiate the European Road 
Transport Agreement on behalf of the EC to be entered into with third countries in 
the framework of the United Nations.12 The decision of the Council was that the then 
six EC Member States should negotiate on their own behalf and become individual 
parties to ERTA. To this response, the Commission reacted by challenging the 
Council proceedings in the ECJ. The ECJ then considered that the Commission 
application was admissible in the following way:
Since the only matter excluded from the scope o f  the action  
for annulment...are “recommendations or opinions”-w hich  
by the final paragraph o f  Article 189 [new Art. 249 EC] are 
declared to have no binding force- Article 173 [new Art.230  
EC] treats as acts open to review by the Court all measures 
adopted by the institutions which are intended to have legal 
force.13
In the analysis of the content and purpose of the Council proceedings, the 
ECJ reacted in such a way:
It thus seem s that in so far as they concerned the objective 
o f  the negotiations as defined by the Council, the
11 [1971] ECR 263.
12 See Bourgeois, J.HJ. “The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challenges” in 
Weiler, J.H.H. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law o f International 
Trade?, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 76.
13 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263, para. 39.
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proceedings o f  20 March 1970 could not have been sim ply  
the expression or the recognition o f  a voluntary co­
ordination, but were designed to lay down a course o f  action 
binding on both the institutions and the M ember States, and 
destined ultimately to be reflected in the term o f  the [EC] 
regulation [that would have to be amended follow ing the 
conclusion o f  ERTA].
In the part o f  its conclusion relating to the negotiating 
procedure, the Council adopted provisions w hich were 
capable o f  derogating in certain circumstances from  the 
procedure laid down by the [EC] Treaty regarding 
negotiations with third countries and the conclusion o f  
agreem ents.14
The concluding remarks of the ECJ were as follows:
...the proceedings o f  20 March 1970 [i.e. the position taken 
by the Council] had definitive legal effects both in relations 
between the Community and the M ember States and in the 
relationship betw een the institutions.15
Another case to be taken into consideration is Commission v Council 
(FAO),16 where the ECJ considered that giving the right to Member States, rather 
than to the EC, to vote in the FAO for the adoption of an agreement on fisheries 
conservation measures had legal effects. Therefore, the ECJ held that the 
Commission application for annulment of that decision was admissible.
14 [1971] ECR 263, para. 53.
15 [1971] ECR 263, para. 55.
16 [1996] ECR 1-1469.
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A.2.b.~ International Agreements
Under Article 300, paragraph 7 EC, agreements “concluded” under the conditions 
which appear in this provision are “binding on the institutions of the Community and 
on Member States.” However, the institutional provisions remain silent on the 
question of whether an agreement binding on the EC becomes part of EC law. In EC 
practice, legislation implementing an international agreement, i.e. transforming it 
into EC legislation, is considered necessary only where the agreement both entails 
precise legal obligations and requires changes of rules in force internally, or where 
the provisions of the agreement call for special measures of internal law in order to 
be implemented in a clear and effective manner. From here, the question that comes 
to light is whether an international agreement concluded by the EC is an act of an EC 
institution within the meaning of Article 230 EC open to challenge or whether only 
the decision to conclude an international agreement can be the subject of a review of 
legality by the ECJ.
In the case France v Commission17 concerning the 1991 Agreement entered 
into by the Commission and the US Government regarding the application of their 
competition laws, the French Republic brought an action under Article 230 EC for a 
declaration that this agreement was void on the grounds that the Commission had no 
competence to conclude such an agreement.
The position of the ECJ with regard to the admissibility of the action was the 
following:
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In its defense, the Com m ission raises the question whether 
the French Government should have challenged the decision  
whereby it authorized its vice-president to sign the 
agreement with the United States on its behalf, rather than 
challenging the agreement itself.
Suffice it to  note that, in order for an action to be adm issible  
under the first paragraph o f  Article 173 [new Art. 230] EEC  
Treaty, the contested act must be an act o f  an institution 
which produces legal effects.18
The Court finds that, as is apparent from its actual wording, 
the agreement is intended to produce legal effects. 
Consequently, the act whereby the Com m ission sought to 
conclude the agreement must be susceptible to  an action for 
annulment.
Exercise o f  the powers delegated to the Community 
institutions in international matters cannot escape judicial 
review, under Article 173 o f  the Treaty, o f  the legality o f  the 
acts adopted.
The French Republic’s action must be understood as being 
directed against the act whereby the C om m ission sought to 
conclude the Agreement. Consequently, the action is 
adm issible.19
The ECJ did not annul the agreement. It declared void the act whereby the 
Commission sought to conclude the agreement with the US.
A.3.- Acts Susceptible to Interpretation b\ the ECJ
If the ECJ has jurisdiction to annul or declare void an act of an EC institution, it can 
also interpret such act. Article 234 EC deals with the so-called “preliminary ruling”, 
one of the main features of the EC system of judicial review.
17 [1994] ECR 1-3641.
18 See Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263 (the ERTA Case).
19 [1994] ECR 1-3641, paras 13-17.
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A.3.a.- Agreements entered into by Exclusive EC Competence
A relevant case of an agreement entered into force by exclusive EC competence is 
Haegeman20 where a Belgian Greek-wine importing company sought repayment of 
countervailing duties exacted from it by Belgium. The Belgian company argued 
before a Belgian court that the imposition of those charges was unlawful having 
regard to the then Association Agreement between the EEC and Greece. The Belgian 
court submitted a number of questions of interpretation of the Association 
Agreement to the ECJ.
The ECJ examined its jurisdiction and referred to Article 234 EC. In this 
case, the provision whose interpretation was sought by the Belgian court was a 
provision of the Association Agreement itself, which is not listed in Article 234 EC 
among the acts covered by the ECJ’s jurisdiction. The ECJ assimilated the 
Association Agreement to “an act of an institution of the Community”, and 
considered that its provisions form an integral part of Community law, since this 
agreement had been approved by a Council Decision. In subsequent judgments, such 
as Polydor21 Kupferberg 22 Demirel,23 and Greece v Commission 24 the ECJ has 
taken the same view.
20 [1974] ECR 449.
21 [1989] ECR 329.
22 [1982] ECR 3641.
23 [1987] ECR 3719.
24 [1989] ECR 3711.
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A.3.b.~ Mixed Agreements/Shared Competence
A well-known case of a mixed agreement is the ILO Convention concerning the 
Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work.25 The advantage of having mixed 
agreements is that it allows to define the exact demarcation of EC competence. 
Mixed agreements, therefore, pose problems every time an international agreement 
with shared competence within the EC is concluded.26 What is, then, the extent or 
scope of the ECJ’s jurisdiction with respect to mixed agreements? Authors such as 
Bleckmann and Kriick argue that the ECJ may interpret mixed agreements in their 
entirety.27 Others, such as Hartley, Waelbroeck and Schermers, believe that the 
ECJ’s jurisdiction is limited to clauses of a mixed agreement that do not extend 
beyond the EC’s field of operation.28
In Demirel,29 the ECJ faces this issue. A German court requested for a 
preliminary ruling by the ECJ. Mrs. Demirel, a Turkish national, challenged her 
expulsion from the German territory on the grounds that her visa had expired. She 
wanted to remain in Germany with her husband, who resided in Germany. Mrs. 
Demirel relied on certain provisions of the Association Agreement between the EEC 
and Turkey. In the proceedings of the ECJ, two EC Member States (Germany and
25 See Opinion 2/91, ECR 1-1061, para. 36.
26 See Dash wood, A. “Why continue to have Mixed Agreements at all?” in Bourgeois, J., Dewost, J. 
& Gaiffe, M. La Communaute europeenne et les accords mixtes, Quelles perspectives?, Presses 
Interuniversitaires Europeennes, 1997, p.94.
27 Kriick, H. “Ad Art. 177” in Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlerman (eds.) Kommentar zum EU/EG Vertrag, 
5th edn., vol. 4 (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997), p. 615; Bleckmann, A. “Der Gemischte Vertrag in 
Europarecht”, (1976) Europarecht 301.
28 See Hartley, T.C. The Foundations o f European Community Law: An Introduction to the 
Constitutional and Administrative Law o f the European Community, Oxford University Press, 1994, 
186, 273; Schermers & Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Communities, 5th edn., 
Kluwer, Deventer, Boston, 1992, p. 430.
29 Meryem Demirel v Stadt Swdbisch Gmiind [1987] ECR 3719.
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the United Kingdom) intervened and put the jurisdiction of the ECJ into question. 
The ECJ reacted in such a way:
H owever, the German Government and the United Kingdom  
take the view  that, in the case o f  “mixed” agreements such  
as the Agreement and the Protocol at issue here, the Court’s 
interpretative jurisdiction does not extend to provisions 
whereby Member States have entered into commitments 
with regard to Turkey in the exercise o f  their own powers 
w hich is the case o f  the provisions on freedom o f  movem ent 
for workers.
In that connection it is sufficient to state that that is 
precisely not the case in this instance. Since the agreement 
in question is an association Agreement creating special, 
privileged links with a non-member country which must, at 
least to a certain extent, take part in the Community system , 
Article 238 must necessarily empower the Community to 
guarantee commitments towards non-member countries in 
all the fields covered by the Treaty. Since freedom  o f  
m ovem ent for workers is, by virtue o f Article 48 e t seq. o f  
the EEC Treaty, one o f  the fields covered by that Treaty, it 
fo llow s that commitments regarding freedom o f  m ovem ent 
fall within the powers conferred on the Community by 
Article 238. Thus the question whether the Court has 
jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation o f a provision in a 
m ixed agreement containing a commitment which only the 
M ember States could enter into in the sphere o f  their own 
powers does not arise.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction o f  the Court cannot be 
called in question by virtue o f  the fact that in the field o f  
freedom  o f  movement for workers, as Community law now  
stands, it is for the Member States to lay down the rules 
w hich are necessary to give effect in their territory to the 
provisions o f  the agreements or the decisions to be adopted 
by the Association Council.
A s the Court held in its judgment o f  26 October 
1982, in Case 104/81 H auptzollam t M ainz v Kupferberg30 in 
ensuring respect for commitments arising from an 
agreement concluded by the Community institutions the 
M ember States fulfil, within the Community system, an 
obligation in relation to the Community, which has assumed 
responsibility for the due performance o f the agreement.
30 [1982] ECR 3641.
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Consequently, the Court does have jurisdiction to 
interpret the provisions on freedom of movement for 
workers contained in the Agreement and the Protocol.31
This agreement could have been concluded by the EC alone, even if it was 
finally a mixed agreement. The clauses of the agreement, for whose interpretation 
the ECJ considered that it had jurisdiction, came within the competence of the EC 
under Article 238 EC. With regard to the interpretation of those clauses of mixed 
agreements that come equally within the competence of EC Member States, the 
situation is somehow different.
B.- With regard to WTO Law
Given the existence of shared competence between the EC and its Member States, 
this raises the issue of the ECJ’s jurisdiction in relation to GATS and TRIPS. In the 
case Hermes International on Article 50, paragraph 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, the 
issue of the ECJ’s jurisdiction was put to the ECJ by a request for a preliminary 
ruling. Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement deals with procedural rules applying to 
judicial remedies contemplated in the TRIPS Agreement. The ECJ rejected the 
European Commission’s view that the EC had exclusive competence to conclude the 
GATS and TRIPS Agreements, in its Opinion 1/94 (Re WTO Agreement).33 The 
ECJ also rejected the view of EC Member States that a number of clauses of the 
TRIPS Agreement fall only within the exclusive competence of Member States. The
31 [1987] ECR 3719, paras. 8-12.
32 [1998] ECR 1-3603.
33 Opinion 1/94, competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning 
services and intellectual property (15 November 1994), [1994] ECR 1-5267.
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ECJ’s conclusion in this respect was that the EC and its Member States “are jointly 
competent to conclude the TRIPS Agreement.”34
In Hermes International, the opinion of the Advocate General Tesauro of 13 
November 1997 was that the ECJ had jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. He based his argument on the requirement of a uniform 
interpretation and application of all provisions of mixed agreements, on the EC’s 
international responsibility,35 the duty of the EC and its Member States to co-operate 
implying the duty to endeavour to adopt a common position, and the EC legal system 
that seeks to function and to represent itself to the outside world as a unified 
system.36
The ECJ pointed out in its judgment of 16 June 199837 that the WTO 
Agreement was concluded by the EC and its Member States “without any allocation 
between them of their respective obligations towards the other contracting parties.”
At the time the WTO was signed, the EC Regulation on the Community trade mark 
had already been in force for a month. EC Member States courts are required to 
apply the remedies of the EC Regulation on the Community trade mark as far as 
possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 50 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. The ECJ concluded from this argumentation that it had jurisdiction to 
interpret Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Even if in Hermes the ECJ managed to avoid the issue of its jurisdiction, 
sooner or later it is bound to face this issue with regard to clauses of mixed
34 Opinion 1/94, [1994] ECR 1-5267, para. 105.
35 The EC and its Member States are parties to the TRIPS Agreement. This Agreement is binding on 
the EC and its Member States, according to Article 300 EC.
36 [1998] ECR 1-3603, 3606, at paras. 20-1.
37 [1998] ECR 1-3603.
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agreements that cannot be regarded as coming within the powers of the EC. The 
consequences from the absence of a uniform interpretation throughout the EC of 
GATS and TRIPS Agreement provisions are “undesirable, artificial and perhaps 
unworkable.”38 If the ECJ fails to rule on whether international agreements such as 
GATS and TRIPS provisions are to be interpreted uniformly within the EC, a WTO 
panel or Appellate Body could be called upon to do so.
A challenge for the ECJ is the creation of a theory that justifies its 
jurisdiction to interpret the entire WTO law and not only those provisions that can be 
regarded as coming within the EC’s powers. In the Hermes case, Tesauro AG 
clarified that the EC is a party to the TRIPS Agreement vis-a-vis the other WTO 
Members and that an international agreement concluded by the EC is, according to 
Article 300 EC, binding on both the EC Member States and the EC institutions. 
Tesauro's conclusion is that the EC is responsible for each part of the agreement in 
question. Third parties will be in a position to call the EC rather than its Member 
States to account in an international agreement, except where, upon the conclusion of 
a mixed agreement, third parties have insisted on the fact that the EC make a 
declaration making clear which parts of the agreement are concluded by the EC. In 
line with Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,39 the EC 
would probably be estopped from claiming that under its “constitution”,40 Member 
States are bound by a given clause of a mixed agreement, since the EC is in part
38 Eeckhout, P. “The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreeement: Interconnecting Legal 
Systems”, 34 CML Rev. (1997) 11 at 20.
39 The 1986 Vienna Convention has not yet entered into force but it follows almost to the letter the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331.
40 For a commentary of the debate on the EU Constitution, see Piris, J.-C. “Does the European Union 
have a Constitution? Does it need one?,” Lecture given by Jean-Claude Piris, Legal Adviser of the 
Council of the European Union, on 3rd May 1999.
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responsible for the uncertainty on who had the power to bind itself for which parts of 
a mixed agreement.41
The Commission argued in Hermes that there is no perfect parallelism 
between the EC’s powers to enter into international agreements and the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction to interpret such agreements. Article 220 EC may justify the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction to interpret an international agreement that is not binding on the EC. 
Such is the case of Burgoa42 or Poulsen and Diva Navigation43 According to 
Warner AG in Haegeman v Belgium,u the ECJ has jurisdiction to interpret an 
international Agreement only “where its interpretation is relevant to the question of 
the validity of an act of a Community institution or to the question of the 
interpretation to be given to such an act.”45 In Opinion 1/91 (First EEA Opinion),46 
the ECJ limits its interpretation “insofar as that Agreement is integral part of 
Community law.”47 Along the same lines, is the reasoning of the ECJ rejecting the 
challenge to its jurisdiction to interpret the Eurocontrol Agreement in SAT v 
Eurocontrol.48
In the eyes of Eeckhout, the extension of the ECJ’s jurisdiction to such cases 
could not affect the division of competence between the EC and its Member States.49 
This raises the question of the legal basis of the ECJ’s jurisdiction in such cases.
41 Bourgeois, J.H.J. “The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challenges” in 
Weiler, J.H.H. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law o f  International 
Trade?, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 86.
42 [1980] ECR 2787.
43 [1992] ECR 1-6019.
44 [1974] ECR 449.
45 Ibid, at 473.
46 [1991] ECR 6079.
47 Ibid, at para. 39.
48 [1994] ECR 1-43, para. 9.
49 Eeckhout, P. “The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreeement: Interconnecting Legal 
Systems”, 34 CML Rev. (1997) 11, at 23-4.
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III. International Agreements in EC Law
In this section we will analyze the relationship between international law in general 
terms and EC law together with the effects of international law on the EC legal 
system and the reliability on an EC international agreement both in the EC courts 
and national courts.
A.- The Relationship between International Law and EC Law
The EC Treaty does not pronounce itself on the effects of an international agreement 
in the EC legal system. Under the EU decision-making process, Member States have 
the guarantee that their interests will be taken into account,50 given the fact that 
international negotiations are concluded by the Council, which consists of 
representatives of Member States. There are more and more examples of cases in 
which international agreements are concluded by the Council acting by qualified 
majority. There is also an increased involvement of the European Parliament in these 
situations. The EC Treaty provides that the European Parliament must be consulted 
before the conclusion of international agreements,51 except for international 
agreements based on Article 133(3) EC. However, in the everyday practice the 
European Parliament must be consulted even in these agreements.52
50 Bourgeois, J.H.J. ‘Trade Policy-making Institutions and Procedures in the European Community,” 
in Hilf, M. & Petersmann, E.U. (eds.) National Constitutions and International Economic Law 
(Kluwer, Deventer, 1993) 175, at 191; McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law o f the European 
Union, Longman, 1997, pp. 89-92.
51 See Article 300, paragraph 2 EC.
52 See Article 300, paragraph 3 EC.
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In addition to that, certain types of international agreements now require the 
assent of the European Parliament. Such is the case of agreements entailing 
amendments of an act adopted under the co-decision procedure, association 
agreements, agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organizing 
co-operation procedures and agreements having important budgetary implications for 
the EC.53
An international agreement that has entered into force and been properly 
concluded by the Council is part of EC law, according to the case law of the ECJ, 
from Haegeman:
“the [Association] Agreement [with Greece] was concluded 
by the Council under Article 228 and 238 of the Treaty...The 
Agreement is therefore, in so far as concerns the 
Community, an act of one of the institutions of the 
Community...The provision of the Agreement, from the 
coming into force thereof, form an integral part of 
Community law.”54
to Racke:
“An agreement with a third country concluded by the 
Council in conformity with the provisions of the EC Treaty, 
is, as far as concerns the Community, an act of Community 
institutions and the provisions of such Agreement form an 
integral part of Community law.”55
53 Ibid
54 [1974] ECR 449.
55 [1998] ECR 1-3655, para. 41.
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The legal literature generally approves the approach taken by the ECJ in this 
respect.56 Some legal authors argue that it is not possible to give an answer to the 
question of the relationship between EC law and public international law or that 
recourse to monist or dualist theories is not productive.58 It is said that an 
international agreement is as such part of the EC legal system once the EC’s 
constitutional procedures required for the EC to be bound internationally have been 
complied with, that is to say, in order to have effect in the EC legal system, the 
international agreement in question does not have to be transformed in a regulation 
or a directive.59
The ECJ has never explained why an international agreement forms an 
integral part of EC law because that agreement has been concluded by the EC. Some 
authors refer to Article 300 EC as the explanation to the issue.60 However, Article 
300 EC only provides that international agreements are binding on the EC and its 
Member States 61 In Bresciani,62 the ECJ held that a private party could rely on the 
Yaounde Convention even though its conclusion had been approved by way of a 
decision rather than by way of a regulation, which is by definition directly
56 Tomuschat, Ch. “Ad Article 228” in Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlerman (eds.) Kommentar zum EU/EG 
Vertrag, 5th edn., vol. 4 (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997), p. 502.
57 Messen, K. “The Application of Rules o f Public International Law within Community Law” 13 
CML Rev. (1976) 485, at 500-1; Verloren van Themaat, P. “The Impact of the Case Law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities on the World Economic Order,” Festschrift Eric Stein 82 
Mich. L. Rev. (1984), 1423,1435.
58 Everling, U. “The Law of the External Economic Relations of the European Community” in Hilf, 
M. Jacobs, F & Petersmann, E.U. The European Community and the GATT (Kluwer, Deventer, 1986) 
85, at. 95.
59 See Howse, R. “Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law: The 
Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence,” in Weiler, J.H.H. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. 
Towards a Common Law o f  International Trade?, Oxford University Press, 2000, chapter 3.
60 See Pescatore, P. ‘Treaty-making by the European Communities,” in Jacobs, F.G. & Roberts, S. 
(eds.) The Effects o f Treaties in Domestic Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1987, p. 179.
61 See Jacot-Guillarmod, O. Droit Communautaire et Droit International Public (Georg, Librairie de 
L’University, Geneve, 1979), 92.
62 [1976] ECR 129.
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applicable. The Council, however, has maintained its no-consistent practice of 
approving the conclusion of international agreements by way of decisions or 
regulations, making clear that it considers the type of legal acts as irrelevant for the 
status of international agreements in the EC legal system.63
A.I.- Hierarchical Rankins of International Agreements
Whenever there is a conflict between an international agreement and the EC Treaty, 
the international agreement does not take precedence. An example is Opinion 1/9164 
on the Agreement establishing the European Economic Area (EEA) between the EC 
and EFT A countries. According to the ECJ, the jurisdiction conferred on the EEA 
Court was incompatible with EC law. This was so because before the EEA 
Agreement could lawfully be entered into, the European Communities Treaties had 
to be amended. The implication is that the Treaties are the “constitution” of the EC 
and that international agreements which conflict with the Treaties cannot take 
precedence over these Treaties.65
However, there are some obiter dicta of the ECJ where, in case of conflict 
between an international agreement and EC secondary law, the former takes 
precedence over the latter. As examples are International Fruit66 and Germany v
63 Bourgeois, J.H.J. “The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challenges” in 
Weiler, J.H.H. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law o f  International 
Trade?, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 94.
64 [1991] ECR 1-6079.
65 See Tomuschat, Ch. “Ad Article 228” in Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlerman (eds.) Kommentar zum 
EU/EG Vertrag, 5th edn., vol. 4 (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997), at 511.
66 [1972] ECR 1219, para. 7.
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( \7Council. The intention of the ECJ is to avoid a conflict between an EC measure and 
an international obligation. Such is the case of Carciati and Poulsen and Diva 
Navigation.69 The ECJ has not found a case of conflict between an EC measure and 
an international agreement. In such a case, and following the most prominent 
literature in this respect, international rules binding on the EC take precedence over 
inconsistent EC secondary law.70
B.- The Effect of International Law on the EC Legal System
Here we shall review what function international agreements may have as legal 
instruments under which EC and Member States courts review measures of the EC 
and its Member States. We will see that international law .has many effects on the EC 
legal system. It cannot be limited to the question whether international law gives rise 
to individual rights that may be enforced in national courts.71 Pescatore argues in this 
respect that the reality cannot be summarized by the insufficiently qualified 
questions of whether international agreements are “applicable” within the EC and
67 [1994] ECR 1-5039, para. 111.
68 [1980] ECR 2773, para. 2.
69 [1992] ECR 1-6019, para. 16.
70 See Jacot-Guillarmod, O. Droit Communautaire et Droit International Public (Georg, Librairie de 
L’University, Geneve, 1979), at 120; Kriick, H. “Ad Art. 177” in Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlerman (eds.) 
Kommentar zum EU/EG Vertrag, 5th edn., vol. 4 (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997), p.386; Pescatore, P. 
‘Treaty-making by the European Communities,” in Jacobs, F.G. & Roberts, S. (eds.) The Effects o f  
Treaties in Domestic Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1987, p. 182; Schermers, H. in Commission of 
the EC (ed.) Thirty Years o f  Community Law (OOPEC, Luxembourg, 1981), 241, at 253.; Schermers 
and Waelbroek, Judicial Protection in the European Communities, 5th edn., Kluwer, Deventer, 
Boston, 1992, at 217; Tomuschat, Ch. “Ad Article 228” in Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlerman (eds.) 
Kommentar zum EU/EG Vertrag, 5th edn., vol. 4 (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997), at 512.
71 Eeckhout, P. “The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreeement: Interconnecting Legal 
Systems”, 34 CML Rev. (1997), p. 13.
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whether they are “directly enforceable.”72 The question is that once an international 
agreement forms integral part of EC law, is it reliable a such in court or does it need 
certain criteria in order to rely on it to challenge the legality of an EC act?
B.l. Reliability on an EC International Agreement in an EC Member State Court
To be relied upon in an EC Member State court, an EC law provision must have 
direct effect; in other words, it must meet the following criteria:
1. It must contain a clear obligation on the Member State
2. Its content must be applicable by a court
3. It must be unconditional
4. The Member State must have no discretion in the implementation of the 
obligation
5. No further act by either the EC or the Member State should be required
Where EC law provisions meet such technical criteria, they are enforceable in 
EC Member States courts, since, as can be inferred from Van Gend en Loos, the EC 
“constitutes a new legal order of international law...the subject of which comprises 
not only Member States but also their nationals.”73 In Costa v Enel, the ECJ argues 
in the same direction by saying that “the EEC has created its own legal system, 
which, on the entry into force of the Treaty became an integral part of the legal
72 Pescatore, P. “Die Rechtsprechung des Europaischen Gerichtshofs zur innergemeinschaftlichen 
Wirkung Volkerrechtlicher Abkommen" in Volkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, Internationale 
Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte-Festschrift Mosler (Springer, Berlin, 1986), p. 663.
73 [1963] ECR 1 at 12.
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system of the Member States...”74 Also in Opinion 1/91, the ECJ refers to the EEC 
Treaty as “the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law...The 
essential characteristics of the Community legal order which has thus been 
established are in particular its primacy over the law of the Member States and the 
direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nationals 
and to the Member States themselves.”75
In Bresciani, the ECJ held that the prohibition in Article 2(1) of the Yaounde 
Convention on the abolition of charges having equivalent effect to customs duties 
was “capable of conferring on those subject to Community law the right to rely on it 
before the courts” on the ground that “this obligation is specific and not subject to 
any implied or express reservation on the part of the Community.”76 According to 
the ECJ, Article 2(1) of the Yaounde Convention met the necessary requirements 
which make it capable of being applied by a court.
In International Fruit, the ECJ required that a provision of international law be 
not only binding on the EC but also “capable of conferring rights on citizens of the 
Community which they can invoke before the courts.”77 Schermers criticized the 
ECJ for introducing an additional condition for the application of international law in 
EC law.78 In Kupferberg,19 the ECJ analyzed Article 21 of the Free Trade Area with 
Portugal. Kupferberg relied as a private party on this agreement. The ECJ verified 
whether “the nature” or “the structure” of the agreement “may prevent a trader from
74 [1964] ECR 585 at 593.
75 [1991] ECR 1-6079, para. 21.
76 [1976] ECR 129, para. 25.
77 [1972] ECR 1219, para. 8.
78 Schermers, “Community Law and International Law” 12 CMLRev (1975), 77 at 80.
79 [1982] ECR 3641.
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relying on the provisions of the said Agreement before a court in the Community.”80 
The ECJ clarified this in Demirel in the following way:
“A  provision o f  an agreement concluded by the Comm unity  
with non-member countries must be regarded as being  
directly applicable when, regard being had to its wording 
and the pu rpose  and nature o f the agreem ent itself, the 
provision contains a clear and precise obligation w hich is 
not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption  
o f  any subsequent measure (emphasis added).”81
As can be inferred from Demirel, for a private party to rely on an EC 
international agreement, it depends not only on whether its content is applicable by a 
court82 but also on the nature and structure of the international agreement of which it 
is part. Some legal authors have criticized this approach,83 while others have 
approved it.84 One practical difference between relying on an EC law provision and 
on an EC international agreement is that, in the latter, a private party needs not only 
to demonstrate that the required technical criteria of direct effect are met but also that 
the context of that clause, i.e. the agreement, its wording, nature and purpose, is such 
as to justify direct effect. This should not be understood as that EC international 
agreements never have direct effect, i.e. never give rise to rights that are legally 
enforceable in EC Member States courts.
80 Ibid., paras. 10-22.
81 [1987] ECR 3747, para. 14.
82 See criterion number 2 above for EC law provisions to be relied upon in an EC Member State court.
83 Pescatore, P. ‘Treaty-making by the European Communities” in Jacobs, F.G. & Roberts, S. (eds.) 
The Effects o f Treaties in Domestic Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1987, p. 187.
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B.2. Reliability on an EC International Agreement in the EC Courts
An applicant who relies on an EC rule in a direct action in the ECJ or the Court of 
First Instance (CFI) of the EC does not need to demonstrate that such rule has direct 
effect.85 The ECJ has so far not pronounced itself for such a requirement. It has just 
stated that if private parties are subjects of a given legal system (the EC legal 
system), “they are entitled to rely on any provision of that legal system, provided this 
provision is technically capable of being applied by a court.” The question that 
arises is whether, in order to be relied upon in a direct appeal before the ECJ, the 
ECJ would require that a clause of an EC international agreement meet the same sort 
of direct effect test as it requires when such a clause is relied upon in a national 
court.
The enforceability of a clause of an EC international agreement in the ECJ 
and in the CH would depend not only on the technical requirements of the clause by 
also on its context, i.e. the international agreements of which it is part. This seems to 
be the conclusion from the Bananas cases. Gulman AG took the view that it is not 
because a provision does not have direct effect in a Member State court that it may 
not be relied upon in a direct appeal in the ECJ.87 The ECJ rejected his view and 
applied the same test in this direct appeal as the test applied in preliminary rulings
84 Tomuschat, C. “Ad Article 228” in Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlerman (eds.) Kommentar zum EU/EG 
Vertrag, 5* edn., vol. 4 (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997), pp. 506-510.
85 Bourgeois, J.HJ. “The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challenges” in 
Weiler, J.H.H. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law o f International 
Trade?, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 101.
86 Ibid.
87 [1994] ECR 1-4980, para. 135.
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o o
for the purpose of application by EC Member States courts. Of course, this does 
not mean that no EC international agreement would ever pass the test. An example is 
Opel Austria?9 where the applicant challenged in the CFI a duty imposed on 
gearboxes manufactured by Opel Austria to counteract subsidies granted by Austria 
to Opel Austria. According to the applicant, such duty infringed several clauses of 
the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA). The CFI applied only the 
technical test to Article 10 of the EEA Agreement to find that it had direct effect.90
There are also cases where there is some form of legislative implementation 
by the EC. In Fediol III?1 according to the applicant the Commission had 
misinterpreted various GATT provisions when it rejected the applicant’s complaint 
lodged under the EC’s New Commercial Policy Instrument. The holding of the ECJ 
was that the applicant could on those provisions on the grounds that the New 
Commercial Policy Instrument defined “illicit practices” against which private 
parties may complain by reference to the GATT. Van Gerven AG took the view in 
his opinion that an international law provision which does not have direct effect per 
se may, none the less, be transformed within a particular legal order, by a rule of that 
legal order, into a rule having direct effect.92
The ECJ went even further in Nakajima,93 where the applicant was 
questioning the applicability of the EC basic anti-dumping regulation by claiming 
that it was incompatible with Article VI of the GATT and certain clauses of the 
GATT Anti-dumping Code. To the eyes of the ECJ, the applicant could rely on these
88 [1994] ECR 1-4973, para. 105.
89 [1997] ECR n-39.
90 Ibid., para. 102.
91 [1989] ECR 1781.
92 Ibid., at 1806, footnote 8.
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GATT provisions on the ground that the basic anti-dumping regulation had 
according to its preamble been “adopted in order to comply with the international 
obligations of the Community.”94 In of the Bananas cases, the ECJ made clear that it 
will review the legality of an EC act under the GATT “only if the Community 
intended to implement a particular obligation entered into within the framework of 
GATT, or Community act expressly refers to specific provisions of GATT.”95 So 
where under an objective test an international agreement has no direct effect, this 
means that contracting parties have no international duty to allow its enforcement in 
national courts.
IV. The WTO Agreement in EC Law
Section V, in contrast with the previous section, deals specifically with international
trade law. The relationship between the WTO Agreement and EC law, as well as its
effect in the EC legal system are treated throughout this section.
A.- The Relationship between the WTO Agreement and EC Law
The ECJ has avoided stating that the GATT “forms integral part of Community 
law.” This may be due to the fact that the EC was not a contracting party in GATT 
1947. The ECJ has avoided this qualification also in relation to the WTO Agreement.
93 [1991] ECR 1-2069.
94 Ibid, para. 31.
95 Germany v Council [1994] ECR 1-4973, para. 11.
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In Fediol //, the ECJ examined the Commission’s interpretation of the term 
“subsidy” in light of the GATT and the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code. It held that 
“the Commission was not wrong or arbitrary in concluding that the concept of 
subsidy...presupposes the grant of an economic advantage through a charge on the 
public account.”96 In Nakajima, the ECJ compared the EC Anti-dumping Regulation 
and the relevant international provision and concluded that the EC Anti-dumping 
Regulation was in conformity with the international law provision “inasmuch as, 
without going against the spirit of the latter provision, it confines itself to setting out, 
for the various situations which might arise in practice, reasonable methods of 
calculating the constructed normal value.”97
In the International Dairy Agreement case, the Commission brought 
proceedings against Germany for having breached obligations under the EC Treaty 
resulting from its failure to comply with the International Dairy Agreement, one of 
the agreements concluded in the framework of the Tokyo Round. According to 
Germany, the IDA did not cover goods imported and exported under inward 
processing arrangements. This interpretation was rejected by the ECJ on the basis of 
the text98 and on the basis of the context of the relevant provision and of the “general 
rule of international law requiring the parties to any agreement to show the good 
faith in its performance”99 and the purpose of the IDA.100
From this evidence, it can be argued that when interpreting GATT 
agreements, the ECJ follows the same approach as in the case of other international
96 [1988] ECR 4155, para. 12.
97 [1991] ECR 1-2069, para.37.
98 [1996] ECR 1-3989, paras. 21-4.
99 Ibid., para. 30.
100 Ibid. paras. 31-7.
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agreements. Though the ECJ has not held yet a provision of secondary EC law 
illegal for breach of a GATT or a WTO obligation, the possibility has been accepted 
in Fidelio II and Nakajima.
B.- The Effect of WTO Agreements on the EC Legal System
In this subsection, we will study the reliability on WTO agreements both in the EC 
courts and national courts.
B.I.-Reliability on WTO Agreements in EC Member States Courts
Ever since International Fruit, the ECJ has held that GATT and GATT agreements 
cannot be relied upon by private parties in EC Member States courts to challenge EC 
or Member State measures. After Nakajima, where the ECJ set the door to reliability 
on a GATT agreement, one could have wondered whether the ECJ would display a 
more open attitude with respect to enforcement of GATT and GATT agreements by 
Member States courts. The ECJ did no longer have to worry about the risk of the 
uniform application of EC law if Member States courts were to enforce the GATT 
and the GATT agreements.
For example, the main Bananas judgment101 revealed that uniform 
application of EC law by Member States courts was not the ECJ’s main concern. 
However, one should not infer from the previous statement that the ECJ is not 
concerned with the uniform application of EC law or that uniform enforcement of
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GATT is left to national courts. Rather one should interpret it in the following way: 
since the EC and its Member States are jointly competent for concluding the GATS 
and TRIPS agreements, it is likely that some Member States courts will consider that 
provisions of these agreements may be relied upon before them and enforced by 
them. This was so in the Hermes case:102 within less than ten days after the ECJ 
came up with the Hermes judgment, a Dutch court in another case specifically 
submitted to the ECJ a request for a preliminary ruling on the direct effect of the 
same TRIPS provisions.103
B.2.- Reliability on WTO Agreements in the EC Courts
In the main Bananas case, the ECJ tried the possibility to rely on the GATT in a 
direct appeal to practically the same direct effect test to be used by EC Member 
States courts for the purpose of applying international agreements. It was in this 
same case that the ECJ defined the issue as “assessing the scope of GATT in the 
Community legal system.” It applied the test based on “the spirit, the general scheme 
and the terms of the GATT.”104 The conclusion is that the GATT cannot be relied 
upon in the EC courts to challenge the lawfulness of EC measures, be it by private 
parties or by Member States. In the words of the ECJ:
It is only if the Community intended to implement a particular 
obligation entered into within the framework of GATT, or if the
101 [1994] EC R 1-4973.
102 Case C-53/96 [1998] ECR 1-3603.
103 The Hague District Court on 25 June 1998 in Parfums Christian Dior v Tuk Consultancy.
104 [1994] ECR 1-4973, para. 105.
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Community act expressly refers to specific provisions of GATT, 
that the Court can review of the GATT rules.105
The GATT may only be relied upon against EC measures if the EC political 
bodies have so decided. This results from the statement previously reported. 
However, in Kupferberg106 the ECJ considered that the courts had the right to decide 
on the effect of an international agreement in the internal legal order, where 
contracting parties to such agreement have not agreed in this effect. By leaving it to 
the EC political bodies to decide on the effect of the GATT in the EC legal system, 
the ECJ has effectively introduced some sort of “sovereignty shield”107 against the 
GATT.
The different outcomes of the direct effect test as applied by the ECJ to the 
GATT and as applied to other EC international agreements remain a bit unclear from 
an international law point of view. Distinctions made in the past, such as in 
Kziber,m  where van Gerven AG contrasted the GATT and the Co-operation 
Agreement with Morocco, do no longer apply since the entry into force of the WTO 
agreement. From a WTO point of view, the ECJ did not draw major consequences 
from the change brought by the Dispute Settlement Understanding. If the ECJ wants 
to maintain its doctrine that the GATT does not meet the direct effect test and 
extends it to other WTO agreements, it will need to devise standards, other than the 
standards it has used up to now, to deny direct effect to the GATT and WTO 
agreements.
105 Ibid., para. 111.
106 [19821 ECR 3641, para. 18.
107 This term was used in the European Parliament’s Report on the Relationship between International 
Law, Community Law and Constitutional Law o f the Member States (PE 220.225/fin).
108 [1991] ECR 1-199.
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V. The Hermes Judgment
This famous judgment is the first of its kind where the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities has been requested to interpret a mixed agreement other than 
an association agreement. In the Hermes case,109 the Court interprets an article of the 
TRIPS agreement. The Court was asked to rule on whether an interim measure, as 
provided for in Article 289 of the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure, constituted a 
provisional measure in the sense of Article 50 of TRIPS, so that a time-limit should 
be fixed for Hermes to initiate proceedings on the merits on a dispute concerning an 
alleged infringement of its trade-mark rights by FHT, according to paragraph 6 of the 
provision in question.
The French, Dutch and UK Governments challenged the Court’s jurisdiction 
by referring to the Court’s reasoning in Opinion 1/94, where it had been stated that, 
insofar as no common rules were adopted in the sense of the ERTA judgment,110 the 
EC’s competence to conclude TRIPS would remain non-exclusive.111 The only 
exception was the subject-matter covered by a Council Regulation112 laying down 
measures to prohibit the release for free circulation of counterfeit goods which fell 
within the Community’s exclusive competence by virtue of Article 133 EC.113 The 
three Governments argued that Article 50 of TRIPS fell within the competence of the 
Member States and not that of the Community, since there had been no decision to
109 [1998] ECR 1-3603.
110 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263, paras. 17 and 22.
111 Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I- 5267, para. 104.
112 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3842/86, OJ L 357 [1986] p. 1.
113 Opinion 1/94, para. 55.
201
The ECJ and EC External Trade Relations Rafael Leal-Areas
Chapter 5
exercise non-exclusive Community competence at the time of conclusion of the 
WTO Agreement.114
Advocate General Tesauro argued that apart from the areas where the 
Community is deemed to enjoy exclusive competence under Article 133 EC, 
competence is vested in the Community insofar as the latter has effectively exercised 
its non-exclusive competence. However, Member States remain competent in those 
areas where no common rules have been introduced.115 Both the Advocate General 
and the Court rejected the claim that Article 50 of TRIPS was outside the Court’s 
jurisdiction under Article 234 EC. The Court noted, in addition, that when the Final 
Act and the WTO Agreement were signed by the Community and its Member States 
on 15 April 1994, Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 on the Community trade mark 
had already been in force for one month.116
Rights arising from a Community trade mark might be safeguarded by the
117adoption of “provisional, including protective, measures.” It is true that the 
measures envisaged by Article 99 were those provided for by the domestic law of the 
Member States concerned for the purposes of the national trade mark. However, 
since the EC was a party to TRIPS and since that agreement applied to the 
Community trade mark, the courts referred to in Article 99 of Regulation No. 40/94, 
and when called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional
114 Case C-53/96 Hermes v FHT [1998] ECR 1-3603, para. 23.
115 Ibid., paras. 12-13 of the opinion of Mr. Tesauro. See also Garzon Clarina, G. “La mixite: Le droit 
et les problemes pratiques” in Bourgeois, J., Dewost, J. & Gaiffe, M. La Communaute europeenne et 
les accords mixtes, Quelles perspectives?, Presses Interuniversitaires Europeennes, 1997, p. 17 and 
Piris, J.C. & Torrent, R. “Les problemes juridiques posees a la Communaute europeenne par la 
conclusion des accords de Marrakech” in Societe Frangaise de Droit International, Colloque de Nice -  
La reorganisation mondiale des echanges (problemes juridiques) (Pedone, Paris, 1996) p. 251 at 270- 
71.
116 Case C-53/96 Hermes v FHT [1998] ECR 1-3603, paras. 26-29.
117 Article 99 of Regulation No. 40/94.
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measures for the protection of rights arising under a Community trade mark, they 
were required to do so, in the light of the wording and purpose of Article 50 of the 
TRIPS agreement.118 In fact, the ECJ had jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of 
TRIPS.119 In the eyes of the ECJ, it was immaterial that the dispute in the main 
proceedings concerned trade marks whose international registrations designated the 
Benelux. Therefore, the Court came to the conclusion that it had jurisdiction to rule 
on Article 50 of TRIPS.120
Taking into account the argument put forward by the three Governments 
challenging the Court’s jurisdiction, the question arises as to the implications of the 
decision for the Court’s competence to interpret mixed agreements. One wonders 
whether the reasoning on the issue of jurisdiction means that the ECJ regards itself as 
competent to rule also on those provisions of a mixed agreement which have been 
concluded under national powers. Should that be the case, is that power limited to 
areas where the EC has non-exclusive competence? Does it also cover provisions 
within the sole competence of the Member States?
As regards the latter question, the Hermes judgment does not resolve the 
question. The ECJ made clear that no provisions of the TRIPS Agreement should be 
understood as being within “some sort of domain reserved to the Member States.”122 
The EC was competent to harmonize national rules on those matters, insofar as they 
directly affected the establishment of functioning of the common market provided by
118 The ECJ referred, by anology, to Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR 1-6019, 
para. 9, and to Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany [1996] ECR 1-3989, para. 52.
119 Case C-53/96 Hermes v FHT [1998] ECR 1-3603, paras. 26-29.
120 Ibid., para. 33.
121 The French, the Dutch and the UK Governments.
122 Opinion 1/94, [1994] ECR 1-5267.
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Article 95 EC.123 According to Professor Dashwood, on the Opinion 1/94 premises, 
the ECJ was not in a position to give any light on the question of whether its 
jurisdiction under Article 234 EC covers the provisions of a mixed agreement which 
are within the sole competence of the Member States.124 However, other authors, 
such as Kaddous125 as well as Correa & Yusuf, conclude that “international treaties 
concluded by the Community, or mixed agreements such as TRIPS, are directly 
applicable and binding upon the Community, and once approved by its organs the 
agreement becomes also binding upon individual EEC Members as Community 
law.” 126
As for provisions where the EC has non-exclusive competence, the reasoning 
in Hermes affirms the ECJ’s jurisdiction for their interpretation. The ECJ’s logic is 
that the court has jurisdiction to interpret all provisions of a mixed agreement falling 
within the exclusive or the non-exclusive competence of the EC, regardless of 
whether it has been decided to exercise the EC’s non-exclusive powers. In other 
words, it has been suggested that what the ECJ said on Article 50 of TRIPS seemed 
to be equally applicable to any of the provisions of the WTO Agreement and other 
mixed agreements that relate to a field of activity where the competence is shared
123 Ibid., para. 104. See Rosas, A. “Mixed Union-Mixed Agreements” in Koskenniemi, M. (ed.) 
International Law Aspects o f the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 135.
124 See Dashwood, A. “Preliminary Rulings on the Interpretation of Mixed Agreements” in O'Keefe, 
D. & Bavasso, A. (eds.) Judicial Review in European Union Law: Liber Amicorum in Honour o f  Lord 
Slynn o f Hadley, Vol. 1, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000; see also, Eeckhout, P. “The 
Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreeement: Interconnecting Legal Systems”, 34 CML Rev. 
(1997), p. 11 at pp. 20-24.
125 Kaddous, C. Le droit des relations exterieures dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des 
Communautes europeenes (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Bale, 1998), pp. 76-78.
126 Correa, C.M. & Yusuf, A.A. Intellectual Property and International Trade, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1998, p. 114.
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between the EC and its Member States.127 This would result from the fact that in 
every such field there is likely to have been some piece of internal legislation 
enacted, which would be enough to bring the relevant provisions of the agreement in 
question within the scope of EC law.128 Rosas takes the same view and submits that
190“the Court is competent to rule on all provisions of TRIPS.”
According to Heliskoski, the above interpretation of the Hermes case would 
seem too broad. In the first place, the assumption that in every field where the EC 
has competence there was at least some EC legislation enacted does not seem to be 
correct.130 The ECJ pointed out in Opinion 1/94 that harmonization achieved within 
the EC in certain areas covered by TRIPS is only partial and, in other cases, no 
harmonization has been envisaged.131 With regard to areas where no harmonization 
has been envisaged, the ECJ referred to the protection of undisclosed technical 
information, industrial design as well as patents. Secondly, the rationale of the 
decision in Hermes was that Article 50 of the TRIPS affected, in the meaning of the 
ERTA judgment, Article 99 of Regulation No. 40/94, that is, the adoption of 
provisional measures. According to the ECJ, there was a Community interest that the 
interpretation of Article 50 of TRIPS was uniform in both cases.
127 Heliskoski, J. "The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to Give Preliminary Rulings on 
the Interpretation of Mixed Agreements", Nordic Journal o f International Law, Vol. 69, No. 4, 2000, 
p. 395 at 404.
Dashwood, A. “Preliminary Rulings on the Interpretation of Mixed Agreements” in O'Keefe, D. & 
Bavasso, A. (eds.) Judicial Review in European Union Law: Liber Amicorum in Honour o f Lord 
Slynn o f Hadley, Vol. 1, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000, p. 173.
1 Rosas, A. “Book Review” of J.H.J. Bourgeoois, J.-L. Dewost and M.-A. Gaiffe (eds.) La 
Communaute europeenne et les accords mixtes. Quelles perspectives? (Presses interuniversitaires 
europeennes, Bruxelles, 1997), 37 Common Market Law Review, (2000) p. 1007 at p. 1009.
130 Heliskoski, J. "The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to Give Preliminary Rulings on 
the Interpretation of Mixed Agreements", Nordic Journal of International Law, Vol. 69, No. 4, 2000, 
p. 395 at 404.
b l Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR 1-5267, para. 103.
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The judgment seems to suggest that where one and the same provision of 
such an agreement might apply to both areas of Community and Member State 
competence, the Court is entitled to give a preliminary ruling on its interpretation, 
irrespective of whether the dispute in the main proceedings concerned a matter 
within the competence of the Member States. Insofar as the EC's competence is still 
and only potential, the competence to conclude an agreement such as TRIPS remains 
vested in the Member States. Advocate General Tesauro put forward a whole series 
of arguments to justify his conclusion that the ECJ should be considered to have 
jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of TRIPS. He mentioned that sectors in which 
there was shared competence were not the “private preserve” of the Member States 
and therefore were not outside the scope of Community law.132
However, it might not be easy to establish precisely whether a given 
provision falls within the Community or Member State preserve. Nor can it be ruled 
out that a given national interpretation might affect the application of Community 
provisions and/or the functioning of the system. Thus, according to Mr. Tesauro, the 
requirement of uniformity in the interpretation and application of all the provisions 
of a mixed agreement could be regarded as fundamental.133 Moreover, as the EC and 
its Member States constituted a single contracting party vis-a-vis other WTO 
Members, the ECJ’s jurisdiction was necessary in order to ensure uniformity in its 
interpretation and application throughout the EC and in order to protect the EC’s 
interest in not being obliged to assume responsibility for infringements committed by
132 Case C-53/96 Hermes v FHT [1998] ECR 1-3603, para. 19 of the Opinion of Mr. Tesauro.
133 Ibid., at para. 20.
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one or more Member States.134 In addition to the above, the recognition of the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction represented a contribution to the fulfillment of the duty of co-operation 
between the EC institutions and the Member States, as emphasized by the ECJ in its 
Opinion 1/94.135
In the case Assco Geriiste GmbH and R. van Dijk v. Wilhelm Layher GmbH 
& Vo KG and Layher BV, Advocate General Cosmas has taken the view that the 
judgment in Hermes was based on the close connection between the rules of the EC 
trade mark and the national trade-marks, which therefore could not prejudge whether 
the Court was entitled to interpret Article 50 of TRIPS in a dispute which did not 
relate to the protection of a trade-mark but an industrial design. He refers to the 
ECJ’s observation that the measures envisaged by Article 99 of Regulation 40/94 on 
the EC trade-mark and the relevant procedural rules are those provided for by the 
domestic law of the Member State concerned for the purposes of the national trade­
mark.136 What can be inferred from all this is that there is a close link between the 
situations concerning the EC trade-mark and those concerning the national trade­
marks which, according to Mr. Cosmas, justified the ECJ’s jurisdiction in Hermes.137 
Desmedt takes the view that in Hermes “the Court seemed to infer its competence for 
interpreting Article 50 TRIPS from the fact that this provision is relevant to the
134 Ibid., paras. 14 and 20.
135 [1994] ECR 1-5267, para. 21.
136 Case C-53/96 Hermes v FHT [1998] ECR 1-3603, para. 28.
137 Joint Cases C-300/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Tuk Consultancy BV  and C-392/98 Assco 
Geriiste GmbH and R. van Dijk v. Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co KG and Layher BV  [2000] ECR I- 
11307, paras. 40 of the Opinion of Advocate General.
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interpretation of national provisional measures which can be taken by virtue of 
Article 99 of the Community Regulation 40/94.”138
According to Heliskoski, there is no such connection between the rules 
concerning the EC trade mark and the rules concerning the national trade marks the 
ECJ relied upon in Hermes. Hence, the judgment does not give the ECJ an unlimited 
jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of TRIPS or any other provision in a mixed 
agreement which might apply to both areas of Community and national competence 
but is limited to the specific case of trade-marks.139 One can conceive two 
interpretations of Hermes with regard to the ECJ’s jurisdiction to give preliminary 
ruling on mixed agreements. On the one hand, one can argue that the Court is 
competent to interpret all those provisions of a given agreement which apply to both 
areas of EC and Member State competence, regardless of whether the dispute in the 
main proceedings actually concerned a matter within the competence of the Member 
States. On the other hand, and following the lines of the Opinion of Advocate 
General Cosmas in Assco Geriiste GmbH and R. van Dijk v. Wilhelm Layher GmbH 
& Co KG and Layher BV, it might be suggested that there also has to be a 
substantive link between the respective spheres of EC trade-mark and the national 
trade-marks respectively.
Neither interpretation resolves the question of whether the ECJ is entitled to 
interpret those provisions in a mixed agreement which have been concluded under 
Member State powers either because they go beyond the competence of the EC or
138 Desmedt, G.A. “European Court Rules on TRIPS Agreement” 1 Journal of International 
Economic Law, (1998) p. 679 at 680.
139 Heliskoski, J. "The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to Give Preliminary Rulings on 
the Interpretation of Mixed Agreements", Nordic Journal o f International Law, Vol. 69, No. 4, 2000, 
p. 395 at 407.
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because it has not been decided to exercise the EC’s non-exclusive competence. In 
this sense, Hermes is not very different from the ECJ’s case-law on association 
agreements.140
VI. Conclusions
The ECJ faces various challenges with regard to international trade law in general, 
and more precisely with respect to WTO agreements. The first of them is about 
jurisdiction. The ECJ will face the issue of its jurisdiction over matters which 
justified Member States’ participation in mixed agreements and with respect to 
which EC rules have been enacted. This will be so as a result of both the mixed 
WTO membership of the EC and its Member States and the joint competence of the 
EC and its Member States for most of the matters covered by GATS and TRIPS. The 
ECJ can take a narrow approach and declare that it has no jurisdiction over GATS 
and TRIPS provisions coming within the scope of Member States’ powers and leave 
it to the Member States and the EC political bodies to sort out the rather messy 
situation both within the EC and vis-a-vis other WTO members. The ECJ could also 
make a distinction between situations that are purely internal to a Member State and 
those that are not. It is also up to the ECJ to draw a line dividing EC and Member 
States’ external powers. This would be a politically controversial exercise. The 
mixed agreement formula is a solution of creative ambiguity that avoids difficult 
discussions and decisions.
140 Gasparon, P. “The Transposition of the Principle of Member State Liability into the Context of 
External Relations” 10 European Journal o f International Law (1999) p. 605 at p. 613 and Turner, C. 
“Arret Hermes” Revue du Marche Unique Europeen (1998) p. 241 at p. 243.
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The ECJ can also take jurisdiction without, firstly, calling into question its 
Opinion 1/94 on the result of the Uruguay Round and, secondly, pre-empting a 
decision of the EC political bodies, under Article 133(5) EC on trade in services and 
intellectual property rights. This would mean exercising jurisdiction over Member 
States’ legislation and their international obligations in cases where the ECJ is not 
able to link Member State legislation to EC legislation. The ECJ could exercise 
jurisdiction via a broad interpretation of Article 10 EC on the Community loyalty 
principle. Even without referring to Article 10 EC, in Opinion 1/94 the ECJ 
identified a duty of “close co-operation”, which extends to “the fulfillment of the 
commitments entered into.” This close co-operation could be applied to Member 
States’ courts so that they have an obligation to seek a preliminary ruling under 
Article 234 EC.
Another challenge that the WTO agreements present to the ECJ is their 
enforceability in the EC legal system. The question that raises is whether or not to 
recognize a degree of enforceability to WTO agreements where they contain 
provisions that are as such capable of being enforced judicially. There is no 
consensus among EC Member State governments against judicial enforceability of 
WTO agreements as a matter of principle. The ECJ will touch on traditionally held 
views on the effect of international agreements and on the interest of these 
agreements in a globalizing world economy.
210








rrrr 1 eee aaa 1
r r 1 e e a 1
r 1 eeeee aaaa 1
r 1 e a a 1
r 111 eeee aaaa 111
rleal (85) Queue: VEGA/CN=VSTRoom_q.0=RES
Server: HP VSTROOM PS
LPT6
October 11, 2002 10:26am
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
L PPPP TTTTT 66
L P P T 6
L P P T 6 : :
L PPPP T 6666 ::
L P T 6 6
L P T 6 6 : :
LLLLL P T 666 ::
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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CONCLUSIONS
My conclusion is that since the European integration is an on-going process, very often 
WTO issues are subject to political consideration and political will in order to really 
have a common position by the EC and its Member States on all trade matters. Before 
the Treaty of Nice of December of 2000, EU Member States had a veto power in issues 
of mixed competence (such as trade in services, intellectual property rights, investment 
and monetary policy), which made the answer to my research question virtually 
impossible. After Nice, the EU has moved to a system of qualified majority voting, 
leaving behind the old system of unanimity in the EU Council and therefore getting 
closer to the desired EC unitary representation in all WTO matters. In Nice it was 
decided that trade agreements relating to services or commercial aspects of intellectual 
property can, in principle, be concluded by the Council acting by qualified majority.1 
The old system of unanimity made negotiations more complex and sometimes less 
effective.2
From the point of view of the negotiating opponent, the EC is a much stronger 
adversary if EU Member States retain tight control over the negotiating process by 
sharing competence with the EC than if the EC acts with exclusive competence and the 
European Commission acts with a centralized power. To give an example, the U.S. 
would be able to successfully negotiate bilateral agreements with most EU Member
1 The European Commission, “Factsheets. Qualified Majority Voting: Common Commercial Policy”, in 
<<http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/igc2000/geninfo/fact-sheet6/index_en.htm>>




States if the EU Member States did not integrate their trade policy and trade negotiating 
authority. This happened in the case of “open skies” agreements, since air traffic 
regulation is not exclusive EC competence.3 Although each party to an international 
agreement is responsible for performance of its own obligations and joint liability under 
an agreement is not to be presumed, the special circumstances of the EC and its Member 
States may amount to an exception to this rule. They generally act together in pursuit of 
a common policy.4 Macleod et al., comment that “for the third party, the most 
convenient conclusion is that the Community and the Member States assume joint 
obligations, the performance of which all are required to assure.”5
The EC faces problems similar to those of federal states. In Germany, to take an 
example of a prominent European federation, the Laender strongly protested against the 
silent transfer of their powers to the Community, and they are justified by the German 
Constitution. It might simply not be realistic to strive for a unitary character of EC 
external trade relations. Mixity may function as an invitation to pursue parochial 
national interests. However, equally important, the unitary tendency is controversial in 
normative terms. In this sense, Professor Weiler indeed has underlined that the EC “may 
not speak with one voice but increasingly speaks like a choir.”6
3 SOPHIE MEUNIER, Divided but United: European Trade Policy Integration and EU-U.S. Agricultural 
Negotiations in the Uruguay Round, Program for the Study of Germany and Europe, Working Paper 
Series #7.3, p. 29.
4 Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, p. 159.
5 Id.
6 Weiler, J. H. H., “The Evolution of Mechanisms and Institutions for a European Foreign Policy. 




The legal recognition by the European Court of Justice in its Opinion 1/947 of 
mixed competencies departs from the founding principle that the EC has a single voice 
in international trade negotiations and from previous case law on external relations. The 
Court’s encouragement of a return to intergovemmentalism in the field of external trade 
is clearly setting the stage for future disputes over competencies and may affect the 
future character of the EC as an international trade actor.8
Proof of this are the words of Rod Eddington, chief executive of British 
Airways, who believes that, with regard to bilateral air services agreements with foreign 
governments, “Brussels should aim to replace national ownership rules in present 
agreements with a European ownership regulation to open the way for the consolidation 
of the European airline industry.”9 In addition, he warned that “a continued 
fragmentation would cause the European industry to lag behind the U.S.”10 More 
clearly, he expresses that the EU “cannot compete globally with North American 
carriers if we [the EU] have 14 to 15 network carriers in Europe.”11 In this same line of 
thought is an argument by Louis Uchitelle, who claims that Mercosur’s Member States, 
and particularly Brazil and Argentina, would benefit from a strong common position in
7 Opinion 1/94, competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services 
and intellectual property (15 November 1994), [1994] ECR 1-5267.
8 See SOPHIE MEUNIER, Divided but United: European Trade Policy Integration and EU-U.S. 
Agricultural Negotiations in the Uruguay Round, in CAROLYN RHODES ed., THE EUROPEAN 
UNION IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 193, 209 (Colorado) (1998).
9 Kevin Done, Aerospace correspondent in London, “Airlines press bigger role for Brussels” in Financial 





Mercosur, which has given the two countries a more powerful voice when negotiating 
with the U.S. and Europe.12
As Keith Richardson13 argues, “the need to negotiate as one, to speak with one 
voice in all international economic negotiations, is about competitiveness, jobs and 
economic survival and it is being trivialized by national administrations which treat it as 
a petty bureaucratic turf battle”.14 He argues that our living standards (in the European 
Union) are increasingly determined by global flows, “not only trade in goods but also 
services, intellectual property and investment. Europe is the world’s largest trading unit, 
and European industry is strong enough to hold its own. But these flows take place 
within a framework of globally agreed rules, and except in the specific case of trade in 
goods European negotiators cannot hold their own because they negotiate not as one but 
as 15.”15 The European Community only has exclusive competence with respect to trade 
in goods. With respect to trade in services, intellectual property and investment, there is 
no European Community exclusive competence.16
Richardson supports his thesis about the importance of a single voice in the 
European Union by comparing the European Union’s and the United States’ power in 
negotiating multilateral trade agreements. “But where would some of our dynamic 
American friends stand in world markets if their interests were represented by 50
12 Louise Uchitelle, Argentina’s Woes May Stmgthen Its Ties to Brazil, The New York Times, Business 
Day, January 10, 2002, p. C l.
13 Keith Richardson is Secretary General of the European Round Table of Industrialists.






separate state-level negotiating teams?”17 This question shows the important role that 
the United States plays in multilateral trade negotiations by negotiating on behalf of all 
fifty states with one voice. The comparison is not perfect since the fifty American states 
are not sovereign States (they have no international legal personality) and, therefore, 
cannot sign any international treaties. However, in the case of the European Community 
its Member States are sovereign states and can therefore sign international agreements. 
The idea behind this transatlantic parallelism is that, although the European Union is 
composed of 15 sovereign Member States, it is in their national interest to give up their 
national sovereignty to the European level in order to have a stronger negotiating 
position. This would only be legally possible by amending the Treaties.
Reflecting on the Future
International trade relations are changing rapidly, and it is of vital importance for the 
European Union to give shape to and change the governing rules and institutions of 
international trade according to its own fundamental aims. In the past, the European 
Union had a defensive attitude when dealing with international trade issues in the 
multilateral trade system. This is no longer possible. The EU needs an innovative trade 
policy, the institutional capacity to act on a long-term basis, a permanent Council of 
Trade Ministers.18 This would make EU policy-making far more efficient. There is also
181 have personally gathered this information at a round table held at the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs in February 1998 during the discussion of a paper written by Johnson, M. 113. European Co­
operation in Action, 1998.
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a tendency among certain scholars to believe in the importance of giving trade matters at 
the highest political level of policy-making to the EU Ministers of Trade instead of 
being competence of the General Affairs Council, which is a priori more interested in 
Foreign Policy issues and usually not so interested in trade matters.19
Although shared competence will be used for the near future between the EC 
Institutions and Member States when dealing with the EC External Trade Relations, it 
still creates a great deal of uncertainty at the international negotiation table. The EU 
must be sure that the present realities of the global economy mesh with the institutional 
design in Europe. However, and unfortunately, there has been little political will to 
reform the present system. There is still a lack of transparency and democratic 
accountability within the EC Institutions.
With the decline of the U.S. hegemony, the EU can no longer have a defensive 
trade policy in international trade diplomacy, especially in an era of globalization. The 
EU must accept global responsibilities, as it is an important international economic actor 
and has a duty to assure a stable international trading system. Will the existing EC 
institutional structures for external trade policy meet the challenge of self-reform?
It is vital for the European Community to reach a common position for effective 
policy-making. Are EU Member States prepared to lose part of their sovereignty in 
order to have “more common” policies? Undoubtedly, when the EC negotiates as one in 
multilateral trade negotiations, as in the Uruguay Round negotiations, between more 




markets overseas, more quickly. However, the supranational trade policy powers of the 
Commission have made Member States envious. The Amsterdam Treaty has made it 
possible for the Commission to have a bigger role in negotiations in international 
agreements, as long as there is agreement by the Council, but the system seems to be 
undemocratic. Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) complain about the 
undemocratic accountability within the EU policy-making. The trend in the EU seems to 
be harmonization. But only in the long run.
Mixity often makes life more difficult for everybody involved. It is, therefore, 
desirable that the EU be able to tackle the following issues in the near future:
1. The extension of the application of Article 133 EC on common 
commercial policy, by Council decisions, to all international agreements 
on intellectual property rights and services.20 By so doing, the EC will be 
able to apply its common commercial policy to areas which have become 
crucial elements of international trade. When GATT was crated in 1947, 
goods were the predominant feature of world trade, not services or 
intellectual property rights.
2. Respect for the duty of co-operation in areas of shared competence 
between the EC and its Member States. As long as Member States insist
20 Article 133.5 EC, added by the Treaty of Amsterdam, reads as follows:
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, may extend the application of paragraphs 1 to 4 to international negotiations and 
agreements on services and intellectual property insofar as they are not covered by these paragraphs.
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on obligatory mixity,21 they must also accept the duty to accede 
themselves to the mixed agreement in question without undue delay.
3. The possibility of having pure Community rather than mixed agreements 
in areas of concurrent competencies.22 For practical reasons, it may be 
favourable to have Community agreements even in areas where Member 
States participation is legally permissible. Often, Member States 
participation in such agreements may matter very little from a strictly 
legal view point, as the agreement may be fully applicable as a 
Community agreement, legally binding not only the EC institutions but 
also the Member States.23
21 See subtitle on Typology of Mixed Agreements.
22 Id.
23 According to Article 300 (7) EC, Community agreements “shall be binding on the institutions of the 





Agreement between Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) OJ L 
60/59, p. 1165
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Madagascar regarding fishing off the coast of Madagascar, OJ L 
73/86, p. 25
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of 
Brazil on trade of textile products, OJ L 40/91, p. 1
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway 
and provisions for its implementation, OJ L 171/73, p. 2
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of India on 
cane sugar, OJ L 292/84, pp. 1 & 5
Agreement between the European Economic Community and Malaysia on trade in textile 
products, OJ L 339/90, p. 42
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Sri Lanka 
on trade in textile products, OJ L 301/90, p. 1
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation on 
the application of the rules of Community transit OJ L 294/72, p. 1
Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Economic 
Community and the United States of Mexico on trade of textile products, OJ L 292/87, 
p. 73
Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and 
Greece, OJ 26, of 18 December 1963, p. 294
Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and 
Turkey, OJ No 217 of 29 December 1964, pp. 3685 and 3705
Agreement establishing a free trade area between the European Economic Community 
and the Republic of Iceland, OJ L 301/72, p. 1
219
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Arcas
Agreement for commercial, economic and development co-operation between the 
European Economic Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, OJ L 108/86, p. 1
Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Community and 
the Eastern Republic of Uruguay on trade of sheep and lamb meat, OJ L 275/80, p. 37
Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters relating to Article 9 of Protocol 1 to the 
EEC-Israel Agreement and concerning the Community of tomato paste originating in 
Israel, OJL 23/77, p. 13
Agreement on the introduction of international railway tariffs for the carriage of coal 
through Swiss territory, OJ ESCS 17/57, p. 223
Agreement on the European Economic Area, OJ L 1/1 (1994)
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration, of August 8, 1967, 6 ILM, 1233
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments: Results o f the Uruguay Round, Vol 31, 33 ILM 81 (1994)
Comision Europea, Informe General sobre la Actividad de la Union Europea, 1997, 
Comunidades Europeas, 1998
Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for External Relations 1-2, 
Multilateral Conventions and Agreements. Signatures and/or Conclusions by the European 
Communities, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1987
Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for External Relations 1-2, 
Relations between the European Community and International Organisations, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1989
Conseil de 1’Union Europeenne, Contribution du Service Juridique aux travaux du 
groupe "Balkans Occidentaux/COWEB”, 5250/00, 2000
Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and Associated 
African States, of July 20, 1963, 2 ILM, 971 (1970)
Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and Associated 
African States, of July 29, 1969, 9 ILM, 484 (1970)
220
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Areas
Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, OJ L 266/78, p. 1
Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, OJ L 268/78, p. 1
Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, all member countries of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations, OJ L 144/80, p. 1
Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom 
of Morocco, OJ L 264/78, p. 1
Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Lebanese 
Republic, OJ L 267/78, p. 1
Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Algeria, OJ L 263/78, p. 1
Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic 
of Tunisia, OJ L 265/78, p. 1
Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Syrian 
Arab Republic, OJ L 269/78, p. 1
Euromediterranean Agreement between the European Economic Community and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, OJ L 187/1997, p. 1
Euromediterranean Agreement between the European Economic Community and 
Tunisia, OJ L 97/1998, p. 1
Europe (association) Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States and the Czech Republic, OJ L 360/94, p. 1
Europe (association) Agreement between the European Communities and their Member 
States and the Republic of Hungary, OJ L 347/93, p. 1
Europe (association) Agreement between the European Communities and the Republic of 
Bulgaria, OJ L 358/94, p.l
Europe Agreement on Trade in textile products between the European Economic 
Community and Romania, OJ L 123/94, p. 476
221
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Arcas
European Commission, Air Traffic Management. Freeing Europe's Airspace: White 
Paper, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1996
European Commission, How does the European Union relate to the World?, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1996
European Commission, Participation des Communautes Europeennes aux Accords 
Multilareaux, Direction General I A, 1997
European Commission, Directorate General 1 A, The Annotated Summary of Agreements 
linking the Communities with Non-Member countries, Brussels, June 1997
European Commission, The European Union and World Trade, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1995
European Court of Justice, Legal Bibliography of European Integration, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1996
European Economic Community-African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries Convention 
(ACP-EEC Convention), of February 28, 1975, 14 ILM, 596 (1985)
European Economic Community-African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries Convention 
(ACP-EEC Convention), of October 31, 1979, 19 ILM, 327 (1985)
European Economic Community-African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries Convention 
(ACP-EEC Convention), of December 8, 1984, 24 ELM, 327 (1985)
European Economic Community-African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries Convention 
(ACP-EEC Convention), of December 1, 1989, OJ L 229/91, p. 3
European Union, Who is who in the European Union? Interinstitutional directory, Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997
Framework Agreement for commercial and economic co-operation between the 
European Communities and Canada, OJ L 260/76, p. 1
Framework Agreement for co-operation between the European Economic Community 
and the Cartagena Agreement and its member countries Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru and Venezuela, OJ C 25/93, p. 32
Framework Agreement for Co-operation between the European Economic Community 
and the Federative Republic of Brazil, OJ L 262, p. 53
222
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Areas
Framework Agreement of Commercial and economic Co-operation between the 
European Economic Community and the Republic of Argentina, OJ L 295/90, p. 66
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, December 10, 1997, 37 
ILM, p. 22. (1998)
Free Trade and Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community 
and Israel, OJ L 136/75, p. 1
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, TIAS No. 
1700, 55 UNTS 187
Interregional framework Co-operation agreement between the European Community and 
its Member States and the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), OJ C 14/96, p. 3 
and OJL 69/96, p. 1
The New Transatlantic Agenda, Vol. 6, No. 49 US Department of State Dispatch, pp. 
894-96
Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the European Communities and their 
Member States and the Russian Federation, OJ 1997 L 327/1
Single European Act, OJ L 169/1 (1987), (1987) 2 CMLRev, p. 741
Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the People’s Republic of China, OJ L 250/85, p. 1
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 UNTS, 11
Treaty of Amsterdam, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
1997
Treaty establishing the European Community, February 7, 1992, OJ C 224/1, at p. 44 
(1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, pp. 573-656, incorporating changes made by the Treaty on 
European Union, February 7,1992, OJ C 224/1 (1992), (1992) 1 CMLRev, p. 719
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, OJ L 51 of 22/2/78, p. 1, 
(78/164/EURATOM)
Versiones Consolidadas del Tratado de la Union Europea y del Tratado Constitutivo de 




WTO: Agreement on Telecommunications Services, February 15, 1997, 36 ILM, p. 354. 
Yearbook of International Law Commission 1982, Vol. II (part 2)
WTO, The Uruguay Round Results. The Legal Texts. (Geneva, 1995)
SECONDARY SOURCES. ARTICLES
Achen, C. & Snidal, D. “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies”, 
World Politics, Vol. XLI, No 2, Jan 1989, pp. 164-65
Amull, A. ‘Does the Court of Justice have inherent jurisdiction?” 27 CMLRev. (1990), 
683
Beseler, H. F. ‘The representation of the European Community on issues of international 
trade”, in a note to the attention of the Heads of Delegations of the EU, 12 April 1999
Bleckmann, A. “Der Gemischte Vertrag in Europarecht”, (1976) Europarecht 301
Bourgeois, J. H. J. “External Relations Powers of the European Community”, Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol 22, 1999, pp. 149-73
Bourgeois, J. H. J. ‘The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: an Echtemach 
Procession”, Common Market Law Review 32, 1995, pp. 763-787
Bourgeois, J. H. J. ‘The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriers and on 
Government Procurement”, Common Market Law Review. 19, 1982
Bradley, K. "Comitology and the Law: Through a Glass, Darkly", Common Market Law 
Review 29, 1992, pp. 693-721
Bradley, K. "The European Parliament and Comitology: On the Road to Nowhere?", 
European Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 3, Sept 1997, pp. 230-54
Brandtner, B. & Rosas, A. “Human Rights and the External Relations of the European 
Community: An Analysis of Doctrine and Practice”, in European Journal o f 
International Law, 9, 1998, pp. 468-90
Brittan, L. “Europe must grow to Change”, The World in 1996, 1996, p. 48
224
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Arcas
Bury, C & Hetsch, P. “Politique etrangere et de securite commune” Rep. Communataire 
Dalloz, October 1996, pp. 1-11
Chua, Amy. ‘The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Development Policy”, 
in Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 41, Number 2, Spring 2000, pp. 287-379
Close, G. “Subordination Clauses in Mixed Agreements” (1985), 34 ICLQ, pp. 382-91
Cremona, M. ‘The European Union as an International Actor: The Issues of Flexibility 
and Linkage” European Foreign Affairs Review, 3, 1998, pp. 67-94.
Dashwood, A. “External Relations Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty”, Common 
Market Law Review 35, 1998, pp. 1019-1045
Da Fonseca-Wollheim, H. & Krenzler, H. “Die Reichweite der gemainsamen 
Handelspolitik nach dem Vertrag von Amsterdam- eine Debatte ohne Ende”, 
Europarecht 1998, pp. 223 ff.
Debeij, T., Ditthard, J., Guallar, G., Hodgson, G., Kaudel, B. & Szapiro, M. "EU-US 
Relations", Department of Political and Administrative Studies 1998-99, College of 
Europe, Brugges, Belgium.
Desmedt, G.A. “European Court Rules on TRIPS Agreement” 1 Journal of 
International Economic Law, (1998) p. 679
Dutheil de la Rochere, J. “L’ere des competences partagees. A propos de 1’etendue des 
competences exterieures de la Communaute europeenne”, (1995) 390 RMUE 461
Editorial Comments, ‘The Aftermath of Opinion 1/94 or how to ensure Unity of 
Representation for Joint Competencies”, Common Market Law Review, 32, 1995, pp. 
385-390.
Eeckhout, P. ‘The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreeement: Interconnecting 
Legal Systems”, 34 CML Rev. (1997)
European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Union 1994
Flaesch-Mougin, C. “Le Traite de Maastricht et les Competences Extemes de la 
Communaute Europeenne: a la Recherche d’une Politique Exteme de l’Union”, Cahiers 
de Droit Europeen 1993, Nos. 3-4, pp. 351-98
225
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Arcas
Gasparon, P. ‘The Transposition of the Principle of Member State Liability into the 
Context of External Relations” 10 European Journal o f International Law (1999) p. 605
Goebel, R. ‘The European Community and Eatem Europe: Deepening and Widening the 
Community Brand of Economic Federalism”, 1 New Eur. L.Rev. 163, 1993
Greilsammer, 2 Jerusalem Journal o f International Relations 141 (1976)
Groux, J. "Le parallelism des competences internes et extemes de la Communaute 
economique europeenne" (1978), Cahiers de droit europeenne, pp. 3-32
Hartley, T.C. “International Agreements and the Community Legal System: Some Recent 
Developments,” 8 ELR (1983) 383
Heliskoski, J. “Joint Competence of the European Community and its Member States and 
Dispute Settlement Practice of the World Trade Organization”, The Cambridge 
Yearbook o f European Legal Studies, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 61-85.
Heliskoski, J. "The Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to Give Preliminary 
Rulings on the Interpretation of Mixed Agreements", Nordic Journal o f International 
Law, Vol. 69, No. 4, 2000, pp. 395-412.
Hilf, M. ‘The ECJ’s Opinion on the WTO -No Surprise, but Wise?”, (1995) 6 EJIL 245
Hill, C., ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International 
Role” (1993) 31 JCMS, 305-28
Joerges, C. & Neyer, J. "From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political 
Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology", European Law Journal, Vol. 3, 
No. 3, Sept 1997, pp. 273-99
Kolliker, A. & Milner, F. “How to make use of closer co-operation? The Amsterdam 
Clauses and the Dynamics of European Integration”, Working Paper, Forward Studies 
Unit, European Commission, 2000
Kuijper, P. J. ‘The Conclusion and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results by the 
European Community” (1995) 6 EJIL 222
Lamy, P. ‘Trade is changing -so must Europe” 
<<http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/speeches articles/spla41 en.htm »
MacCormick, N. “Beyond the Sovereign State”, The Modem Law Review, Vol. 56, No. 
1, January 1993, pp. 1-18
226
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Areas
Marquardt, S. ‘The European Union’s Capacity for Action. Article 24 of the Treaty on 
European Union: are agreements which are negotiated and concluded on this legal basis, 
so done on behalf of the European Union?,” Speaking Note for Mr. Piris for COREPER 
II on February 23, 2000, SN1628/00.
Maunu, A. ‘The Implied External Competence of the European Community After the 
ECJ Opinion 1/94 -Towards Coherence or Diversity?” (1995) 2 L IE I115
Mavroidis, P. “Lexcalibur: The House that Joe Built”, Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, Vol. 38, 2000, Number 3, pp.669-677
Messen, K. ‘The Application of Rules of Public International Law within Community 
Law” 13 CML Rev. (1976) 485
Mestmacker, E.-J. “Wirtschaftsrecht”, 54 RabelsZ (1990) 409
Meunier, S. "Talking with a Single Voice: European Integration and EC-US Trade 
Negotiations", paper prepared for delivery at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, The Sheraton Washington Hotel, August, 28-31,1997
Morawiecki, W. “Actors and Interests in the Process of Negotiations between the CMEA 
and the EEC,” 1989/2, Legal Issues of European Integration, pp. 1-38
Monar, J. ‘The European Union’s Foreign Affairs System after the Treaty of 
Amsterdam: A “Strengthened Capacity for External Action”?”, 2 European Foreign 
Affairs Review 1997, pp. 413-436
Neuwahl, “Joint Participation in International Treaties and the Exercise of Powers by the 
EEC and its Member States: Mixed Agreements”, Common Market Law Review, 28, 
1991, pp. 717-740
Neuwahl, “Shared Powers or Combined Imcompetence? More on Mixity”, Common 
Market Law Review, 33, 1996, pp. 667-687
O'Keeffe, D. “Community and Member State Competence in External Relations 
Agreements of the EU”, European Foreign Affairs Review 4, 1999, pp. 7-36
Paasivirta, ‘The European Union: From an Aggregate of States to a Legal Person?,” 2 
Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium, 1997, pp. 37-59.
Paemen, H. ‘The European Union in International Affairs: Recent Developments”, 
Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 22, 1999, pp. 136-48
227
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Arcas
Peraldi-Leneuf, F. “La reforme de la politique commerciale par le Traite de Nice (Article 
133): un difficil negoce” in Gazette du Palais, Gazette Europeenne [Special], N. 28,
2001, pp. 20-26.
Pescatore, P. “Die Rechtsprechung des Europaischen Gerichtshofs zur 
innergemeinschaftlichen Wirkung Volkerrechtlicher Abkommen" in Volkerrecht als 
Rechtsordnung, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte-Festschrift Mosler 
(Springer, Berlin, 1986), 661-89.
Pescatore, P. “External Relations in the Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities”, Common Market Law Review, 16, 1979, pp. 615-645.
Pescatore, P. “Opinion 1/94 on “Conclusion” of the WTO Agreement: is there an Escape 
from a programmed Disaster?”, Common Market Law Review 36, 1999, pp. 387-405
Petersmann, E.-U. “Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities”, Common Market Law Review 20, 1983, pp. 397-437.
Piris, J.-C. “Does the European Union have a Constitution? Does it need one?,” Lecture 
given by Jean-Claude Piris, Legal Adviser of the Council of the European Union, on 3rd 
May 1999.
Piris, J.-C. “La Capacite de l’Union Europeenne de s’engager et d’agir en Matiere de 
Relations Economiques Exterieures: l’example de l’OMC”, Florence, Academy of 
European Law, Coference given by Jean-Claude Piris, Jurisconsult of the Council of the 
European Union, on the 15th July 1998
Piris, J.-C. & Torrent, R. “Les problemes juridiques posees a la Communaute europeenne 
par la conclusion des accords de Marrakech” in Societe Fransaise de Droit International, 
Colloque de Nice -La reorganisation mondiale des echanges (problemes juridiques) 
(Pedone, Paris, 1996)
Rama-Montaldo, M. “International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International 
Organizations”, The BritishYearbook o f International Law, 44,1970, pp. 111-155
Richardson, K. “Speak with one voice in trade negotiations” Letters to the Editors, 
Financial Times, 17 March 1997
Rosas, A. “Book Review” of J.H.J. Bourgeoois, J.-L. Dewost and M.-A. Gaiffe (eds.) La 
Communaute europeenne et les accords mixtes. Quelles perspectives? (Presses 




Rosas, A. “The External Relations of the European Union: Problems and Challenges” in 
The Forum for US-EU Legal-Economic Affairs, The Mentor Group, 1998, pp.59-71
Sack, J. ‘The European Community’s Membership of International Organisations”, 
Common Market Law Review, 32, 1995, pp. 1227-1256
Schermers, “Community Law and International Law” 12 CMLRev (1975), 77
Simmonds, K. R. ‘The Communities Declaration Upon Signature of the UN Convention 
of the Law of the Sea” (1986) 23 CMLRev, 521-44
Smis, S. & Van der Borght, K. ‘The EU -US Compromise on the Helms-Burton and 
D’Amato Acts”, (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law, 227-236
Smis, S. & Van der Borght, K. ‘The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) 
Act of 1996, Some Aspects from the Perspective of International Economic Law”, Revue 
Beige de Droit International 1998/1, pp. 217-258
Sterm, B. “Vers la mondialisation juridique? Les lois Helms-Burton et D’Amato- 
Kennedy”, Revue Generale de Droit International Public, 1996, pp. 979-1003
Tizzano, A. “La Personality Internationale de l’Union Europeenne”, Revue du Marche 
Unique Europeen, 4/1998, pp. 11-40
Torrent, R. “Whom is the European Central Bank the Central Bank of?: Reaction to 
Zilioni and Selmayr”, Common Market Law Review 36, 1999, 1229-41
Turner, C. “Arret Hermes” Revue du Marche Unique Europeen (1998), p. 241
Van Raepenbusch, S. “L’Emergence de l’Union Europeenne dans l’Ordre Juridique 
International” Etudes de Droit Europeen et International, Melanges en Hommage a 
Michel Waelbroeck, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1999.
Verloren van Themaat, P. ‘The Impact of the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities on the World Economic Order,” Festschrift Eric Stein 82 Mich. 
L. Rev. (1984), 1423
Weiler, J. “Pride and Prejudice-Parliament c. Council”, 14 EL Rev. (1989) 334
Weiler, J. H. H. ‘The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism”, 
Yearbook of European Law, 1981, pp. 267-280
229
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Arcas
Weiler, J. H. H., ‘The Evolution of Mechanisms and Institutions for a European Foreign 
Policy. Reflections on the Interaction of Law and Politics”, European University Institute 
Research Paper No. 85/202, 1992
Wellenstein, E. ‘Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations”, 
Common Market Law Review 16, 1979, pp. 407-423
Wessel, R. ‘The International Legal Status of the European Union”, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 2, 1997, pp. 109-129
Wessel, R. “Revisiting the International Legal Status of the European Union,” European 
Foreign Affairs Review, 5, 2000, pp. 507-537.
Wils, W. ‘The Search for the Rule in Article 30 EEC: much to do about nothing?”, 1993, 
18 European Law Review, p. 475-
Woolcock, S. ‘The European Union as an International Actor in Commercial Policy”, 
(Unpublished Article)
Woolcock, S. ‘The European Union’s Role in International Commercial Diplomacy”, 
(Unpublished Article)
SECONDARY SOURCES. BOOKS
Academie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours, Tome 103, A. W. Sijthoff, 1962
Albert, M. Capitalism against Capitalism, Whurr Publishers Ltd, 1993
Allen, J. J., The European Common Market and the GATT, The University Press of 
Washington, D. C., 1960
Alter, K. J. Establishing the Supremacy o f European Law. The Making o f an 
International Rule o f Law in Europe, Oxford University Press, 2001
Andenas, M. & Turk, A. (eds.) Delegated Legislation and the Role o f Committees in the 
EC, Kluwer Law International, 2000
Armstrong, D., Lloyd, L. & Redmond, J. From Versailles to Maastricht. International 
Organization in the Twentieth Century, Macmillan, 1996
Arrow, K. The Limits o f Organization, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1974
230
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Areas
Bajwa, S. & Jason-Lloyd, L. The Legal Framework o f the European Union, Frank Cass, 
1997
Bainbridge, T. & Teasdale, A. ThePenguin Companion to European Union, Penguin 
Books, 1996
Barnes, I. & Barnes, P. The Enlarged European Union, Longman, 1995
Bauwens, W., Clesse, A. & Knudsen, O. F. (eds.) Small States and the Security
Challange in the New Europe, Brassey's, 1996
Beaumont, P. & Weatherill, S. EC Law. The Essential Guide to the Legal Workings o f
the European Community, Penguin Books, 1995
Bekemans, L. & Tsoukalis, L. (eds.) Europe and Global Economic Interdependence, 
College of Europe and European University Press, 1993
Bellamy, R & Castiglione, D. (eds.) Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and 
Theoretical Perspectives, Blackwell, 1996
Bermann, G., Herdegen, M. & Lindseth, P. (eds.) Transatlantic Regulatory 
Cooperation. Legal Problems and Political Prospects, Oxford University Press, 2000
Blokker, N., Brus, M. & Heukels, T. (eds.) The European Union after Amsterdam: A 
Legal Analysis, Kluwer Law International, 1998
Bomberg, E. & Peterson, J. Decision-Making in the European Union, Macmillan Press, 
LTD, 1999
Bonete Perales, R. & Mugnoz de Bustillo Llorente, R. lntroduccion a la Union Europea. 
Un analisis desde la Economia, Alianza, 1997
Bourgeois, J., Dewost, J. & Gaiffe, M. La Communaute europeenne et les accords 
mixtes, Quelles perspectives?, Presses Interuniversitaires Europeennes, 1997
Bourgeois, J. H. J. et al.(eds.) The Uruguay Round Results. A European Lawyers’ 
Perspective, European University Press, 1995




Bridge, J. W. & Lasok, D. Law & Institutions o f the European Communities, 
Butterworths, 1987
Bridge, J. W. & Lasok, D. Law & Institutions o f the European Union, Butterworths, 
1994
Bronckers, M. C. E. J. A Cross-Section o f WTO Law, Cameron May, 2000
Brown, L. & Kennedy, T. The Court of Justice o f the European Communities, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1994
Brownlie, I. Principles of Public International Law, Clarendon Press, 1990
Budge, I., Newton, K. et al. The Politics of the New Europe, Longman, 1997
Caello, P. Rethinking Europe's Future, Princeton University Press, 2001
Cafuny, A. & Peters, P. The Union and the World: The Political Economy of a Common 
European Foreign Policy, Kluwer Law International, 1998
Capotorti, F., Ehlermann, E.-D., Frowein, J., Jacobs, F., Joliet, R., Koopmans, T. & 
Kovar, R. (eds.) Du droit international au droit de Tintegration, Nomo 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987
Carlsnaes, W. & Smith, S. (eds.), European Foreign Policy. The European Community 
and Changing Perspectives in Europe, SAGE Publications, 1994
Castanos de Medicis, S. Principes et Problemes de Relations Internationales 
Europeennes, Editions A. Pedone, 1965
Cerexhe, E. Le Droit Euopeen: Les Objectifs et les Institutions, Nauwelaerts, 1989
Chalmers, D. & Szyszczak, E. European Union Law. Volume II. Towards a European 
Polity ?, Dartmouth, 1998
Chalmers, D. European Union Law. Volume I. Law and EU Government, Dartmouth, 
1998
Church, C. & Phinnemore, D. European Union and European Community: A Handbook 




Cini, M. The European Commission. Leadership, Organization and Culture in the EU 
Administration, Manchester University Press, 1996
Commission of the EC (ed.) Thirty Years o f Community Law (OOPEC, Luxembourg, 
1981)
Conze, A. Die voelkerrechtliche Haftung der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft, Nomos, 
1987
Cook, C. & Paxton, J. European Political Facts, 1900-1996, St. Martin's Press, 1998
Correa, C.M. & Yusuf, A. A. Intellectual Property and International Trade, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1998
Council of the European Communities, European Communities Glossary French- 
English, Office des publications des Communautes Europeennes, 1990
Craig, P. & de Burca, G. EC Law. Texts, Cases & Materials, Clarendon Press, 1998
Craig, P. & de Burca, G. (eds.) The Evolution ofEU Law, Oxford University Press, 1999
Craig, P. & Harlow, C. (eds.) Lawmaking in the European Union, Kluwer Law 
International, 1998
Curtin, D., van Empel, M., Volker, E. & Winter, J., Leading Cases on the Law of the 
European Communities, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1994
Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2000
de Cara, J. Y. & Duffy, P. European Union. The Lawyers’ Guide, Longman, 1992
Deckmyn, V. & Thomson, I. (eds.) Openness and Transparency in the European Union, 
European Institute of Public Administration, 1998
de Fouloy, C. Glossary of EC Terms and Acronyms, Butterworths, 1992
Dehousse (ed), Europe After Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union? (1994, Law Books in 
Europe, Munich)
Dehousse, R. The European Court of Justice, Macmillan Press LTD, 1998 
De la Fuente, F. Diccionario Juridico de la Union Europea, PPU, 1994
233
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Areas
Demaret, P. Relations exterieures de la Communaute europeenne et marche interieur: 
aspects juridiques et fonctionnels, Story-Scientia, 1988
Dent, C. The European Economy. The Global Context, Routledge, 1997
Descheemaekere, F. L'Union Europeenne: Les Grands Defis, Les Editions 
d'Organisation, 1995
Deutsch, K. et al. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton 
University Press, 1957
Dolmans, M.J.F.M. Problems o f Mixed Agreements: Division o f Powers Within the EEC 
and the Right o f Third States, Asser Insstituut, 1985
Dony, M. (ed.) L ’Union Europeenne et le Monde Apres Amsterdam, Edition de 
l’Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1999
Drost, H. What’s what and Who’s who in Europe, Cassell, 1995
Duff, A. The Treaty of Amsterdam. Text and Commentary, Sweet and Maxwell, 1997
Duignan, P. & Gann, L. H. Contemporary Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. A Political 
History, Blackwell Publishers LTD, 1998
Dunleavy, P. Democracy, Bureacracy and Public Choice. Economic Explanations and 
Political Science, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991
Eeckhout, P. The European Internal Market and International Trade: a Legal Analysis, 
Clarendon Press Oxford, 1994
El-Agraa, A. Economic Integration Worldwide, Macmillan Press LTD, 1997
El-Agraa, A. The Economics of the European Community, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994
Emiliou, N. & OTCeeffee, D. The European Union and World Trade Law. After the 
GATT Uruguay Round, Wiley, 1996





Evans, A. The Integration of the European Community and Third States in Europe: A 
Legal Analysis, Clarendon Press, 1996
Evans, A. The Law of the European Community, Including the EEA Agreement, Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers, 1994
Evans, P., Jacobson, H. & Putnam, R. (eds.) Double-Edged Diplomacy, International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics, University of California Press, 1993
Farrell, M. EU and WTO Regulatory Frameworks: Complentarity or Competition?, 
Kogan Page, 1999
Fawcett, L. & Hurrell, A. (eds.) Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization 
and International Order, Oxford University Press, 1995
Featherstone, K. & Ginsberg, R. The United States and the European Union in the 
1990s. Partners in Transition, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996
Feld, W. The European Common Market and the World, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967
Feld, W. The European Community in World Affairs. Economic Power and Political 
Influence, Alfred Publishing Co., Inc., 1976
Feltham, R. G. Diplomatic Handbook, Longman, 1993
Flaesch-Mougin, C. Les Accords Extemes de la CEE. Essai d ’une Typologie, Editions 
de l’Universite de Bruxelles, 1980
Forschungsinstitut fur Wirtschaftsvefassung und Wettbewerb e.V. (ed.), 
Weiterentwicklung der Europaischen Gemeinschaften und der Marktwirtschaft, 1992
Foster, N. EC Legislation, Blackstone Press Limited, 1998
Frellesen, T., Jones, E. & Ludlow, P. EC-US Relations. Priorities for the Next Four 
Years, Center for European Policy Studies, 1993
Frid, R. The Relations between the EC and International Organizations. Legal Theory 
and Practice, Kluwer Law Inemational, 1995




Geiger, T. & Kennedy, D. Regional Trade Blocs, Multilateralism and the GATT: 
Complementary Paths to Free Trade?, Biddles, 1996
Gifis, S. H. Dictionary of Legal Terms. A simplified Guide to the Language o f Law, 
Barron's, 1998
Gilpin, R. The Transformation o f the International Political Economy, Jean Monnet 
Chair Papers, 1991
Gijlstra, D. J. et al. (eds.), Leading Cases and Materials on the Law o f the European 
Communities, Kluwer, 1977
Glockler, G., Junius, L., Scappucci, G., Usherwood, S. & Vassallo, J. Guide to EU 
Policies, Blackstone Press Limited, 1998
Goldin, I., Knudsen, O. & van der Mensbrugghe, D. Trade Liberalisation: Global 
Economic Implications, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
1993
Goldstein, J. & Keohane, R. (eds.) Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions and 
Political Change, Cornell University Press, 1993
Green Cowles, M. & Smith, M. (eds.) The State o f the European Union. Risks, Reform, 
Resistance and Revival, Vol 5.0xford University Press, 2000
Grilli, E. R. The European Community and the Developing Countries, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993
Groeben, Thiesing, Ehlerman (eds.) Kommentar zum EU/EG Vertrag, 5th edn., vol. 4 
(Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997)
Groom, A. & Light, M. (eds.) Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to 
Theory, Pinter, 1994
Groux & Manin, The European Communities in the International Order, Commission of 
the European Communities, 1995
Haas, The Uniting o f Europe, political, social and economic forces 1950-1957 (1958, 
Stevens)
Habermas, J. Faktizitat und Geltung, Frankfurt am Main, 1992
236
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Arcas
Hartley, T. C. The Foundations of European Community Law. An Introduction to the 
Constitutional and Administrative Law of the European Community, Oxford University 
Press, 1998
Hay, P. Federalism and Supranational Organizations, University of Illinois Press, 1966
Hayes, J. P. Making Trade Policy in the European Community, MacMillan, 1993
Heap, S. H., Hollis, M., Lyons, B., Sugden, R. & Weale, A. The Theory o f Choice. A 
Critical Guide, Blackwell, 1998
Heidensohn, K. Europe and World Trade, Pinter, 1995
Heliskoski, J. Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International 
Relations of the European Community and its Member States, Kluwer Law 
International, 2001
Henig, S. External Relations o f the European Community. Associations and Trade 
Agreements, Chatham House: PEP, 1971
Herman, A.H. & Jones, C. Fair Trading in Europe, Kluwer-Harrap Handbooks, 1977
Hilf, M., Jacobs, F. G. & Petersmann, E. (eds.) The European Community and GATT, 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1986
Hilf, M. & Petersmann, E.U. (eds.) National Constitutions and International Economic 
Law (Kluwer, Deventer, 1993)
Hill, C. (ed.) The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy, Routledge, 1996
Hitiris, T. European Community Economics, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991
Hocking, B. & Smith, M. Beyond Foreign Economic Policy. The United States, the 
Single European Market and the Changing World Economy, Pinter, 1997
Hoekman, B. & Kostecki, M. The Political Economy of the World Trading System, 
Oxford University Press, 1995
Hosli, M. O. & Saether, A. (eds.) Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions. 
Experiences, Challenges and Constraints, Tacis, 1997
Iglesias Cabrero, M. Fundamentos de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, Colex, 1989
237
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Areas
Jackson, J. & Sykes, A. Implementing the Uruguay Round, Clarendon Press Oxford,
1997
Jackson, J. The World Trading System. Law and Policy of International Economic 
Relations, The MIT Press, 1997
Jackson, J., Davey, W. & Sykes, A. Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations. Cases, Materials and Text on the National and International Regulation of 
Transnational Economic Relations, West Publishing, 1995
Jacobs, F.G. & Roberts, S. (eds.) The Effects o f Treaties in Domestic Law, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1987
Jacot-Guillarmod, O. Droit Communautaire et Droit International Public (Georg, 
Librairie de L’University, Geneve, 1979)
Jennings, R.Y. & Watts, A. (eds) Oppenheim's International Law, 9th edn, Harlow, 
Longman, 1992
Johnson, M. 113. European Co-operation in Action, 1998
Kaddous, C. Le droit des relations exterieures dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de 
justice des Communautes europeenes (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Bale, 1998)
Kaempfer, W. H., Markusen, J. R., Maskus, K. E. & Melvin, J. R. International Trade. 
Theory and Evidence, McGraw-Hill, 1995
Kaniel, M. The Exclusive Treaty-Making Power o f the European Community up to the 
Period o f the Single European Act, Kluwer, 1996
Kapteyn, P. J. G. & VerLoren van Themaat, P. Introduction to the Law o f the European 
Communities. From Maastricht to Amsterdam, Kluwer Law International, 1998
Kegley, C. W. & Wittkopf, E. R. World Politics. Trends and Transformation, St 
Martin’s Press, 1997
Kennedy, T. Learning European Law. A Primer and Vade-mecum, Sweet & Maxell,
1998
Kent, P. Law of the European Union, Financial Times Pitman Publishing, 1996




Koutrakos, P. Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law. The Legal 
Regulation of Sanctions, Exports of Dual-Use Goods and Armaments, Hart Publishing, 
2001
Lanjouw, G. J. International Trade Institutions, Longman, 1995
Lasok, D. The Trade and the Customs Law of the European Union, Kluwer Law 
International, 1998
Lasok, K.P.E. The European Court of Justice. Practice and Procedure, 2nd edn. 
Butterworths, London, 1994
Latter, R. A New-Transatlantic Bargain, London: HMSO, 1993
Latter, R. The Future of Transatlantic Relations, London: HMSO, 1993
Le Heron, R. Globalized Agriculture. Political Choice, Pergamon Press, 1993
Lopes, G. (ed.) Las Relaciones Exteriores de la Comunidad Europea, Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 1993
Louis, J.-V. L ’Ordre Juridique Communautaire, Office des Publications Officielles des 
Communautes Europeennes, 1993
Ludlow, P. Mortensen, J. & Pelkmans, J. (eds.) The Annual Review of European 
Comunity Affairs 1991, Centre for European Policy Studies, 1992
Lundestad, G. “Empire ” by Integration. The United States and European Integration, 
1945-1997, Oxford University Press, 1998
MacLean, R. & Volpi, B. EU Trade Barrier Regulation. Tackling Unfair Foreign Trade 
Practices, Palladian Law Publishing Ltd., 2000
Macleod, I., Hendry, I. & Hyett, S. The External Relations o f the European 
Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996
Malosse, H. Europa a su alcance, Fundacion Galicia-Europa, 1996
Maresceau, M. The European Community's Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal 
Dimension, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993
239
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Arcas
Markusen, J., Melvin, J., Kaempfer, W., & Maskus, K. International Trade. Theory and 
Evidence, McGraw-Hill, 1995
Martin, E. A. (ed.) A Concise Dictionary o f Law, Oxford University Press, 1990
Martin, L. Democratic Commitments. Legislatures and International Cooperation, 
Pricenton University Press, 2000
Martin Martinez, M. National Sovereignty and International Organizations, Kluwer 
Law International, 1996
Mathijsen, P. S. R. F. A Guide to European Community Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 1990
McGoldrick, D., International Relations Law of the European Union, Longman, 1997
McLean, I. (ed.) The Concise Oxford Dictionary o f Politics, Oxford University Press, 
1996
Mestmacker, E.-J. Die unsichtbare Hand des Rechts (1978)
Miall, H. (ed.) Redefining Europe. New Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1994
Middlemas, K. Orchestrating Europe. The Informal Politics o f European Union 1973- 
1995, Fontana Press, 1995
Missiroli, A. (ed.) Flexibility and enhanced co-operation in European security matters: 
assets or liabilities?, The Institute for Security Studies, WEU Occasional Paper No. 6, 
1999
Mittelman, J. H. (ed.) Globalization: Critical Reflections, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1996
Molina del Pozo, C. El Derecho Comunitario Europeo, Salvat, 1987
Molina del Pozo, C. Las Instituciones de las Communidades Europeas, Salvat, 1987
Molyneux, C. Domestic Structures and International Trade. The Unfair Trade 
Instruments o f the United States and the European Union, Hart Publishing, 2001
Monar, J., Neuwahl, N., O'Keeffe, D. & Robinson, W. (eds.) Butterworths Expert Guide 
to the European Union, Butterworths, 1996
240
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Areas
Moran, F. Carta abierta a un Joven sobre la Europa que viene, Ediciones Peninsula, 
1996
Moravcsick, A. (ed.) Centralization or Fragmentation? Europe Facing the Challenges 
of Deepening, Diversity and Democracy, The Council on Foreign Relations, 1998
Nelsen, B & Stubb, A. (eds.) The European Union. Readings on the Theory and 
Practice o f European Integration, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998
Neuwahl, N. A. Mixed Agreements: Analysis o f the Phenomenon and their Legal 
Significance, European University Institute, Law Department, 1988
Nicoll, W. & Salmon, T. Building European Union. A Documentary History and 
Analysis, Manchester University Press, 1997
Nicoll, W. & Salmon, T. Understanding the New European Community, Prentice 
Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994
Noble, A. From Rome to Maastricht. The Essential Guide to the European Union, 
Warner Books, 1996
Nugent, N. The Government and Politics o f the European Union, Macmillan Press LTD, 
1999
O’Keeffe & Schermers (eds.) Essays on European Law and Integration, Kluwer, 1982
O'Keefe, D. & Bavasso, A. (eds.) Judicial Review in European Union Law: Liber 
Amicorum in Honour o f Lord Slynn o f Hadley, Vol. 1, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, 2000
O'Keeffe, D. & Schermers, H. Mixed Agreements, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
1983
O’Keeffe, D. & Twomey, P. (eds.) Legal Issues o f the Maastricht Treaty, Chichester, 
Wiley Chancery, 1994
Ontiveros, E. & Valero, F. La Guia del Euro. Todas las Respuestas sobre la Moneda 
Unica, Escuela de Finanzas Aplicadas, 1997
Oreja Aguirre, M. Europa Magnana. Reflexiones sobre la construccion europea, Oficina 
de Publicaciones Oficiales de las Comunidades Europeas, 1996
Oxley, A. The challenge o f Free Trade, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990
241
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Arcas
Paemen, H. & Bensch, A. From the GATT to the WTO. The European Community in the 
Uruguay Round, Leuven University Press, 1995
Peterson, J. Europe and America. The Porspects for Partnership, Routledge, 1996
Peterson, J & Sjursen, H. A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of 
the CFSP, Routledge, 1998
Piening, C. Global Europe. The European Union in World Affairs, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1997
Pijpers, A. et al. (eds.) European Political Co-operation in the 1980s: A Common 
Foreign Policy for Western Europe?, 1988
Poaires Maduro, M. We, the Court. The European Court o f Justice & The European 
Economic Constitution, Hart Publishing, 1998
Quintas, J. La Integracion Economica Europea, Salvat, 1987
Qureshi, A. The World Trade Organization. Implementing International Trade Norms, 
Manchester University Press, 1996
Rhodes, C. (ed.) The European Union in the World Community, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1998
Rhodes, C. & Mazey, S. (eds.) The State of the European Union. Vol. 3. Building a 
European Polity? Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1995
Richardson, J. European Union: Power and Policy-making, Reutledge, 1996
Roberts, J. M. A History of Europe, Helicon Publishing Ltd, 1996
Rometsch, D. & Wessels, W. (eds.) The European Union and member states. Towards 
institutional fusion?, Manchester University Press, 1996
Roney, A. EC/EU Fact Book. A Complete Question and Answer Guide, Kogan Page, 
1996
Rutley, P. MacVay, I. & George, C. (eds.) The WTO and International Trade 
Regulation, Cameron May, 1998
242
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Areas
Saint-Ouen, F. L'Europe en bref. Les Grands Courants Politiques, Centre Europeen de 
la Culture, 1996
Salmon, T. & Nicoll, W. (eds.) Building European Union, Manchester University Press, 
1997
Sandholtz, W. & Sweet, A. (eds.) European Integration and Supranational Governance, 
Oxford University Press, 1998
Schermers, H. G. International Institutional Law, Vol. 1, Sijthoff, 1972
Schermers, H. G., van Empel, M., Volker, E. L. M. & Winter, J. A. (eds.) Leading Cases 
on the Law of the European Communities, Kluwer, 1990
Schermers & Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Communities, 5th edn., 
Kluwer, Deventer, Boston, 1992
Shonfield, A. Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination, Allen Lane, 1972
Smith, M. & Woolcock, S. The United States and the European Community in a 
Transformed World, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993
Snape, R. H. Issues in World Trade Policy. GATT at the Crossroads, MacMillan, 1986
Stingelin, P. The European Community and the Outsiders, Longman Canada Limited, 
1973
Story, J. (ed.) The New Europe. Politics, Government and Economy since 1945, 
Blackwell, 1993
Stubbs, R. & Underhill, R. D. (eds.) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, 
MacMillan, 1994
Taylor, P. International Organization in the Modem World. The Regional and the 
Global Process, Pinter, 1993
Taylor, P. The European Union in the 1990s. Oxford University Press, 1996
Thatcher, M. Statecraft. Strategies for a Changing World, Harper Collins Publishers, 
2002
Thomsen, S. & Woolcock, S. Direct Investment and European Integration. Competition 
among Firms and Governments, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993
243
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Areas
Timmermans, C. & Volker, E. (eds.) Division of Powers between the European 
Communities and their Member States in the Field o f External Relations, Kluwer, 1981
Torrent, R. Droit et Pratique des Relations Economiques Exterieures dans VUnion 
Europeenne, http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html. 1998
Tsoukalis, L. The New European Economy Revisted, Oxford University Press, 1997
Urwin, D. W. A Dictionary o f European History & Politics 1945-1995, Longman, 1996
Urwin, D. W. The Community of Europe, A History o f European Integration since 1945, 
Longman, 1991
Usher, J. European Community Institutions and Legislation, Longman, 1998
Usher, J. General Principles o f European Community Law, Longman, 1998
Usher, J. A. (ed.) The State o f the European Union. Structure, Enlargment and 
Economic Union, Pearson Education, 2000
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report, 
1997, United Nations, 1997
Vacher's, European Companion, Vacher's Publications, 1997
Van Raepenbusch, S. Droit institutionnel de VUnion et des Communautes europeennes, 
3e edition, 2001.
Vincenzi, C. Law of the European Community, Financial Times Pitman Publishing, 1999
Vogel, D. Barriers or Benenfits? Regulation in Transatlantic Trade, Brookings 
Institution Press, 1997
Volker, E. L. M. Barriers to External and Internal Community Trade, Kluwer, 1993
Volker, E. L. M., (ed.) Protectionism and the European Community, Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, 1987




Wallace, H. & Wallace, W. (eds.) Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th Edition, 
Oxford University Press, 2000
Wallace, W. (ed.) The Dynamics o f European Integration, The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1990
Wallace, W. The Transformation o f Western Europe, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1990
Weatherill, S. Law and Integration in the European Union, Oxford University Press,
1995
Weidenfeld, W. America and Europe: Is the Break Inevitable? Bertelsmann Foundation 
Publishers, 1996
Weiler, J. H. H. The Constitution o f Europe. "Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?" 
and Other Essays on European Integration, Cambridge University Press, 1999
Weiler, J.H.H. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law of 
International Trade?, Oxford University Press, 2000
Westlake, M. The Council o f the European Union, Cartermill, 1995
White, N. The Law of International Organisations, Manchester University Press, 1996
Whitman, R. From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity o f the 
European Union, MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998
Winter, J., Curtin, D., Kellermann, A. & de Witte, B. (eds.) Reforming the Treaty on 
European Union. The Legal Debate, Kluwer Law International, 1996
Woods, N. Explaining International Relations since 1945, Oxford University Press,
1996
Woolcock, S. Market Access Issues in EC-US Relations. Trading Partners or Trading 
Blows?, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991
Worlledge, H. Guide to the European Commission, European Information Association, 
1996
Zapf, W. (de.), Die Modemisierung modemer Gesellschaften. Verhandlungen des 25. 
Deutschen Soziologentages in Frankfurt am Main 1990 (1991)
245
Bibliography Rafael Leal-Areas
Zielonka, J. Explaining Euro-Paralysis. Why Europe is Unable to Act in International 
Politics, MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998
Zielonka, J. (ed.) Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, Kluwer Law International, 
1998




The graphs which appear in this annex have been taken from the book European 
Commission, Participation des Communautes Europeennes aux Accords 
Multilareaux, Direction General I A, 1997, Graphiques.
246
